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TASS Reports Perfilyev 27 Dec News Briefing

Romanian Situation

LD2712163889 Moscow TASS in English 1631 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today about the safe arrival to the homeland of the Soviet citizens evacuated from Romania. He said there were no casualties in the Soviet colony during the recent developments in Romania, noting that two persons from the trade mission were lightly injured and the necessary medical aid given to them.

Perfilyev said that the USSR did not have plans to cut the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Romania. He recalled the congratulatory message by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev to the new Romanian leadership, which said that new and broad vistas are being opened now for developing and strengthening Soviet-Romanian cooperation in the interests of the two peoples, lasting peace and stability in Europe.

Commenting on the question put by one of the journalists concerning the possibilities for the Communist Party of Romania to play a considerable role in the life of the country in future, Perfilyev noted that "regrettably, some notions such as socialism, the Communist Party, its leadership and the top leader have long since appeared to be associated with the people who in actual fact were not the carriers of those notions' content". "Therefore, the slogans which can appear there in this connection, in actual fact are a concentrated denunciation of former methods and deformations typical of the country in recent past", he stressed.

Answering the question on the supposed involvement of Palestinians in the recent events in Romania, Perfilyev said that the Soviet side "did not have any information on such an involvement". Moreover, he stressed, "Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Executive Committe, in a talk with ambassadors from socialist countries, categorically rejected such fabrications. Palestinian representatives report that only Palestinian students, diplomatic staff and persons sent there for treatment are staying in Romania".

Concern at U.S. Buildup in Panama

LD2712160689 Moscow TASS in English 1547 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—Vadim Perfilyev, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, expressed at a briefing here today profound concern on behalf of the Soviet Union over U.S. military buildup in Panama. The fulfilment of the demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops is an indispensable condition for the restoration of peace and tranquility in that country, he pointed out.

Dmitriy Titov, a senior executive of the Department of International Organizations of the Soviet Foreign Ministry who took part in the briefing, spoke about the blockade by U.S. troops of the Cuban Embassy and the residency of the Cuban ambassador to Panama. He described this step as an act of violence.

He told journalists that on December 26 Cuba had requested the U.N. Security Council to discuss the illegal U.S. step, recalling that, apart from staff members, there are 29 women and 19 children in the Cuban Embassy. Titov expressed satisfaction over "Cuba's reasonable and responsible stand on this issue, over its desire to look for ways to resolve the problem by political means, using the possibilities offered by the U.N. Charter".

"It is obvious that the illegal actions against the Cuban Embassy in Panama should be immediately stopped", the Soviet diplomat said. U.S. actions "run counter to the basic standards of international law with regard to diplomatic missions, which are strictly observed in interstate relations". "Naturally, this step cannot be justified from the political, legal or moral point of view". Titov recalled that in the past similar actions taken against American diplomatic missions had invariably been strongly condemned by Washington. "Of course, such double standards are impermissible in international relations", he said.

Israeli Actions in Lebanon

LD2712164789 Moscow TASS in English 1642 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—The Soviet Union resolutely condemns Tel Aviv's actions in Lebanon as aggressive and provocative, Soviet Foreign Minister Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

Commenting on the latest Israeli raid inside Lebanese territory, Perfilyev said that Israel again demonstrated its disregard for universal international legal standards.

Israeli Commandos fired at civilian facilities. There are casualties in killed and wounded, he said.

Israeli interference destabilises the fragile situation in Lebanon and threatens to undermine the peace process started by the al-Ta'if Agreement, Perfilyev pointed out.

Israel should immediately comply with the corresponding U.N. Security Council decisions and end its occupation of south Lebanese lands.

"Israel's interference in Lebanon is one of the prime causes of the Lebanese crisis," Perfilyev stated.

Replying to journalists' questions, the spokesman said that the USSR stands for the adoption of necessary international efforts to end bloodshed and foreign interference and Israeli aggression against Lebanon and its neighbours.

Today, when new political thinking is gaining momentum in international relations, measures that will make it possible to resolve the Middle East problem at the negotiating table must be adopted.

Bombardment of Kabul

LD2712160289 Moscow TASS in English 1536 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—The barbarous bombardments of the Afghan capital by the armed opposition spark our indignation and at the same time sincere sympathy for the residents of Kabul, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Center today.

These senseless actions continue to be widely supported by the United States and Pakistan, signatories to the Geneva Agreements.

The Afghan armed opposition amassed over 2,000 missiles near Kabul to bombard its residential areas. On Tuesday, rebels fired 38 missiles at Kabul, hitting apartment houses, the grounds of a hospital, the airport and other crowded places. Six children and five women were killed and four children and four women injured.

Fifty missiles were fired at the city today, twelve of them fell in the area of the USSR Embassy. One of the rockets exploded in direct proximity to the Watan Children's Boarding School at the time when representatives of the Soviet Aeroflot were distributing presents to the orphaned children. It was only by luck that the explosion caused no casualties.

Perfilyev drew journalists' attention to the appeal by residents of Kabul to the population of the districts from which the attacks originate. The appeal calls to put an end to the muderers' actions.

Vietnamese-Italian Talks

LD2712185289 Moscow TASS in English 1819 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes the results of the Vietnamese-Italian talks, regarding them as a hope-inspiring step towards the consolidation of the process of detente and the development of mutually advantageous cooperation in South-East Asia, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

Vadim Perfilyev told reporters that Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis, during his visit to Vietnam, called for the establishment of close cooperation between the two countries in politics, economy and culture.

The minister urged the European Community to resume aid to Vietnam and expressed his intention to contact all interested sides with a view to promoting ceasefire in Cambodia.

Perfilyev said Italy and Vietnam on Tuesday signed two economic cooperation agreements and agreements for cooperation in science, technology and culture.

Negotiator Criticizes NATO Reluctance To Cut Arms

LD2612103189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 25 Dec 89

[Interview with USSR Major General Viktor Mikhailovich Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation to the fourth round of talks in Vienna on Confidence-Building Measures and on Reduction of Conventional Arms, by Viktor Mikheyev; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Mikheyev] Viktor Mikhailovich, what are the results of this fourth round? What is new in comparison with the situation that existed after the end of the previous, third, round?

[Tatarnikov] I have to tell you that the results of this round are not straightforward. It has its pluses and it has its minuses, but among its pluses I would first and foremost include the submission by the Warsaw Pact states of the draft plan for reducing armed forces and armaments, a draft treaty. And this step is, in my view, evidence of the fact that, in spite of the differences in the approaches of the sides, common tendencies, so to speak, have already been found. On the other hand, I would say that there are negative elements as well that the NATO countries have not, in my view, made use of the potential which could have been used after all those NATO summit-level statements when they promised to speed up the drafting of an agreement.

During the last round, the Warsaw Pact countries made major steps with regard to reductions in aviation; and the NATO countries said we had made an advance, but unfortunately up to the present time they have not responded to these steps with deeds. That is a minus.

And in general I would say that at this round they behaved in a restrained manner. I would say that they strove most of all for the cuts to be unilateral here. Naturally, this cannot lead to any rapid solution, since we believe that we (?have not come here in order to reach agreement at any price). We (?are here) to draw up a just agreement, to see that there really is a balance of forces in Europe, that there should be stability.

It should be said quite bluntly that the NATO countries wish to bring about destabilization, they wish to bring about a state of affairs where their level of armaments, either in terms of technology, or in terms of quantity, should, as it were, be higher. We regard this approach as unacceptable, and therefore we think that at the next round the NATO countries should (?draw their conclusions from this).

'Top Priority' Views Panama, German Reunification

LD2312135789 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Excerpts] [Kuznetsov] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen. I am Pavel Kuznetsov, presenting "Top Priority," with Sergy Plekhanov and Andrey Korchunov. I think you would agree with me gentlemen, that we're going through—the world is going through—very difficult times, and one of the current hotspots is Panama. We know about the American invasion which took place last Wednesday. Now the intrusion continues and I would like you to comment on some of the theories making the rounds, not only in the United States, but in Western Europe, as to the reasons of the American invasion, one of them being protection of American lives and another, major (?actual) reason is the future of the Panama Canal. Who'd like to begin?

[Korchunov] Well, my [word indistinct].

[Kuznetsov] Andrey? You're welcome.

[Korchunov] My feeling is that, first of all, the events of recent days in Panama were not something quite unexpected because the tension there was going for a long time and both sides showed unwillingness to find any compromise. I think that, of course, we can find some, you know, relationship of the events in Panama over the future of the Canal, but at the same time I think that the most, well, er, urgent reason that caused this intervention was now American obsession with drugs, and that was important.

[Kuznetsov] Do you share this point of view, Sergey?

[Plekhanov] Well, I....

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] [Words indistinct) (? this, er, America's) obsession with drugs.

[Plekhanov] I think the drugs aspect here is important, but I think the Canal aspect could perhaps be the main reason. [passage omitted: U.S.-Panamanian treaties attacked by U.S. conservatives, Panamanians suspected United States would try to prevent implementation of treaties; political struggle in Panama recalled] But, you know, all these things, I think, are secondary to the fact that a large nation, a superpower decided to intervene militarily on a wide scale in a classic imperialist fashion in the affairs of another country. Whatever the rationale is—we know it from our own experience and the world knows it from a broader experience—that superpowers should not behave like that.

[Kuznetsov] I understand that that was the rationale, as you put it, behind the decision of the organization of American States, who are not supportive of the American move because they fear that one of their turn may be next.

[Plekhanov] Right. I think it's a very short-sighted decision on behalf of the Bush administration to act like this because it immediately resurrects all the suspicious, all the animosities in Latin America Vis-a-Vis anti-imperialism.

[Kuznetsov] Now, there is one theory that perhaps the Soviet Union is responsible for what the United States is doing by having stopped playing the traditional role of being an opponent of the United States.

[Plekhanov] I think it's a very misguided view of what's going on. [Passage omitted: Recalling U.S. interventions when Soviet-U.S. relations were not good]

[Kuznetsov] My question was not as outlandish as you may think because Mr Perfilyev who is our Foreign Ministry spokesman, had to deny rumors that the invasion, the American invasion, was discussed in Malta and approved by the Soviet Union. He called it a blatant lie and ....

[Korchunov, interrupting] And disinformation....

[Kuznetsov, continuing] Disinformation. Andrey, I interrupted you, wanted to [words indistinct]

[Plekhanov] Well, I wanted just to mention that our side can be criticized for the press coverage of Noriega because sometimes you could get an impression that Noriega was almost a hero of national liberation movement, and therefore I think maybe some people here in Moscow will have a somewhat one-sided impression of what is going on in Panama just now. I think that our press should be more objective on such issues. Though, of course, I'm not going to explain American intervention by this factor, but still I think it's worth consideration.

[Kuznetsov] Gentlemen, let's look at the bright side of things and the bright side is—includes, actually—the recent visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Brussels, where he signed the first accord ever with the European Community and also visited the headquarters of NATO, which is something unprecedented. We still have time to get to the issue of the reunification of Germany, because Mr Shevardnadze, while in Brussels, raised, I think, seven objections that in his view currently stand in the way of this process, which I think has already begun.

[Korchunov] Well, I think that the visit of Shevardnadze to Brussels is very important. [passage omitting; elaborating]

[Kuznetsov] Yes, we've already mentioned that Germany's reunification has begun and I understand it's not only because Chancellor Kohl was in the German Democratic Republic, but I think that on the side of the German Democratic Republic there is a lot of eagerness to be integrated, at least economically. Is that correct? I think one of the objections raised by Mr Shevardnadze was that Germany will become a giant and there are no good guarantees that the past will not be repeated.

[Plekhanov] Well, I think there is a legitimate concern, not only in the Soviet Union, but in many other European countries about what the prospect of a reunified Germany will mean for security in Europe. Nobody can say for sure. I think there's a dilemma here. On the one hand, everybody recognizes that the principle of sovereignty of a nation is very important and if the German people make a decision....

[Korchunov, interrupting] Yes, that's exactly! We keep saying that if the people alone can make decisions....

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Right, that's right, but on the other hand, I mean people can make decisions, but there are certain legal structures which govern our lives. Otherwise, I think, in any society there will be total chaos if everybody did just what they wanted to do. That legal structure is determined by certain sets of agreements concerning, number one, the borders, inviolability of the borders between the states. That involves, of course, some of the territories that formerly belonged to Germany, or formerly were occupied by Germans, and they're concerned about that. Another thing is that there be no military threat. I mean, a united Germany, if it is armed, as the two parts of Germany are armed now, I mean that would be a really, really powerful weight on the military scale in the center of Europe. Therefore, for us and for other Europeans, the prospect of reunification of Germany looks acceptable only if Germany is not involved in East-West political-military balance. If it's demilitarized, if it's neutralized, that kind of a prospect I think might be more acceptable, but there's yet another factor and that is that one should not artificially push this process. I think Gorbachev said it very succintly when he said at Malta that, you know, the current situation in Germany, where there are two German states, has been created by the historical process. That's the status quo. What history will produce at the next stage we will see. Nobody can tell now. The important thing is not to work out a formula and to cram the developments into that formula. Let's rely on the natural process and the natural process, I think, does not necessarily lead to a unified Germany. There will be closer relations between the two parts of Germany....

[Kuznetsov, interrupting] But there's been talk of a confederation (?as a)....

[Plekhanov, interrupting] Well, again, that's a word. Nobody knows what the confederation will mean. (?I) mean, what kind of a confederation, what kind of relations? Well, I'm convinced that there will be closer ties between the two parts of Germany and that's natural, but one should also remember that Germany throughout its history very seldom has been really integrated as a single state. Most of the time it existed as a confederation of kingdoms, of lands, as they were called, laender, and I think that the Prussians and the Saxonians and the Bavarians often think and even talk as if they belong to different nations, at least their accents are different. So we never know what the future will produce in Germany.

[Kuznetsov] We still have some time left, and my question to Andrey as a military expert: Mr Shevardnadze, while in Brussels, spoke about the possibility of cooperation between the Soviet Union—actually urged cooperation—between the Soviet Union and NATO. In what areas can this cooperation proceed.

[Korchunov] Well, I think what we really need now, (?you know, is) the system of (?our) alliances in Europe to make the Warsaw Treaty a more political than military alliance, and here the experience of NATO, the structures of NATO and some of the institutions of NATO, can be very useful for the changes within the Warsaw Treaty. I think that we now—at the moment we do not have anything like political system of, you know, committees and institutions and commissions within the Warsaw Treaty—and here we can use the experience of NATO, first of all. Besides, I think that the confidence building measures, and you know, (?transparency) and all that stuff can be used here.

[Kuznetsov] Thank you, gentlemen, for coming and sharing your views on "Top Priority". I am Pavel Kuznetsov, and together with me in the studio were Sergey Plekhanov and Andrey Korchunov. Goodbye until next time, a week from now.

United States & Canada

TASS Cites Bush on Panama, Romania

LD2712213589 Moscow TASS in English 2125 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Washington December 27 TASS—Addressing a news conference at the U.S. Corpus Christi Naval Air Station, Texas, U.S. President George Bush said that he was very pleased with the turn of events in Panama. The President described the U.S. military invasion of Panama as an amazingly well-coordinated, superbly executed operation.

Bush said that he personally takes part in negotiations for the purpose of extraditing General Noriega, who found refuge in the Vatican diplomatic mission in the Panamanian capital, and bringing him to trial in the United States. The President said that the United States does not set any time limits for itself to get Noriega to be extradited and tried.

The U.S. President was asked if he feared that in the light of press reports on Noriega's close ties with the Central Intelligence Agency in the past the holding of such a trial would lead to the disclosure of information that could embarrass the agency. I don't think so, said the President. I think that's history.

On events in Romania, the U.S. President said that he is respectful of the change that has taken place. Noting once again that in the opinion of Washington the trial of Ceausescu should have been more open, he added: but that's their matter...my concern is for tranquility and freedom in Romania.

Northeast Asia

Mongolian Foreign Minister on Asia, PRC Ties

PM2712195689 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Mongolian Foreign Minister Tserenpiliin Gombosuren by unidentified IZVESTIYA correspondent: "Renewal Is Necessary"—date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Tserenpiliin Gombosuren was born in 1943 in Ovorhangay Aymag in Mongolia to the family of a peasant livestock farmer. He has a higher education and graduated from the Printing Institute in the Soviet Union. Since 1976 he has been in the diplomatic service: He was chief of a Mongolian Foreign Ministry department, deputy foreign minister, and envoy-counselor at the Mongolian Embassy in the USSR. Since 1987 he has been deputy chief of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee International Relations Department. In 1976-1984 he took part in the work of UN General Assembly sessions and a number of other international organizations. In June 1988, by a decree of the Mongolian People's Great Hural Presidium, Ts. Gombosuren was appointed Mongolian foreign minister. At the request of the editorial office, the minister answered our correspondent's questions.

[Correspondent] You have been Mongolian foreign minister for about 18 months. Did your appointment mean a change of emphasis in the work of Mongolia's foreign policy department?

[Gombosuren] Yes, it seems so. But not because of me. The point is that, as we can now see very well, an urgent need had arisen for the renewal of our country's foreign policy activity, as well as of other spheres of public life. This was discussed at last year's December plenum of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee. The plenum seriously criticized our department's work. We were largely prisoners of the "old" thinking. Our activity was noted for its ideologized approach to questions of foreign relations, its declarative nature, its isolation from domestic needs, its tendency to bow to bloc policy, its insufficient realism... But I should not speak of all this in the past tense. The main work still lies ahead.

[Correspondent] Mongolia's foreign policy initiatives aimed at strengthening trust and establishing mutually beneficial cooperation among Asian states are well known in the Soviet Union. To what extent are the radical changes taking place in the world in general and the Asian and Pacific region in particular reflected in your government's foreign policy?

[Gombosuren] The positive global and regional changes have the most direct effect on the galvanization of our foreign policy activity and the enhancement of its effectiveness. The task is to do everything to turn these changes into a continuous and irreversible process. There may be different paths here. In our view the most important is the strengthening of confidence and mutual understanding. This approach forms the basis of our efforts, in particular, to establish diverse ties with Asian states and Western countries. This was our aim when in August of this year we put forward the proposal to form a permanent talks mechanism between the countries of the northeastern part of the Asian and Pacific region with a view to seeking ways of resolving the problems that have accumulated here and expanding cooperation in the most diverse spheres.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the improvement in the international atmosphere creates favorable conditions for the more effective utilization of the factors arising from foreign relations in the resolution of our domestic development problems. Foreign policy activity should promote this aim, too.

[Correspondent] To what extent did the withdrawal of Soviet troop units from Mongolian territory affect Mongolia's international activity?

[Gombosuren] The decision by the governments of Mongolia and the USSR to withdraw a significant proportion of the Soviet troops from Mongolia was, on the one hand, a reaction by our countries to the emerging trend toward normalization of the situation in the region. On the other hand, it confirms our sincere desire to promote in practice the strengthening of confidence and mutual understanding between the countries of the Asian and Pacific region. That is the spirit in which this step was received in international circles. The background to our foreign policy activity is therefore improving.

[Correspondent] The Soviet Union and Mongolia are linked by a series of bilateral treaties. Many of them were concluded a decade ago. How, in your opinion, are they continuing to "work" today, or do they need to be amended?

[Gombosuren] Yes, Mongolian-Soviet relations are based on a ramified network of treaties and agreements. There are hundreds of them, they cover virtually all spheres of our interaction, and on the whole they "work" well.

At the same time some of them do indeed need to be amended, especially in these days of perestroyka. So we have begun a thorough study of the existing bilateral treaty acts.

[Correspondent] What are the most characteristic features that you would single out in Mongolia's relations with China today?

[Gombosuren] Above all, the mutual desire to develop bilateral relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. It is thanks to these mutual efforts that Mongolian-Chinese ties have recently received a powerful boost. In particular, interparty ties were restored this year. Official visits by foreign ministers took place. An accord was reached on holding a summit meeting in the first half of next year. Cultural and trade exchanges and scientific and technical cooperation are continuing to expand.

Another feature is the strengthening of the legal and treaty base of our mutual relations. Among the agreements concluded earlier, I would like to stress the significance of the 1960 Treaty on Friendship and Mutual Assistance between Mongolia and the PRC. The recent period has seen the signing of the Treaty on the Border Regime and the Settlement of Border Issues, the Agreement on Reciprocal Visits by Citizens Without Visas, the Agreement on the Creation of an Interparliamentary Commission on Economic, Trade, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil and Criminal Cases, and others.

I would also like to note the expansion of cross-border cooperation and direct ties between our aymags and the provinces of China, and the interest in the mutual study of experience in economic building. In short, Mongolian-Chinese relations are gaining in pace and scope.

Dialogue on Arms Reduction in Asia Urged

OW2312021289 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] The outcome of the recent Soviet-U.S. summit talks in Malta continues to be the world's major topic of discussion. Regarding this, Radio Moscow commentator Dmitriyev writes as follows:

The world's attention is centered now on what impact the Soviet-U.S. summit will have on the international situation. In this connection, I would like to bring to your attention some remarks General Secretary Gorbachev made at the 9 December CPSU Central Committee plenum. General Secretary Gorbachev cited in his speech the treaties and protocols that are to be concluded next year: a treaty on a 50% reduction in the arsenals of the Soviet and American strategic attack arms, a treaty on large-scale reductions in conventional forces in Europe, a treaty on extensive reductions in the stockpiles of Soviet and American chemical weapons, and protocols to the 1974 and 1976 underground nuclear test limitation agreements.

The signing of these treaties and protocols will signal an easing of military confrontation to a level never before seen in history. There will be no way that the disarmament process can go backward once this happens. While these treaties are expected to be concluded next year, many sources view the Malta summit as representing the termination of the cold war.

In its 10 December editorial, ASAHI SHIMBUN depicted the Malta summit as a death knell of the cold war. I do not believe that such a view is a hasty one. A cold war means confrontation in the military and the international relations spheres. To stop regarding as foes those who might be partners and to move away from confrontation toward dialogue—these are the first and important steps in ending the cold war. Everything starts from this step. Indeed it may be said that the aim of the Malta summit was to realize this shift in international relations.

In this regard, ASAHI SHIMBUN, in its 9 December issue wrote that the question of establishing a practical mechanism to ensure ongoing Soviet-U.S. cooperation is being studied. But, in fact, such mechanisms basically exist already. For instance, Soviet-U.S. summits have become routine events. Other examples of such mechanisms are the meetings between the Soviet and American foreign ministers, which have a major bearing on East-West relations, the Vienna arms limitation talks, and the activities undertaken within the framework of the Helsinki process to deal with security and cooperation of Europe. Furthermore, dialogue between the Soviet Union and West European states is progressing rapidly.

Such mechanisms of cooperation, naturally, are necessary for the Asian and Pacific region, too. In the absence of such mechanisms it would be difficult to expect the region to benefit from the ongoing shift in the East-West relationship from confrontation to cooperation. Scowcroft, U.S. assistant to the President for national security affairs, recently visited Japan to explain the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit. In his meeting with the President's assistant, Prime Minister Kaifu expressed his hope that such mechanisms would appear in that region. However, at present, there are no such mechanisms in the Asia and Pacific region through which benefits could be gained as a result of the easing of tensions in Soviet-U.S. relations.

In September 1988 General Secretary Gorbachev, while visiting Krasnoyarsk, proposed that such a mechanism be established in the Asia and Pacific region. Unfortunately, he has not yet received an appropriate response. It is for this reason that we hope the outcome of the Malta summit will encourage Japan to expand its thinking toward such an objective.

In fact, Japanese opposition parties already have presented this question to the Diet. Dietman Kubota of the Japan Socialist Party, pointing out the slow progress in arms reduction efforts in Asia, criticized the Japanese Government's negative stand. Dietman Kanzaki of the Komei Party called on the Japanese Government to take initiatives to create conditions for arms reduction talks in Asia. Meanwhile, Dietman Ito of the Democratic Socialisty Part, proposed establishing a consultative international organization to be participated in by six nations in the region—Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the ROK, and the DPRK. Dietman Ito pointed out that there is no mechanism for dialogue in Asia and said that this is becoming an impediment to eliminating the cold war from the Asia and Pacific region.

Soviet, Japanese Officials on Environmental Talks

OW2512014389 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 13 Dec 89

[From the "Interview Corner" program]

[Text] As has already been reported, the first round of talks on preparations for formulating a Soviet-Japanese agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection was held in Moscow. The talks, which concluded on 7 December, lasted for 2 days. These discussions can be viewed as the first step by the Soviet Union and Japan, two neighboring nations, to join efforts in resolving the environmental problems that have suddenly deteriorated.

Radio Moscow reporter (Durodov) interviewed two of the participants in these recent Soviet-Japanese consultations. He first spoke with Councillor Ogawa of the Japanese Embassy in the Soviet Union. Councillor Ogawa served as head of the Japanese delegation at the recent talks.

[Begin recording] [(Durodov)] Would you briefly tell us about the outcome of your recent talks on environmental issues?

[Ogawa] Well, this was the first negotiation on concluding a treaty with regard to environmental issues between Japan and the Soviet Union based on an accord reached between the foreign ministers of our two nations. Since this was the first round of talks, the two sides explained to one another their respective government's general concept of the problems, as well as the measures taken by the administration to deal with these issues in an effort to promote mutual understanding.

As for the contents of the treaty, the Soviet side prepared suggestions and we made basic comments on their suggestions. We are satisfied with the results achieved at this first round of talks, which was carried out smoothly.

[(Durodov)] Is it true that some sort of protocol has been worked out?

[Ogawa] No. It will take considerable time before an agreement can be worked out. The recent talks were held as the first step in the negotiations. In this regard, no protocol will be signed.

[(Durodov)] Who attended the talks on behalf of the Soviets?

[Ogawa] Representing the Soviet side were (Protayev), first vice chairman of the State Committee for the Protection of Nature, and Mr Sakharov, a bureau chief of this committee. Officials from the State Committee on Meteorology were also present.

[(Durodov)] When and where will the next talks be held?

[Ogawa] The two sides will consult on the next round of talks through diplomatic channels.

[(Durodov)] Perhaps it will be held next year. Isn't that so?

[Ogawa] Yes, I think so.

[(Durodov)] I wish you success.

[Ogawa] Thank you. [end recording]

Vladimir Sakharov, director of the International Cooperation Bureau of the State Committee for the Protection of Nature, was also interviewed. Reporter (Durodov) first asked if he agreed with the appraisal of the recent talks made by the Japanese side.

[Begin Sakharov recording in Russian fading into Japanese translation] The Soviet side also favorably appraises the first round of talks. We are optimistic about the actions to be taken by both sides. Everything will proceed according to the saying: Well begun is half done. At these talks, the two sides discussed the first draft proposal formulated by the Soviet Union. [end recording]

He was also asked: In working out conditions, what fields in the protection of nature will be covered?

[Begin Sakharov recording in Russian fading into Japanese translation] Both sides have agreed that no announcement will be made on this point for the time being. This is not because it should be kept a secret, but we have not yet reached an accord. We can say, however, what fields we are concerned about. The Soviet side has made a proposal for cooperating in those areas of environmental problems that have now become the most serious, as well as the issue pertaining to the reasonable uses of natural resources. Among these areas are problems concerning the abolition of pollution in the atmosphere, fresh water, sea water, and underground water. We must also assess the influence such pollution has had on the environment. We are interested in problems concerning the areas for protection, including the protection of nature, the protection of animals and plants, and the economic management of natural monuments. It is also important to deal with education in terms of environmental problems and to train experts in this field. We have raised several other problems in addition to these.

Even though we have brought up these problems, it does not mean that we want to begin cooperation immediately. We have submitted material from which prospective issues of mutual interest can be selected. Among the Japanese representatives, however, there were none from those organs connected with environmental protection.

We hope that we can talk with our colleagues in Japan—those officials who are responsible for the problems concerning environmental protection—and that we will be able to take great steps forward at the next round of consultations, which is expected to be held this spring. [end recording]

Southeast Asia & Pacific

New Formula for Cambodia Solution Examined

BK2312070289 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Text] During a meeting with Indochinese and ASEAN press correspondents, Comrade Hun Sen, head of the Cambodian Government, has said that there are now a number of good proposals on the negotiating table, such as the proposal of Australian Foreign Minister Evans. Comrade Hun Sen said that that we are prepared to discuss these proposals.

Concerning this matter, our observer, Aleksey Nikolayev, has the following comments.

The Australian proposal, as is known, deals with the possibility of the establishment of a provisional mechanism of state power for Cambodia under the UN auspices. The so-called Evans document also proposes that Cambodia's UN seat be left vacant. The seat is currently occupied by a representative of the Cambodian opposition groups.

The concept directly initiated by Canberra permits quite an active effort to seek a solution in Cambodia. Is it a different matter or a new formula and can it be possible? I still have doubts about this point. Although the leader of the Cambodian opposition groups, Sihanouk, seems, through his own words, to have a good opinion of the Evans plan, at the same time he has opposed the idea of leaving Cambodia's UN seat vacant. Moreover, he even demanded the so-called total dissolution of the present Phnom Penh government.

It is regrettable that such an attitude remains the same. What is seen as something new is that such a demand has become firmer. Such a demand is really not in line with the current trend.

As Comrade Hun Sen emphasized during his meeting with the press correspondents in Phnom Penh, a solution to the Cambodian problem is possible only when the confronting parties show their readiness to make mutual concessions with the intent to seek compromise. Such a preparedness has always been displayed by the government of the State of Cambodia.

Commenting on the Australian proposal, Comrade Hun Sen said the role of supervising the elections in Cambodia might be given to the United Nations. The unacceptable point is the dissolution of the government before the elections. This is because such a dissolution will only enable the Pol Pot clique to seize power in the country.

It is the Khmer Rouge who are attempting to topple the Phnom Penh government in order to restore their regime. At present, the forces which are really opposing these elements are the government and the Armed Forces of the State of Cambodia. Thus, how can one talk about the dissolution of the Phnom Penh government?

In no circumstances should Pol Pot and the other criminals in the Khmer Rouge group be allowed to return to power in Cambodia, Australian Foreign Minister Evans noted when he was explaining his plan. This is the point that should be upheld as the most important formula for the Cambodian solution.

Vietnamese President Cited on Bloc Reforms

PM2712160189 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Vietnam. Speech in Hanoi"]

[Text] The majority of socialist countries, embarking on the path of changes, have realized the error of building socialism according to any single scheme, Vo Chi Cong, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the SRV State Council, has stated.

Speaking to heads of parliamentary delegations taking part in the SRV National Assembly session, he noted that new systems in these states are being formulated only on the basis of trial and error, and none can yet affirm that it has found the truth.

Gross violations of the bases of democracy, the principle of democratic centralism in party life, and an underestimation of the people's role by communist parties have led to serious crises in a number of socialist countries. These and a number of other factors are the reason why the bulk of the East European countries were late to enter the period of the scientific-technical revolution and socioeconomic changes, the Vietnamese leader pointed out. Numerous mistakes were also made by violating objective laws of world development and underestimating the commodity economy, which meant that the potential advantages of socialism were stifled.

International imperialism, the speaker continued, wants to use the crisis phenomena to undermine socialism. Socialist countries are experiencing difficult situations, and not for the first time, but this has not stopped their progressive development. They will be able to come out of the crisis situation by overcoming errors that have occurred and by consistently implementing reforms.

Yazov Greets SRV Minister of National Defense

PM2212144389 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Message from Soviet Defense Minister Yazov to SRV Minister of National Defense Le Duc Anh on Vietnamese People's Army anniversary]

[Text] To Army General Comrade Le Duc Anh, SRV minister of national defense.

Esteemed Comrade Minister!

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and myself personally, I cordially congratulate you and all Vietnamese servicemen on the 45th anniversary of the Vietnamese People's Army.

Soviet servicemen value highly the friendship of the Vietnamese People's Army and treasure their traditional cooperation. The historic transformations in our countries are creating favorable conditions for enhancing the effectiveness of Soviet-Vietnamese military ties in the interests of reliably ensuring their fraternal peoples' peaceful creative labor.

On this portentous day I wish you and all the servicemen of the Vietnamese People's Army new successes in the implementation of the tasks set by the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam to strengthen your motherland's defense capability. [Signed] Army General D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense

Near East & South Asia

Zaykov Receives Syrian Defense Minister Tlas

PM2712150489 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Meeting Held"]

[Text] On 22 December L.N. Zaykov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received Syrian Defense Minister Corps General Mustafa Tlas, who is in our country on a working visit.

In the course of the friendly talk the stable level of Soviet-Syrian relations was stressed. The Syrian defense minister noted that Syria assesses highly the progress of perestroyka in the Soviet Union and is confident of its success. Certain questions of Soviet-Syrian military-technical cooperation were also discussed.

Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, and M.'I. al-Na'ib, Syrian ambassador to the USSR, took part in the meeting.

Visit Ends

PM2812103889 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 89 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Visit Ends"]

[Text] Corps General M. Tlas, member of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and Syrian defense minister, who was in our country on a working visit, left the Soviet Union on 23 December.

The guest and those accompanying him were seen off at the airport by Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister, Army General I.M. Tretyak, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, and other officials.

Among the sendoff party were I. Na'ib, Syrian ambassador to the USSR, and Divisional General A.K. al-Muhammad, military attache to the Syrian Embassy in the USSR.

Indian Premier, Foreign Minister See Vorontsov

PM2712150289 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "In the Interests of Cooperation"]

[Text] Delhi, 22 Dec—Indian Prime Minister V.P. Singh today received the Soviet leadership's special representative Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, who has arrived here, and who handed him a message from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Soviet representative also had a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral, in the course of which an invitation to visit the Soviet Union was extended to him.

The Soviet side voiced its firm intention to continue to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries and to increase its effectiveness, to meet the interests not only of the Soviet Union and India, but of the entire world community. The special significance of the two countries' collaboration in the international arena was stressed. The prospects for bilateral economic, scientific, and technical cooperation were examined in detail. Readiness to maintain the now traditional regular contacts at the highest level was reaffirmed.

The Indian prime minister expressed warm thanks for the message and the wishes it expressed. He noted the unique nature of relations between the Soviet Union and India and the importance of maintaining continuity in their development.

V.P. Singh stated that his government will do everything to help strengthen the friendship between the Indian and Soviet peoples. For his part, he expressed a commitment to maintaining the closest contacts between the two countries' leaders.

A wide range of international problems were discussed in detail during the Soviet representative's meeting with Sh.K. Singh, Indian first deputy foreign minister.

Gorbachev Message Given Rajiv Gandhi

PM2712153589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS dispatch: "Meeting in Delhi"]

[Text] Delhi, 23 Dec—Yu.M. Vorontsov, special representative of the Soviet leadership and USSR first deputy foreign minister, who is staying here, today visited Rajiv Gandhi, leader of the opposition in the lower house of the Indian Parliament and chairman of the Indian National Congress-Indira [INC-I] Party, and handed to him a personal message from M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Cnetral Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the UNI news agency reports. During the ensuing conversation, the agency reports, the present international situation and Soviet-Indian relations were examined in detail. UNI points out that the chairman of the all-Indian committee of the INC-I described the meeting as "very cordial and friendly" and noted that the important issue of the further strengthening and development of interparty relations between the INC-I and the CPSU was broached at the meeting.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Reports Cited on Burkina Faso Coup Attempt

EA2712203389 Moscow International Service in Swahili 1730 GMT 26 Dec 89

[Text] As we have already reported, an attempted coup d'etat has been carried out by the military in Burkina Faso. The following is from news agency reports from Ouagadougou.

The one charged with the rebellious act is Boukari Kabore. He is a former Burkinabe Army captain and a follower of Thomas Sankara, the former president who was overthrown by Blaise Compaore, the country's current leader, in 1987. As reported, Boukari Kabore left Burkina Faso in the same year. Of the 200 people who participated in the coup attempt, most of the rebel elements are mercenaries. Justice Minister Antoine Komy Sambo brought two of the soldier mercenaries before a news conference in Ouagadougou. News agencies reported that they were nationals of neighboring African countries.

The minister of justice said that investigations were continuing and that those guilty would be brought to justice. The minister did not elaborate further. At the same time, he rejected news reports which stated that seven people who participated in the coup attempt were killed on Wednesday.

According to news received from Paris, the opposition community, members of which live in France, issued sharply contradictory statements. They asserted that the trial of the Burkina Faso Army men took place on 25 December. According to their reports, from 30 to 100 people, all of them Army officers and troops, have been detained.

Meanwhile, the Burkinabe ambassador in France, Mr Serge Theophile Balima, strongly denied the opposition's accusations, citing news issued by his government's leaders which he received by telephone. News agencies recall that a coup attempt was carried out in Burkina Faso in September last year. According to current official news, four coup plotters were sentenced to death.

Agreement To Avert Famine in Ethiopia Endorsed

EA2412214789 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] The situation in the Horn of Africa, as in previous weeks, is still fraught with difficulties. There seems to be no (?stability). Vladimir Borisov comments: The war being waged by the Addis Ababa government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] in the northern parts of Ethiopia has aggravated the drought problem in the area. It has subjected many millions of people to famine.

According to news received from the areas during the week, the heavy rain which came 2 or 3 months earlier than expected is estimated to have damaged teff and other crops. With heavy rain added to war it is feared that it will be difficult to deliver the food aid donated by international donor organizations in time.

During the talks held by the Ethiopian Government and TPLF delegates in Rome last week, they agreed to open food aid corridors to areas under their control, in order to deliver international food aid to the people affected by famine. If the agreement is genuine and is implemented, it is to the credit of the two warring parties.

Effects of Somalia's 'Gravest Crisis' Noted

EA2312213589 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Text] The situation in Somalia as 1989 draws to a close cannot be described merely as difficult. In the context of the many happenings in Somalia, we can say that Somalia is going through its gravest crisis so far. It is very difficult to assess the situation in Somalia, our commentator, Aleksandr Mikhaylov, who wrote this comment, believes.

Twenty-three Somalis of the Isaaq clan arrived at Paris airport and asked for political asylum recently. Nineteen Somalis who arrived in Nairobi from Mogadishu said they feared returning to Somalia. These two reports are indicative of the situation in Somalia, where many people are fleeing the country. This exodus cannot be regarded as the product of an economic problem. Somalia's economy has indeed collapsed completely with people having problems meeting basic needs, but the economic catastrophe began long before this year was drawing to a close. At the same time it can hardly be said that the exodus of Somalis to Kenya and Tanzania is of people hoping to improve their lives in those countries.

Somalia is suffering from a disease called fear. The recent past clearly demonstrated what brought about the fear. The fear might have originated from the greater Somalia strategy. It began when young Somali men took up arms against the Ogaden region and northern Kenya in order to bring them into the Somalian fold. The courage of Somali soldiers is beyond doubt, that after the strategy of unifying those areas by force failed, the fear of losing one's life in this unnecessary war gripped the country. Moreover, increasing members of people in Somalia came to the conclusion that the crisis facing the country could only be solved through the barrel of a gun. This applies as much to the Mogadishu government which has attempted to subdue everyone through the barrel of a gun as it does to the various rebel groups. The Mogadishu government has tried to subdue the rebel groups. Is it the government's fear of a mass uprising which has prompted it to lean on the Marehaan tribe alone?

Until recently, many towns in Somalia remained unaffected by the ongoing fighting, but the assault launched to flush out rebels from Hargeysa and what happened in Mogadishu in July this year show that security is no longer guaranteed in the towns. The situation is further aggravated by the extent of tribal conflict prevailing in the country. In Mogadishu hundreds of people were liquidated just for belonging to a particular tribe. The government blamed the Isaaq clan for the confrontation in Mogadishu. Hundreds were massacred for belonging to the Isaaq clan. They were not taken before a court of law and there was no investigation whatsoever to ascertain guilt. It is plain that no one can reside in a country where he will be murdered for belonging to a clan.

The civil war is mounting and being fought in northern, central, and southern Somalia. The people living in Somalia are left with three alternatives: 1) to take up arms in support of the government; 2) to join one of the rebel movements; or 3) to flee the country. Unfortunately, none of the three alternatives provides a solution to the country's problems.

What one needs to ask is whether there is a way out of this difficult situation? There is a way out says our commentator, Aleksandr Mikhaylov. The government of Mohamed Siad Barre, is now showing the way. It is doing so by proposing to democratize the country's political system. A committee has been appointed to draft a new consttution and plans have been made to hold general elections in which various political parties will take part next year. The eventual resolution of the complex situation in the country will depend on how genuine the elections turn out to be and what changes for the better are brought into effect. I have no doubt that solving the country's problems will be an uphill task which will take a long time. Those seeking a remedy may even balk at the complexity of the daunting task, but I think the method chosen to deal with the country's problems is the right one.

East Europe

More Reportage on Developments in Romania

Gorbachev Talks To Iliescu by Phone

LD2712195889 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had a telephone conversation today with Ion Iliescu, chairman of the Council of Romania's National Salvation Front.

Iliescu expressed deep gratitude to the Soviet leadership for the support rendered to the Romanian people in those difficult days, when the destiny of their country had been decided. The National Salvation Front highly appreciates the fact that the Soviet Union's supreme body of power, the Congress of People's Deputies, used its prestige to support the working people of Romania in their revolutionary struggle against personal dictatorship, for democratic changes and the renewal of society.

Gorbachev and Iliescu exchanged information about processes taking place in their countries. Gorbachev stressed that the Second Congress of People's Deputies that ended recently was an important stage in the life of the Soviet state and became a major step in its democratic development. It outlined priority tasks in the economic and social spheres.

Iliescu said that the situation in Romania was getting back to normal. Some 90 per cent of industrial enterprises are functioning. Local bodies of power representing the National Salvation Front are being created in provinces. He also stressed that the working people of Romania—workers, peasants and intellectuals—had met revolutionary changes with great enthusiasm. They are actively supporting the work of the Council of the National Salvation Front.

Gorbachev and Iliescu agreed that at present mutual understanding and mutual support of their two nations, as well as the deepening of cooperation in all the spheres, are of special importance.

Iliescu, Roman Interviewed

LD2712140689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2050 GMT 26 Dec 89

["Topical Interview" program; interview with Ion Iliescu, chairman of the Council of the National Salvation Front of Romania, and Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman by Soviet journalists in Bucharest on 26 December—recorded; responses in Romanian by Roman carry superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Journalist] First of all, many thanks to you, on behalf of the Soviet viewers and all Soviet people, for finding a few minutes during this complex and difficult time to receive representatives of Soviet television and other Soviet journalists in order to give us a brief interview. I would like to ask you straight away, Comrade Iliescu, how you would evaluate the current situation in the country?

[Iliescu] It is still complex. First of all I would like to make a few clarificaitons about the process in Romania, and the specificities of this process, which is to some extent different from others. It is a truly spontaneous process, a mass movement.

This is one of the historical responsibilities of the Ceausescu regime which brought the country to maximum crisis: in the economy, the social sphere, politics, and all other spheres. All this created a great social tension which was ready to explode. It was a spontaneous wave which caused the government to collapse. It would not be correct to present this process as a coup organized by some forces or other, even with external support. No, there were no such forces and there are none. So perhaps [word indistinct] but this is what comprises the great complexity of our situation. There is not yet any well-organized structure of the new power. At the moment we are only preparing ourselves. We were all [words indistinct] of those who took part as a result of their personal views. We are now creating such an organized structure.

This presents a great complexity at this time, because there are two great complications. First, terrorist actions. The Ceausescu regime disorganized the economy and the social sphere, and so on. But at the same time it created a very powerful system of repressions which continues to function, destabilizing the country and creating difficulties in the organization of a new political structure.

And, second, and in connection with this, the difficulties of reorganizing and making the economy more healthy. There are even some tendencies to organise diversions and sabotage but at the same time there is mutual mistrust between the new forces of the Front and the old apparatus. This is one of the features and the difficulties of the process in hand. For this reason, the main thing for us now is to create new organizational structures.

There are several positive circumstances—to be precise, the general consensus of all of the forces which participated in the overthrow of the regime. This is the main program of the Front which is open to all strata of Romanian society. The creation of a genuine, extensive, all-encompassing front of all of the healthy forces of society for the renewal of the country. But at the same time there are difficulties in this process, the creation of new structures. But this is probably in the history [word indistinct]. We also had it. [passage indistinct]

[Journalist] When was the National Salvation Front set up, Comrade Iliescu? Could you introduce us to some of its members?

[Iliescu] Here are just two of them, no three. Here is a young man.

[Journalist] As far as I have seen, the Council contains a large number of young people, of those who in fact started the movement, started the coup.

[Iliescu] No, it was not the movement which created the coup, but it was created by the coup. The Front was formed after the overthrow of Ceausescu.

[Journalists] There were no instruments before, no [words indistinct]?

[Iliescu] There were no [words indistinct] before that. That is the peculiarity and difficulty. We set it up in time.

[Journalist] What are the main tasks you now see facing your new government?

[Roman] I understand Russian very well, but don't speak it so well. I don't want to deform the beautiful Russian Language, so please forgive me, but I'll begin speaking in Romanian, is that all right?

(?Mainly) the questions I shall have to work on are the tasks of restoring, such as the functioning of the economy in the new conditions. We are forced to work with the old structures. And, of course, we hope that we will work more competently than the previous regime did. But under the conditions created by terrorist actions and in connection with the fact that the majority of the cadres whom we need for the economy have still not fully resumed their activities, it is understandable that our difficulties are great. Frankly speaking, we have not yet managed to come to grips with the economy in earnest. All that we have been able to do is to solve a number of urgent problems. I can give you an example which in some way expresses this. If we take the figures for the use of electricity, activity throughout the country comprises about 90 percent of the normal activity under the old regime.

[Journalist] You're talking about the production of electricity?

[Roman] No, the usage. Of course, this is a good result and it can be explained by the remarkable devotion of the people.

[Journalist] You mean their profound understanding of the situation?

[Roman] The people did this, and if they are working now, it means they will [word indistinct].

(Journalist] How will the process of forming new structures proceed in the future? When do you plan to hold elections in the country? And when will the new parliament renew its work, and so on?

[Roman, in Romanian] This is a very short time scale, but we have now started. The lawyer Mazilu, vice president of the Council, has begun to busy himself with the commission for creating a renewed constitution and a law on the elections. As for urgent measures, we are also reconsidering several legislative acts which would facilitate our economic development and free society from many shackles. We wish to renounce centralism [word indistinct] and encourage initiatives at all levels.

The organization of new structures is a complex matter but it must be done quickly. [Word indistinct] the constitutional principles which we intend to have, we intend in the first instance we must separate powers—legislative, executive, and judicial. For the period in question, the Council has taken on temporarily the functions of a legislative body and the government will concern itself with state administration. [Word indistinct] we intend to (?prepare) this idea in a more well regulated way. But we are faced with other questions, too. In this period the immediate tasks which touch on the lives of the people must be resolved urgently. It is the end of the year and the beginning of a new year (?and we have already adopted a series of measures) concerning plan indicators for the coming year. They must be reviewed because they were established without taking reality into account.

[Journalist] Another question if I may, Comrade Iliescu. Did you hear the voices of Soviet people, the statement by the Soviet Government, the statement by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR?

[Iliescu] Certainly.

[Roman, in Romanian] I would like to express my thanks, we would like to express our thanks. We heard this with great satisfaction. We were convinced that this is what would happen. These statements were among the first to arrive. [words indistinct].

[Journalist] Another question, Comrade Iliescu. Soviet people, as did television viewers throughout the world, saw with anger and revulsion and horror some of the documentary pictures of the violence of the former dictatorial regime against the people in revolt. How do you evaluate the casualties borne by the people during this uprising?

[Roman, in Romanian] At the recent trial some figures were given of more than 60,000 victims. We don't yet have very accurate figures. Perhaps these are impressive. This expresses once again the monstrous nature of the antipopular [words indistinct]. [passage indistinct].

During the many years of personal dictatorship, these aspects of repression and violence against the popular masses, using actions of the terrorist elements, are truly monstrous.

[Journalist] So what was the main thing for the victory of the uprising? What was it that tipped the balance? The resolve of the people, or the participation of the Army which went over to the side of the people? What do you consider to have been the main thing?

[Iliescu] [Words indistinct] the popular masses. It was the masses who did it. The army only supports them, and [words indistinct]. And it supports them fully. But basically it was a mass participation, first and foremost by young people. It was a revolution of young people.

[Journalist] And the very last question: How will you, as members of the National Salvation Front Council, welcome in the New Year?

[Iliescu] With hope.

Iliescu TV Address Noted

LD2712132489 Moscow TASS in English 1301 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Bucharest December 27 TASS—"The Romanian revolution is a spontaneous action of the popular masses, a manifestation of discontent that amassed over many years and amplified by attempts to suppress popular actions, above all those of the youth. This is not a coup d'etat staged by organised forces, all the more so with outside support," Ion Iliescu, chairman of the National Salvation Front Council, said in his appearance on Free Romanian Television on Tuesday [26 December].

The National Salvation Front Council has not sponsored the movement, it has come as its consequence, he said.

It is now necessary to organise and normalise the economic and social life of the country. But the old repressive apparatus continues to terrorise the population. It is now important to ensure the safety of the members of the new state agencies. Terrorist actions aim to destabilise the socio-economic life and to prompt popular masses' discontent with the new leadership, which is allegedly unable to put things in order in the country.

There can be no normalcy, until we establish new structures of state power, the state administration both in the centre and in districts, Iliescu said. All district and local committees should prioritse specific tasks: provision of the population with basic necessities, the operation of transport and trade.

In solving economic problems, the romanian leader said, we rest upon the existing structures, and we should not destroy them since that would lead to major complications. We should give enterprises and the economy more freedom and abolish laws aimed at comprehensive centralisation.

The council's temporary structure is now being decided before it is finally formed on the basis of a new constitution. The front is being established as a permanent structure to prepare new elections and to establish forms of organising Romanian society on a new basis. A decree on the council's structural activities has been drafted.

Iliescu urged all those who took an active part in the Romanian revolution to unite in the struggle against attempts to destabilise the situation, to work for unity of all creative forces in Romanian society.

The front will try to maintain unity that is open to all possible trends, to all interested forces that will form, through a lively dialogue, a programme for further activities.

It is now necessary to draw up a programme of work for the next three months. These three months should not only witness the election campaign. They should be a time of action, a time to solve fundamental problems in society and elaborate long-term programmes, Iliescu said in conclusion.

Moldavians Volunteer To Fight

LD2712214289 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1629 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, Dec 27 (TANJUG)—Some five thousand members of the alternative movement National Front in the Soviet Republic of Moldavia have stated readiness to leave for Romania and take part in the armed resistance to members of the deposed dictator Nicolae Ceausescu regime.

Reports are that the front representatives have already made lists of volunteers who wholeheartedly support the new authorities in Romania.

Moldavia is on the Soviet-Romanian border and many Moldavians have relatives in Romania.

Moldavia is also very active in collecting aid for the Romanian population. So far scores of wagonloads of food, clothes, medicaments and other goods have been sent to Romania.

The Soviet Union has officially stated that it has no intention of becoming militarily involved in Romania, nor has such a request been made by Romania.

Moldavian Ministry Facilitates Aid

LD2712202889 Moscow TASS in English 1951 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Kishinev December 27 TASS—By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Chubashenko:

Forty-seven freight cars loaded with foods, industrial goods and medicaments crossed the Moldavian border today, and another eight are ready for dispatch.

Donors continue giving blood for Romanians wounded in the recent events. 6,520 people have donated 1.965 litres of blood over the past four days. It is used for making preparations that are later sent to Romania.

About 150,000 roubles have been put on a special bank account opened to help the Romanian people. Cash donations will continue pouring in from enterprises, organisations, work collectives and individuals representing different nationalities.

The Vibropribor plant has decided to transfer its Romanian currency—about 120,000 lei to Romania.

The Moldavian Interior Ministry is doing its best to simplify the process of going to Romania for Soviet experts. At all checkpoints all the necessary exit papers are prepared without extra formalities. The Moldavian Interior Ministry workers have already collected and transferred more than 30,000 roubles worth of personal savings to the Romanian people.

Moldavian Interior Minister Vladimir Voronin emphasised that each militiaman was trying to make his contribution to the campaign of aid to neighbouring Romania.

'Non-Romanians' Among Arrested

PM2612162189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 7

[Own correspondent V. Volodin dispatch under general rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Romania: Alarming Days"]

[Excerpts] Bucharest—For the first time in many years, Romania is openly celebrating Christmas. Despite the fact that the situation remains tense, carols rang out at midnight. The mellow chiming of bells rose above Bucharest. Despite the sporadic firefights flaring up in the area of the Victory of Socialism Boulevard, the Central Savings Bank, and Victoria Avenue, the people celebrated the arrival of Father Christmas. [passage omitted]

A tour of Bucharest on Christmas night and conversations with the patrols of volunteers and the militia make it possible to cast some light on the question "But who are the terrorists?" A question which remains open.

The students and militiamen to whom I talked about this told me that the wounded and captured in Bucharest include several foreigners. According to the patrols, two Arabs were captured during the terrorist attack on Radio House. Four people, wounded and captured during a nighttime street clash, were brought to a hospital. It turned out that all four came from developing countries. Similar reports have come in from Ion Neculce Street near the Jewish cemetery, where a group of people were firing machineguns. Free Romanian Television also reported the arrest in Brasov of two terrorists of non-Romanian origin.

More than once in past years I have heard stories about "Ceausescu's children"—as they were referred to—orphans and war victims from Third World countries. The youths were brought to Romania where, with time, they were transformed into janissaries—the tyrant's guard. In special military camps—according to some reports there were at least five of them—they were trained in street combat techniques and individual terror and sabotage, techniques which have been witnessed during these turbulent days by the whole of Bucharest. Hitmen for certain despotic regimes are also said to have been trained in exchange for money to these camps. If this report is confirmed, it is possible that with time this secret too will appear before the world public in all its lurid details.

It cannot be ruled out that the tyrant, having fled from Bucharest, managed to set in motion the inhuman mechanism of killings. Some time after the disappearance of the Ceausescu family and its henchmen, Free Romanian Television reported the arrival of helicopters delivering foreign mercenaries to the city. The terrorists are still trying to sow panic and death, but they will not succeed in intimidating a people who, having toppled the dictatorship, are filled with the desire to create a peaceful, democratic Romania.

The first Christmas morning brought calm to Bucharest. Streetcars and buses are running, and cars have ventured into the streets. Fresh bread is on sale, stores are open. Newspapers have started appearing. Some of them have new names—LIBERTATE, SCINTEIA POPORULUI—others have a new leadership. ROMANIA LIBERA, which is akin to IZVESTIYA, has included on its editorial board Anton Uncu, Petre Mihai Bacanu, and Mihai Creanga, journalists and rights champions released from prison and exile....

Role of Security Forces, Army Viewed

LD2712095489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Dec 89

[Text] As we have already reported, an extraordinary military tribunal sentenced Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu to death with confiscation of their property for grave crimes against the Romanian people and state. Our correspondent Sergey Zheleznyak reports from Bucharest.

[Zheleznyak] The sentence has been carried out. But groups loyal to them have still not given up their weapons. Today, during the night, there were again exchanges of fire in various areas of Bucharest. The Ceausescu clan had created for its defense secretly trained, I would say schooled [otdressirovanniye: used as performing animals] special forces units, which were under the dictator's direct command. On the whole, consider this: Orphans operated in them, who were provided for, trained, and educated in a spirit of loyality to the clan similiar to loyalty to one's beloved parents. These special forces units had everything, even helicopters without identifying markings. Secret stores of ammunition were created, and all this was under the guise of the fight against terrorism. Here are those who ostensibly were supposed to fight terrorism terrorizing their own people.

Of course it is impossible to ascribe all the opposition only to these special forces units. Undoubtably, they have been joined by officers of state security, of whom there were also many in the country. There were groups of them in practically every enterprise; together with volunteers and conscripted local people, the security forces numbered around 4 million out of a population of 23 million. Of course, I have not seen this figure documented, but it has been given with enviable consistency by Romanian specialists from various countries. Maybe the figure is exaggerated, invented in order to terrify their own people; I can accept this. I can accept it without hesitation. But Romania in the golden age and era of Ceausescu does not cease to be a country of total shadowing and denunciations because of this.

The Army is a different case. In my opinion, until the end of December this year the Army was the most advantageous and profitable enterprise in the country. They, the soldiers, built houses, dams, factories; they gathered the harvest. Of course, they did not receive any payment for this. The income from the Army was not only direct, concrete, and material, but also political. From time to time Ceausescu made reductions in the Armed Forces, presenting this to public opinion as an example of peacemaking. At the expense of the reductions, the military feels, new allocations were made to the security forces. The time has come for the Army to have its word as well. Today, under the leadership of the National Salvation Front and a new command, it controls the situation in the country. In Bucharest and other towns and areas, life is returning to normal.

Mixed Reaction to Ceausescu Execution

PM2712174389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA PRESS SERVICE roundup: "Mixed Reaction"]

[Text] The summary trial and execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceasescu has evoked mixed reaction in the world. The international public is unanimous in its condemnation of the toppled dictatorial regime in Romania. The reasons given by P. Roman, the head of the new government, have met with understanding: The swift execution of the sentence was a forced step undertaken by the National Salvation Front Council to forestall attempts by N. and E. Ceasescu's supporters to liberate them, which would have only increased the bloodshed. At the same time, regret is being expressed in connection with the fact that the leaders of the former regime have taken to their graves many secrets which should have been unraveled in the interests of avoiding anything similar ever recurring in the future.

There are also protests from people who are opposed to capital punishment on principle, including people in our country. Rashid Kadayev, a reserve officer from Vologda, for instance, says in a cable to IZVESTIYA: "I am convinced that the people of Romania did not thirst for the blood of these people...." Alas, after the bloodbath perpetrated by the Ceausescu clan at first in Timisoara and then in Bucharest, the Romanian people would find it difficult to argue, as R. Kadayev does, that "the arsenal of punishments is already immeasurably great...."

Contradictory rumors about the position of the Army are circulating in the Romanian capital. The establishment of various parties in the country is being reported. Prime Minister P. Roman has said in an interview with a special Yugoslav Government envoy that the main task of the country's leadership is the establishment of new organs of power at all levels.

The head of the Swiss foreign affairs department has stated that an investigation will be carried out into Nicolae Ceasescu's deposits in Swiss banks.

Situation After Execution Reported

PM2712090189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Decc 89 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Balandin, A. Ivanko, G. Stepanov roundup under general rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Romania in the Wake of Ceausescu's Execution"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The situation remains uneasy in many cities in Romania, including the capital. Supporters of the Ceausescu regime, using the ramified system of underground tunnels in Bucharest, are surfacing in various parts of the city and firing on military units and militia detachments. The dead include women and children.

Information about casualties is contradictory. According to the West German DPA news agency, citing Hungarian television, a total of some 70,000 people have perished as a result of the "atrocities perpetrated by the special units" and in street clashes, and the number of injured is approaching 300,000.

V. Ciobanu, Romania's former health minister, has said that the number of people killed in Bucharest does not exceed 500. This statement has been rebutted by A. Karasi [name as published], chief surgeon at one of the capital's clinics, who declared that in the capital alone it may be a question of at least 5,000 to 7,000 killed and 15,000-20,000 injured.

The great number of medical workers, who include many volunteers from among medical faculty students, are finding it hard to cope with the influx of casualties.

Citing reports from the Romanian city of Arad, the DPA agency carries an item about the "capture of five Libyan mercenaries" who took part in shelling one of the city's hospitals. G. Horn, Hungary's foreign minister, stated in an address on Hungarian radio that the new Romanian leadership "has evidence of the presence of Arab mercenaries in the country."

Meanwhile the Romanian ambassador has been summoned to the Libyan People's Bureau for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation and a protest has been lodged with him in connection with reports that Libyan hit men fought on the terrorist side. At the same time Libya announced its decision to dispatch medicines and relevant equipment to Romania.

Leading foreign mass media are commenting about the report on the execution in Romania of N. Ceausescu and his wife Elena. The Paris LIBERATION writes for instance: "The Romanian people have been deprived of the right to hold a proper trial of the Ceausescu clique.... In any case, the Army can be reproached with not having given the country the opportunity to freely debate one of the 20th century's most inhuman dictatorships." According to the TF-1 French television channel, the population has received the haste with which the death sentence was carried out with a certain amount of perplexity.

The White House has issued a statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new Romanian Government, the National Salvation Front. However, Press Secretary M. Fitzwater noted: "The U.S. Government regrets that the trial of Ceausescu, the executed dictator, was not open and public." So far the FRG, France, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland, the GDR, and China have recognized the country's new leadership.

REUTER reports with reference to ATA, the ALBANIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY: The Albanian Foreign Ministry has informed the Romanian Embassy that "Albania recognizes the right of the Romanian people to handle their domestic affairs themselves on the basis of freedom, independence, and sovereignty."

The agencies continue to discuss reports about the expediency of using Warsaw Pact troops to quell the flashpoints of terrorist opposition. Official U.S. and French spokesmen let it be known that they would not object to military intervention on the part of the USSR or other East European countries in Romania's affairs on the side of the National Salvation Front. [passage omitted]

It has just become known that Iran has decided to recall its ambassador from Romania because he "incorrectly briefed" the leadership about the situation in the country before Ceausescu's visit. This occurred after a number of Tehran newspapers reported that world public opinion of Iran has seriously deteriorated when it became known "that the country maintains friendship with a government that is hated by its own people."

Two Soviet Tourists 'Gravely Injured'

LD2712230589

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian, in its "Vremya" newscast at 1800 GMT on 27 December, broadcasts a report from Romania by V. N. Nogin, the television's Belgrade correspondent, who says that in the past 4 days, he and his camera crew have crossed into Romania from Yugoslavia three times.

Nogin states that despite the continuing strict controls on the highways in Timisoara, the situation in that city is "gradually returning to normal." The city's democratic committee has established stable communications with the National Salvation Committee in Bucharest and has fully supported its program, Nogin says, adding that the new rule has extended to virtually all spheres of Romania's life. As Nogin speaks, the video shows roads, a roadblock, and armored vehicles.

One of the confirmations of this—not entirely pleasant for journalists, Nogin says, is the fact that the urban authorities of the Romanian town of Turu-Severin banned the Soviet crew from shooting street scenes in the town. Nogin adds that they explained this by the fact that after the decision to introduce field tribunals in Romania against terrorists, who, unfortunately, continue operating, all manner of armed provocations have become possible. He notes that earlier his crew filmed in Romania without any restrictions.

Nogin then says: "Fairly sad circumstances brought us to this town. Three days ago a large group of Soviet tourists passing by motor vehicle through Romania were fired on with automatic weapons, as a result of which 11 were injured, including two gravely injured. Now you can see how Soviet tourists are being brought to the hospital of the Yugoslav border town of Kladavo."

At this point there is an interview with a Soviet woman in a hospital bed, identified as L. Kuzyk, who previously was shown being transported in an ambulance and delivered to the hospital: The woman expresses gratitude to Romanian and Yugoslav doctors for their help, and to the Soviet Embassy for not leaving them in the lurch. Nogin then goes on to advise Soviet tourists still on Romanian highways to postpone travel in Romania, even when in transit.

Bucharest 'Returning to Normal'

LD2712174789 Moscow TASS in English 1707 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Bucharest December 27 TASS—By TASS corespondents Dmitriy Dyakov and Nikolay Morozov:

Life is returning back to normal in the Romanian capital: Shooting has subsided, uninterrupted supplies of water and electricity have been ensured, enterprises and shops have resumed oprations and newspapers are issued on a regular basis.

The Palace Square is still crowded but troops and protesters have been repalced by numerous foreign reporters taking snapshots of what was left by recent clashes. This place was devastated more than any other part in the capital. The university library building, a valuable historical and architectural monument, was razed, the palace that housed the State Council gapes with numerous holes, glass was shattered in all windows of smoke- blackened residential buildings round the square.

When a group of foreign reporters including TASS correspondents was shown around the Central Committee building, some soldiers of the Romanian Army and the patriotic guard, exhausted after days of tension, were taking a rest in former dictator Ceausescu's office. Many of them have not left the building for a single day since December 22, when it was occupied by protesters.

"Along with the television centre and the Foreign Ministry building, the Central Committee headquarters is among the most important places in Bucharest," Colonel N. Berban told TASS. The Council of the National Salvation Front meets here and most of the archives are kept in the building. The building is of great political significance, too, as the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee was the central body of power.

The interior of the building is one big picture of devastation—full of debris, walls pock-marked by bullets, furniture overturned, glass smashed, sandbags piled up in some rooms, unheated and left without water supply. Guards with automatic guns at the ready are posted at every corner, and a watch word is asked on every landing on stairways leading from one floor to another.

Correspondents were informed that at that very moment Army units smoking the last groups of terrorists out of the underground tunnels below. [sentence as received]

In the afternoon, a news conference for Romanian and foreign journalists was held in the Foreign Ministry building, formerly inaccessible to the press. The news conference was told that Sergiu Celak was appointed new minister of foreign affairs. He used to fill a responsible post in the ministry but his diplomatic career ws cut short under Ceausescu and he worked as editor and translator from Russian in a Bucharest publishing house.

During the news conference it was stressed that the new leadership of Romania intended to pursue a policy aiming to promote democracy and cooperation with all countries, respect for human rights and freedoms including the right to free travel.

The following question was asked by TASS at the news conference: The Ceausescu regime is known to have opposed restructuring in the Soviet Union. What is the stance of the new leaders of the Foreign Ministry towards perestroyka? Newly appointed First Deputy Minister C. Bogdan said, among other things, that "without Gorbachev's initiative transformations in Eastern Europe including Romania would have been impossible".

Many Romanians today discussed the dramatic episodes of the trial and execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu televised yesterday. They expressed indignation with the cynicism of the ousted dictator who refused to answer the tribunal's questions, denied his guilt and responsibility and declared the extraordinary tribunal court "illegal".

The mass media continue reporting the support for the Romanian revolution by numerous foreign governments, the statements about the recognition of the country's temporary government, the Council of the National Salvation Front, and the arrival of humanitarian aid from other countries.

'Anarchy,' 'Anticommunist' Mood Grows

PM2712193989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On Events in Romania"]

[Text] According to reports coming out of Romania, the resistance of the security forces loyal to Ceausescu has been broken almost everywhere. Only in a few cities are there occasional exchanges of fire. At the same time it is reported that chaos and anarchy are growing rapidly in the country. There has been a sharp increase in anticommunist sentiments since the majority of the population who suffered from the Ceausescu dictatorship link his name with the communist system.

A rally held in Bucharest 26 December in which around 1,000 people participated was held under anticommunist slogans. A bigger demonstration was planned for later. The leadership of the National Salvation Front appealed to the population to refrain from such an action.

More and more political parties and associations of the most diverse hue are being formed. The country's newly formed leadership has immediately embarked on the speedy abolition of the most unpopular measures and laws of the previous regime. An end to rationing of basic foodstuffs has been announced, along with the abolition of the program to eliminate many Romanian villages which were to be replaced by agro-industrial complexes. Restrictions on movements by the population within the country are being reviewed and the compulsory registration of typewriters has been abolished.

The National Salvation Front Council has issued a decree on transferring the state security department to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense. The reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been announced.

The setting up of military tribunals in all Romanian cities to investigate the crimes of security forces which sided with Ceausescu has been announced. The tribunals will pronounce and carry out their sentences without any delay.

Numerous reports are coming in from abroad on the continuing recognition of the new Romanian regime by various countries. It is also reported that Arab countries have denied reports that there were Arab mercenaries fighting in the Romanian security forces.

British Assistant Military Attache Brown, who returned to London along with other British diplomats who have left Romania, stated on television that he joined with Romanian students in liberating the Romanian television building from Ceausescu supporters.

'Calm' in Bucharest 28 Dec

LD2812092689 Moscow TASS in English 0855 GMT 28 Dec 89

[Text] Bucharest December 28 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Dmitriy Dyakov:

Wet snow hampers the traffic on Bucharest streets. Cars move slowly and uncertainly as they did three or four days ago when Romanian soldiers were suspicious about any fast moving vehicle.

The night was calm, except for several shots in the telegraph office area, reported by soldiers from the Palace Square.

Morning news programs on the Romanian Radio and TV carried information on Romanians' reaction to the trial and execution of the Ceausescus. People are outraged with the cynicism of the former dictator, who refused to answer judges' questions, did not plead guilty or recognise the legality of the extraordinary tribunal.

There were also several reports on donations of medicines, food and clothes from Soviet Moldavia, collected on the initiative of the Soviet-Romanian Friendship Society, the Soviet Red Cross and Moldavian public organisations.

The formation of the new Romanian government will be continued today.

RCP 'No Longer Exists' in Timisoara

PM2812101989 Moscow TRUD in Russian 28 Dec 89 p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondents A. Komrakov and A. Poroshin: "The Last Straw"]

[Excerpt] Timisoara-Arad, 27 Dec—[Passage omitted] How many people died in the first days of the uprising in Timisoara? The figures cited range between 4,000 and 12,000. The atrocities have yet to be investigated. In this connection, it is understandable why the Democratic Front Committee in Timisoara did not approve of the hasty execution of Ceausescu and his wife. In the opinion of the committee members, there should have been a national trial relayed on television. "The world should have learned of Ceausescu's crimes from the man himself," one member of the committee said. Another representative of the the authorities in the city of Arad was more specific: "Ceausescu should have been given a Nuremberg-style trial. That is what he deserved."

There are heated arguments about the country's future. What will be the fate of the Communist Party? It is clear to everyone that the people will no longer tolerate the kind of party created by the Ceausescu clan. The Communist Party no longer exists in Timisoara, but its representatives are being enlisted to perform certain functions. Thus, for instance, the former first secretary of the party committee is being used as a consultant in the process of organizing a peaceful life in the city. The revolution greatly appreciated the fact that he refused to give orders for the insurgent people to be shot.

Romania is experiencing turbulent and disturbing days...

Soviet Trade Unions Condemn Ceausescu Crackdown

LD2212210289 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 22 TASS—Soviet workers reacted with a sense of deep anxiety and compassion to reports of numerous casualties caused by the use of armed forces on government orders in a number of Romanian towns, the Soviet national trade union headquarters said in a statement issued today.

The statement expresses serious concern over these tragic events. The national trade union centre condemns the authorities and individuals guilty of the crack down and expresses hope that urgent measures will be taken to meet the just demands of the working people and that the newly-emerging issues will be settled in the spirit of respect for democracy and humaneness.

Commentary Sees Changes Facing CPCZ

LD2712152989 Moscow International Service in Czech 1800 GMT 26 Dec 89

[Summary] Soviet Radio commentator Aleksandrov says about the situation in Czechoslovakia:

People in Czechoslovakia spoke more about politics this Christmas than ever before as so many things have happened. Czechoslovakia is moving toward democracy; new parties are created. The Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] purifies itself by getting rid of its discredited members and adopting more modern ways. There is no crisis of socialism in Czechoslovakia—only a deformed red-tape system that is falling apart.

"The Soviet Union believes that there is no quick and easy way out for the CPCZ. It will have to do painstaking and consistent work, the aim of which is to attain political and economic stability, to reinforce moral and other guarantees of the people, and the advancement of society on socialist principles. This is the basic way of the CPCZ, and if it follows this way, it can regain the people's trust. But as things look now it will not make it by the time a president is elected. Not enough time has gone by and too much still needs to be done.

"With regard to the Civic Forum, which is the most popular and the main force of opposition, it will be putting forward its candidate, Vaclav Havel, in the open elections in the Federal Assembly. We must also take into consideration that the opposition was able to get many of its people into many leading posts. At the same time, the CPCZ and the opposition, with the exception of a few extremist groups, see their tasks as rapidly overcoming the crisis in the country by the development of democracy and flow of information to the public. I am convinced that they must submit their party and group interests to tackling these tasks. In this lies the guarantee of Czechoslovakia's success as a democratic country.

"I would like to conclude my thoughts about the situation in Czechoslovakia with the words of Mikhail Gorbachev from his speech at the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on 9 December 1989. When comrade Gorbachev spoke about Czechoslovakia and the situation in the CPCZ, he said, quote: In the forefront there is the task of consolidating all forces which defend the positions of socialism, democracy, and progress, end quote.

"People in the USSR hope that the election of a president will contribute to this noble process and that it will not act as a stimuli for the division of forces which take part in this process. Let us hope that the Christmas holiday has given people time for peaceful thoughts so that they are able to determine their attitude in harmony with the country's interests without superfluous emotions."

CSSR's Havel Cited on Civic Forum Role, Poll

PM2712153389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[Interview in Prague with Vaclav Havel by APN special correspondent A. Vinogradov for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA; date of interview not given: "Vaclav Havel on Ideals and Prospects: Guaranteeing Justice"]

[Text] [Vinogradov] Mr Havel, it is quite possible that you will soon become president. Do you think that the word "socialist" will remain in the republic's name?

[Havel] The result of the free elections will be the new Federal Assembly, which will of course adopt a constitution. The draft constitution proposed by "Civic Forum" calls our country the Czechoslovak Republic. It is possible that this draft will be adopted. It depends on the Federal Assembly. The new Federal Assembly.

[Vinogradov] And on the president himself as well, no doubt....

[Havel] As far as I am aware, the president does not submit constitutional initiatives to the Federal Assembly. But it looks as if there is greater consensus than difference of opinion regarding the country's name. So it is quite possible that the word "socialist" will disappear from the name. There are specific reasons for such a step, incidentally. In the context of our language this word has been discredited and has lost all meaning. However, this does not mean that our society will not be socially just.

[Vinogradov] If you have no objections, we will now talk about the future. Free elections have taken place. What future has been planned for "Civic Forum"? Will it be divided into separate parties and political clubs or will it stay in its present form? What will its place be in the political process?

[Havel] I can scarcely tell you anything about the future of "Civic Forum" after the free elections. Life will reveal it to us. The aim of "Civic Forum" before the elections is to guarantee their groundwork and their genuine freedom. It stands to reason that the forum will propose that the population support separate political forces and parties and specific people from among the independent candidates. There are people whom "Civic Forum" will not support, or whom it will suggest are not supported. "Civic Forum" itself, however, will not become a political party that will directly put forward or delegate its own candidates. In a word, "Civic Forum" must guarantee—and, I would even say, must be the basic guarantee of—the development and deepening of the changes which have begun in our country which are leading to the formation of a really creative, pluralist democratic society.

[Vinogradov] Whom do you consider to be your most serious political opponent?

[Havel] The times are such that increasing numbers of talented people are appearing on the political horizon. I hope that this will continue. I also hope that a number of strong political opponents will appear.

[Vinogradov] How did you imagine the ideal president of your country 20 or maybe 25 years ago?

[Havel] The ideal of a worthy head of state—though this is hard to achieve—has always been our first president, Masaryk.

[Vinogradov] What are your Christmas greetings to your supporters and...to everyone else?

[Havel] I hope that everyone lives in peace, calm, and in hope.

Moscow Views CSSR Presidential Elections

LD2812100389 Moscow International Service in Slovak 1800 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Valentin Aleksandrov commentary]

[Text] Esteemed listeners, neither you nor we have any doubts. It seems clear that on 29 December at Prague Castle the people will be addressed by Acting President Vaclav Havel.

In my view, what matters is not so much the personality of Vaclav Havel, a well-known fighter for human rights. The leading official of the Civic Forum and the political streams in unison with it has become in the eyes of his fellow citizens a symbol of democracy and of free expression of will, not only because he was often persecuted in the past. We pay our respect to him for his persistence and loyalty to his views, regardless of the fact that we do not support him in everything.

Everything that is applicable personally to Vaclav Havel is looked after in the Civic Forum by a group of advisers, that is by the apparatus that deals with the election campaign. Among them, naturally, are people who share his democratic views. They are even in the majority. Among them, however, are also people who hope that they will be able to misuse the inexperienced politician-playwright in their own interest which has nothing in common with socialism, who see the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] as a force able to prevent, despite the difficulities it is going through at the moment, the dismantling of the existing political system in the country. They are aware that its influence among the people, although badly damaged by the administrative-directive methods of the previous leadership, cannot be ignored.

Many thousands of Communists and millions of working people believe in the socialist way of development of their country. They believe that the purified and restored CPCZ will be able to work for the well-being of socialist society. That was the very reason why the Civic Forum, under pressure from some of its leading officials, refused the proposal of the CPCZ to organize direct, nationwide elections of the future president. By implementing this proposal everything would fall in its proper place. In spite of this, they were able to promote the letter of the constitution which, as is known, says that the president is to be elected by the Federal Assembly.

This move has a simple explanation. It is easier and more reliable to pressure the limited number of members of the Federal Assembly—who are already under pressure in this direction—than millions of citizens. Furthermore, the opposition has been openly implementing a policy which is directed at changes in the composition of the Federal Assembly itself. Some deputies have been recalled by their electorate. The opposition also insists on direct television relays of the session so people can see how each deputy has voted. The opposition thinks logically that under these conditions hardly anybody will have the courage not to vote for the candidate of the Civic Forum. This, in my view, is the political situation on the eve of the presidential elections.

It is difficult to predict the development of events in the future. The issue is not the choice between the Civic Forum and the CPCZ. Czechoslovakia, as we know, has long democratic traditions. I think that in a joint democratic process the Civic Forum and the renewed CPCZ will cooperate for the people's well-being. I think that this development will be welcomed in the USSR.

Radicals 'Satisfied' With CPCZ Congress

PM2712143589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS correspondent V. Rzhevskiy dispatch specially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "CPCZ After Extraordinary Congress. Program of Renewal"]

[Text] Prague—"Separate the wheat from the chaff," a placard in the lobby of the Prague Palace of Culture said. It is no easy task to swiftly make a detailed analysis of the abyss of accumulated problems and find the correct way out of the crisis in which the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party] finds itself. A 2-day extraordinary CPCZ Congress was held here.... The delegates, elected at district party conferences, worked until late evening. Hundreds of journalists could see and hear what herculean work this was.

First impressions have not yet settled down, but it is impossible not to note the main point—the party is alive and well, and the hundreds of thousands of Communists are with it, with the people, heart and soul and are vitally interested in rapidly overcoming the crisis and restoring a democratic CPCZ oriented toward man, toward the country's vital interests.

The congress expelled V. Bilak from the party, describing him as a representative of the forces that were the initiators of the intervention by foreign armies in August 1968. The party membership of 33 former CPCZ leadership personnel was suspended for blatant political errors.

The course of the debate at the congress was heated, and there were sometimes emotional outbursts. The delegates worked all out to adopt the CPCZ action program, which is a platform for creating a socially just democratic and humane society. Around 200 observations were incorporated in the draft of the program.... It deems the document "The Lessons of the Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th CPCZ Congress" to be null and void. All CPCZ members expelled for condemning the forcible suppression of the "Prague spring" or on other political grounds are rehabilitated. The CPCZ action program contains the main tasks for the upcoming difficult period of restoring the party's capacity for action and the working people's trust. The CPCZ advocates cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on a basis of equality. On the eve of the congress and in the corridors you often heard forecasts of a possible split in the CPCZ. The preconditions for this did exist. In recent weeks a radical wing within the party—the Democratic Forum of Communists—demanding fundamental changes in the CPCZ had emerged. On the eve of the congress its spokesman Rudolf Prevratil stated that the Democratic Forum is not just an ideological current within the party, but is also emerging as an organizational-political structure that now musters around 60,000 people. The Democratic Forum put forward four main demands: that new people be elected to the CPCZ leadership, that the current party apparatus be disbanded at all levels, that party organs be built anew on the basis of democratic principles, and it called on the congress to make an objective analysis of the deformations of socialism in Czechoslovakia, including the whole period after 1968. The Democratic Forum also demanded that the congress adopt a resolution on the responsibility of the CPCZ for the policy that was pursued and formulate guarantees of democratic principles in the party's future policy.

We will judge from the results of the CPCZ Congress whether the party is capable of beginning to implement the building of true socialism. If this is not done, the Democratic Forum and hundreds of thousands of Communists will leave the CPCZ, R. Prevratil stressed.

Judging from the initial reaction, the radical wing of the CPCZ is satisfied with the results of the congress. Time will tell how the party as a whole greets them. Ladislav Adamec, until recently head of the CSSR Government, was elected CPCZ chairman in a secret ballot. Vasil Mohorita, until a month ago head of the Czechoslovak Socialist Youth Union, was elected first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee. Karel Urbanek was elected chairman of the CPCZ Central Control and Audit Commission. The party's new Central Committee has 140 members. The list of members has not yet been published, but, taking into account the composition of the congress delegates, it has been almost totally renewed.

Zdenek Mlynar on USSR, E. Europe Reforms

PM2712171989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview in Moscow with Prof Zdenek Mlynar by own correspondent Leonid Shinkarev: "Power and Society"; date of interview not given—first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] As reported in the press earlier, Zdenek Mlynar, professor of political science at Innsbruck University, Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee secretary in 1968, "Prague Spring" activist, and one of the authors of the "CPCZ Action Program," visited Moscow during the proceedings of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the invitation of the Soviet Association of Political Science and the M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University. He delivered lectures at Moscow University, the Economics of the World Socialist System Institute, and the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law and met with politicians and public figures. Before his departure from the Soviet Union Prof Mlynar gave an interview to IZVESTIYA. [passage omitted]

[Shinkarev] The program of the Czechoslovak Government of National Understanding envisages a profound reform of political, societal, and economic life and a switch to creating a market-type economy. Will this not run into opposition from your conservative forces, might they not declare that the new processes are an effort to dismantle socialism?

[Mlynar] When people speak of "defending socialism" they most often have in mind the preservation of the vestiges of the old system to which many functionaries owed their posts and privileges. They may exaggerate the flaws of the new processes in an effort to focus the masses' attention on them and evoke a negative attitude toward the changes. Your perestroyka has demonstrated the tactics typical of the conservative forces. For example, the introduction of market relations can be accompanied by heightened activity on the part of speculators and their visible enrichment. This kind of phenomenon is difficult to avoid, but it can be kept in check, provided you don't get frightened that everything might fall through as a result. Let us remember that the previous system, which described itself as "socialist," collapsed for entirely different reasons. Above all because it was based on administrative-edict principles. Only champions of the old thinking can see a danger to socialism in elements of market relations.

The question of the nature of socialism, as long as it is not identified with the Stalinist system, is a complex theoretical question which is being debated throughout the world. Clearly, this debate was banned only in the Soviet Union because people here were convinced that socialism was what they had. And they were good at silencing those who did not like it. If this debate also develops in your country I believe that this in itself will be a sign of progress and that it will bring Soviet society even closer to other present-day democratic societies.

[Shinkarev] I know that you give courses in "East-West Relations," "The Development of Soviet-type Systems" and so forth at Innsbruck University. How do you view the processes taking place in Czechoslovakia in the context of the events currently under way in East Europe?

[Mlynar] They are closely interconnected. It is important for people not just in Czechoslovakia but also in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and the GDR to realize that this interconnection is in fact greater than might appear. If we want to change political relations in Europe, if in the longer term we are to build the "common European home," then I believe the existing blocs should proceed in a more coordinated fashion, must act in concert, by mutual agreement. Just as it is inconceivable for, say, Holland to conduct a policy which has not been coordinated with its partners in the European community, it is difficult to imagine that Czechoslovakia, or any other country, could take important steps irrespective of its accords with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

I will say it again: In Czechoslovakia, and also in the GDR, efforts to reform society have been delayed. The pressure from the masses is great, but a mechanism capable of regulating this process is still lacking. The danger lies in the fact that events might take an unexpected turn. I cannot rule out that some group of influential conservative politicians, availing themselves of a suitable moment, might try to thwart the policy of perestroyka. Therefore understanding between the friendly countries is even more necessary so that joint actions can be taken within the framework of European political culture. The processes are so closely interlinked that it is difficult to imagine that should perestroyka in, for instance, the Soviet Union fail, the development in central European countries could continue along the democratic channels we see today.

[Shinkarev] Do you think that the threat to perestroyka is nonetheless real?

[Mlynar] In the Soviet Union, in my opinion, a situation has taken shape where the old system is no longer functioning and the new system has not yet come fully into play. This is a stressful time. And in some respects a dangerous time. If it is impossible within a year or two to achieve tangible positive results, the broad masses might lose confidence in this policy and will no longer be willing to make sacrifices and take risks for its sake. That would be very bad. The main difficulty lies in the fact that there is a knot of contradictions (ethnic, social, economic, and other contradictions) which has not appeared today. If you want to unravel one thread, it is necessary to unravel them all, otherwise this knot will become even tighter, even harder to unravel.

What is needed here is patience. We must all get rid of the notion that either we are in power, or our actions have no effect on the process. The time has come to think in democratic terms. If I am in the minority, but I am guaranteed the right to express my opinion rather than being silenced, then everything is in order. A minority may become the majority. All new initiatives are launched as a minority cause. Nothing new ever has the support of the majority from the outset.

And patience, I must repeat, is what we all lack. This applies above all in Russia, where even prerevolutionary experience taught people to think along the following lines: Whoever is in power is omnipotent, he can only be toppled. Probably the most negative aspect of bolshevism is radicalism and intolerance of alternative solutions. However, this cannot be overcome by espousing another kind of radicalism. Everything can be achieved with the help of patience, democratic thinking, and a contest of ideas.

Naturally, this is more easily said than done in practice. In society people defend contradictory interests, they fight for them. And there is another reason why it is difficult to preach restraint to them. They have been patient for a long time and have gained nothing by it.

[Shinkarev] You have attended a session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and have seen what a multitude of problems they have to grapple with in pursuit of their aim...

[Mlynar] I have been able to see there once again how important it is to face realities squarely, to see them as they are rather than as we would have them be. For instance, I am not one of those who believe that during the "Prague Spring" the Czechoslovak leadership proceeded wisely in every way. We underestimated the changes which took place in the Soviet Union after Khrushchev's fall and Brezhnev's accession. We failed to perceive in this the switch to rigid neo-Stalinism which became obvious after 1968. This was where we, and I myself personally, went wrong. Everyone must answer for the actual results, not for what he was hoping would happen. The result of our efforts at that time, as you know, was dire. During the next 20 years the situation in our country became worse than it had been prior to the "Prague Spring." Psychologically it is difficult to implement a specific policy and at the same time bear in mind that it may fail, that someone may thwart it. It is a matter of either... or... I have tried to expound my thoughts on this subject in my new book "What Can Gorbachev Do?"

[Shinkarev] Well, what can he do?

[Mlynar] In the West people are trying to assess the changes in the Soviet Union by comparing them with systems which exist in Germany, or Britain, or France. I believe that this approach is wrong. It is necessary to take account of the Soviet system's potential. Pluralism is essential, but its forms and pace of development are not conditioned by foreign models but the economic, social, and political characteristics of the Soviet society. Imitation may be partly necessary when it comes to, for instance, the creation of a rule-of-law state. There is no need to invent anything here, these structures exist in many countries. I believe that it is possible to copy certain principles.

When it comes to building a system of the democratic expression of diverse social interests, however, the country's specific conditions have to be taken into account. For instance, the problem of the labor collective's interests is posed in a unique fashion in the Soviet Union. The problem of the multiparty system's development is posed differently in the West because the multiparty system has always been the point of departure there. Whereas here the point of departure has been the one-party system. I believe that even in your country the creation of qualitatively new structures is inevitable, but the forms and pace of change must be approached from the angle of the prevailing conditions.

Inevitably, your renewal looks like a contradictory process. Reformist politicians have to fight on two fronts—against the essentially antireformist forces (the conservatives) and at the same time against those who advocate extreme radical measures which could get out of the reformists' control. However, it seems to me that the domestic policy preconditions for keeping the process of renewal under control "from above" are better in the Soviet Union than they were in Czechoslovakia during the "Prague Spring." It is a question of how to ensure in practice the elimination of a system which dates back to the times of the totalitarian Stalinist dictatorship and to replace it with a system capable of evolution and incorporating the necessary elements of democracy.

In the foreword to the second edition of the book "Cold Wind Blowing From the Kremlin" I wrote that current Soviet policy is creating favorable conditions for a possible reform in Czechoslovakia. Under Gorbachev, I believe, the threat of an invasion by troops as a result of changes similar to those which were introduced during the "Prague Spring" would not arise.

[Shinkarev] Zdenek, do not the changes in Czechoslovakia make you want to return home?

[Mlynar] I am very pleased that the opportunity has emerged to take part directly in the processes of renewal, to be able to visit, discuss, and write. My books will be published in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. In this way it is possible to really influence what is happening. I have no desire to hold high posts again in some hierarchy or other, but I intend to visit my country and the Soviet Union frequently. Especially during this stressful time. In my opinion, the coming year, 1990, will be of decisive importance for the fate of the reforms.

CSSR's Dienstbier Invited To Visit FRG

PM2712143389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 7

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "Border Meeting"]

[Excerpt] Prague—For the second time now the Czechoslovak foreign minister, equipped with wire-cutters, has symbolically cut the border fence's barbed wire together with a Western colleague. A week ago this took place on the Austrian border and now on the border with the FRG.

During the meeting, which took place Saturday [23 December], H.-D. Genscher invited the Czechoslovak minister to visit the FRG at the beginning of the new year. Agreement was reached on opening consulates general, concluding treaties on the expansion of economic cooperation, and backing youth exchanges. The possibility of doing away with visas and building new border crossings will also be discussed in Bonn. The FRG is prepared to support Czechoslovakia's wish to become a member of international financial organizations, and to contribute to the intensification of Czechoslovakia's relations with the European Community. J. Dienstbier announced that a commission of Czechoslovak and German historians will be set up which will objectively discuss the problems of the past, including the question of the German citizens who suffered innocently when they were expelled from western parts of Czechoslovakia after the war.

At a news conference the Czechoslovak foreign minister declared his position on the reunification of Germany. This process must take place gradually, in step with the unification of Europe. It is necessary to avoid everything that might give rise to old and new fears. Czechoslovakia regards the borders of the Polish People's Republic as inviolable. All steps toward the unification of Germany must be undertaken within the framework of a universal accord, without giving rise to confrontation but, on the contrary, by promoting mutual understanding. [passage omitted]

Vremya Looks at German Reunification

LD2612223289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Dec 89

[Video report by V. Kondratyev in Bonn—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The year now ending, 1989, has been declared the year of the Germans by the West German press. What had remained an unattainable dream for 4 decades has in 2 months, it is being noted here, acquired its first real outline—in a line of an anthem written in the last century, "Germany, united Fatherland." After the formation of the GDR, the famous quadriga with the goddess of victory on the historic Brandenburg Gate was turned 180 degrees, toward the East. However, the eyes of the Germans in the GDR are now, in the opinion of their compatriots on the other side of the border, becoming more and more fixed on the West. It has been announced that the federal government intends to put the treaty-based community between the FRG and the GDR, which was outlined recently in Dresden, into practice swiftly, right from the first days of the new year. However, cooperation between the states within a confederative framework is seen in Bonn as just an intermediate step toward complete unity. [Video shows old film of traffic moving through the Brandenburg Gate, Kohl doing likewise last week; Kohl meeting Mitterrand at a train station]

Against this background, statements by representatives of the victorious powers, which are far from interested in haste in the problem of German reunification, are rejected here with marked irritation. The seven fundamentally important questions asked by the Soviet foreign minister during his stay in Brussels are being described here as inquisitorial and devoid of topical importance. To be sure, Genscher's ministry, with its characteristic diplomacy and circumspection, promised to study them in detail, pointing out that the Soviet Union had not spoken out in principle against the future unity of Germany. [Video shows Shevardnadze addressing a meeting; Genscher in a hall]

While military confrontation exists and while there are no firm guarantees that a unified Germany will not be a factor of instability and a new headache for its neighbors, the policy of German reunification—with which, to date, it emerges from surveys that the majority of the population of the GDR do not agree, either—is perfectly capable of prompting an exacerbation of the political climate on our continent. But we have to think of the future right now. That is why there needs to be an answer to questions which some may consider inquisitorial, but which cannot be avoided. [Video shows Kondratyev standing outside a building]

GDR, FRG Contemplate Economic Cooperation

PM2212112989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 16

[IZVESTIYA PRESS SERVICE report under the general headline "GDR and the FRG: Politics and Economics"]

[Text] The FRG and the GDR have agreed to set up a joint economic commission and conclude an agreement on economic cooperation. The two documents could be signed as early as next week, during FRG Chancellor H. Kohl's forthcoming visit to the country. This was announced by FRG Economics Minister H. Haussmann at the end of his talks in Berlin.

According to the minister, the way is now open to cooperation between small and medium firms in the FRG and enterprises in the GDR: More than 40 percent of West German businessmen have stated their readiness to invest in developing the economy of the neighboring German state. Medicine, power engineering, environmental protection, and automobile construction are being discussed as areas for cooperation.

It is also reported that the GDR has made contact with the IMF.

Meanwhile, demonstrations in the country are continuing. In Erfurt, for example, more than 10,000 people have taken to the streets. The participants are demanding that the republic's social achievements be preserved and the GDR strengthened. Some also carried banners demanding the reunification of the two German states.

Opening of Brandenburg Gate Crossings Noted

PM2712150089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent S. Baygarov report: "Crossings at the Brandenburg Gate"]

[Text] Berlin, 22 Dec—New pedestrian border crossings were opened in the Berlin Wall at 1500 today, in the region of the Brandenburg Gate.

This happened in the presence of the heads of government of the GDR and the FRG—Hans Modrow and Helmut Kohl, the mayors of Berlin and West Berlin, and thousands of citizens from both sides. There was a live television relay. It was decided to abolish, from 24 December, visas for FRG citizens visiting the GDR. Thus the border is open to Germans in both directions. But, while being open, it still exists.

The political leaders of various countries have spoken unequivocally of the inviolability of the postwar European borders. Special relations between the GDR and the FRG, which differ in their social systems and belong to different military-political alliances, can only develop within the context of common European processes.

NATO 'Galvanizing' 'Espionage' in GDR

PM2712101189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Instead of Aid—Espionage?"]

[Text] Berlin, 26 Dec—The opening of the border crossing points in the region of the Brandenburg Gates in Berlin has created one more favorable opportunity for exchange between inhabitants of the GDR, the FRG, and West Berlin and for the establishment of honest, frank relations between states with different social systems. But far from everyone is in a hurry to renounce the "image of the enemy." While verbally greeting the changes taking place in the socialist countries the NATO states are galvanizing their espionage activity here.

The GDR department for the safeguarding of constitutional rights has reported that the secret services of the West, primarily of the United States and the FRG, are expanding the dimensions of their political and economic espionage in the GDR. They proceed from the premise that the formation of a single German state is allegedly inevitable. But they believe that two options are possible—a relatively rapid reunification and gradual rapprochement.

The second path could lead to the stabilization of the situation in the GDR and the restoration of the authority of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany- Party of Democratic Socialism and to the growth of the influence of the political forces advocating the renewal of socialism. This obviously does not suit the NATO "champions of democracy." They have elaborated plans to discredit the leading GDR statesmen. Exploiting the fact that the competence of the national security organs has declined recently, agents, whose network has been considerably expanded, are being infiltrated into the leading organs of various parties and public organizations and into military organizations.

Having made public materials relating to the illegal subversive activity of the Western special services, the ADN news agency is warning of the danger of mindless euphoria over the open state border and calling for sensible vigilance to be preserved.

Bulgarian Minister on Ties With Romania, Turkey

PM2712111189 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 23 Dec 89 p 6

[Own correspondent Yu. Savin dispatch: "Bulgaria's Position"]

[Text] Sofia, 22 Dec—At a meeting with journalists Bulgarian Foreign Minister Boyko Dimitrov, touching on events in Romania, recalled: As far back as 19 December the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry expressed concern at the fact that the Romanian side had unilaterally and without warning introduced restrictions on transit procedures on the Bulgarian-Romanian border. At the same time B. Dimitrov stressed that in reacting at state level it is also necessary to take into account the country's economic interests, since each year 3 million tonnes of freight vital to the Bulgarian economy transit via Romania.

Touching on Bulgarian-Turkish relations and the problems of the Bulgarian Muslims, the minister noted that under the former regime decisions on these questions were adopted single-handedly. The Foreign Ministry, the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Central Committee, and even the Politburo were confronted with a fait accompli. This question, it was said at the meeting, is very delicate because of the emotion accumulated among the population.

The BCP Central Committee, it was said at the meeting, has created a commission headed by Aleksandr Lilov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, that will carefully analyze all aspects of the problem and formulate a party stance. Representatives of the entire spectrum of Bulgaria's social forces will be involved in the discussion of the question, for it is a problem not only for the BCP but for all Bulgarian citizens, all society, and it can be solved only on the basis of broad social consensus.

Political good will and the maximum sense of tact and responsibility are required in order to open a new page in Bulgarian-Turkish dialogue, the minister stressed. He also said that there are sufficient grounds to expect his Turkish colleague to bring a constructive position to the 9 January meeting in Kuwait. The Bulgarian side is also preparing to bring such a position.

New Bulgarian Foreign Minister Cited on Changes

PM2712171789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 12

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov dispatch: "Critical Questions for the Minister"]

[Text] The first meeting has been held between new Bulgarian Foreign Minister Boyko Dimitrov and authorized journalists in Sofia.

B. Dimitrov noted that the former regime had wanted outward effects and had held expensive and pompous international measures, forums, and meetings. However, their actual effect was minimal. Perestroyka needs an effective and economical foreign policy, the minister stressed. Cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries and active Bulgarian participation in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, as well as the maintenance of good-neighborly relations with the Balkan states, are still priorities.

As regards Bulgarian-Turkish relations, which became very tense at the end of May in connection with the mass exodus of "Bulgarian Muslims" into Turkey, the minister said: If we are to open a new chapter in these relations, political will is needed on both sides and political tact and responsibility must be shown. He expressed the hope that his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister M. Yilmaz, scheduled for 9 January in Kuwait, will be constructive. At the same time, he stressed that the Bulgarian people will not tolerate interference in their internal affairs or infringement of the country's sovereignty and integrity.

The minister was also asked how the decision on changing the names of "Bulgarian Muslims" to Slavic names had originally been received.

"That decision," the minister answered, "was adopted by the previous regime without notifying the Foreign Ministry, the country's government, or even the Politburo. All of these organs were faced with a fait accompli. What is the way out of a situation that arises as the result of a subjective decision adopted by one person? That question has already been examined at the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee plenum in December..."

Since the minister referred to the plenum resolution, I will take the liberty of quoting from it: "Party policy, aimed at consolidating the people, must be based on complete legal equality among all Bulgarian citizens, regardless of differences in social position, religion, cultural origin, or ethnic consciousness."

After the December plenum Aleksandur Lilov, Politburo member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, said that this was one of the most critical problems and that the party is filled with the wish and desire to find a solution. He noted that this complex problem must be thoroughly and profoundly analyzed. A BCP Central Committee commission would be created for that purpose, A. Lilov said.

The foreign minister told the journalists that such a commission is already working, under A. Lilov's leadership. Not just BCP partners from social organizations, but also those people who do not agree with the party's position will be involved in the discussion of this question, since the problem confronts not just the Bulgarian Communists but all of society and all Bulgarian citizens.

"This question is extremely complex and cannot be resolved by improvisation; it must be examined purely on the basis of current interpretations of human rights as laid down in the Vienna documents and on the basis of observing Bulgarian national interests. There must be no illusions in this respect."

The minister was then asked about his meeting with the SFRY ambassador in Sofia and, in particular, about the Macedonian minority. B. Dimitrov answered that the processes taking place in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have much in common. There is a broad basis here for constructive cooperation. The two countries' borders will be opened wide for the exchange of visitors. Basing ourselves on the principles of good-neighborliness and collaboration, we can go forward successfully and overcome the negative features of the past, B. Dimitrov said.

"Personally, I am convinced that there are no grounds, either historical or legal, for raising the question of the Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria," the minister noted.

Gusev Confers With Hungarian Deputy Premier

PM2712145989 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 24 Dec 89 p 3

[TASS report: "Working Meeting"]

[Text] Budapest, 22 Dec—A working meeting between the chairmen of the national sections of the Soviet-Hungarian intergovernmental commission on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation—V.K. Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and P. Medgyessy, deputy chairman of the Hungarian Republic's Council of Ministers—has taken place.

Attention was focused on problems of Soviet-Hungarian economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, including questions associated with the restructuring of the mechanism of bilateral links and the transition to a new system of mutual settlements using freely convertible currency in line with current world prices.

SFRY President Sends Thanks for Message

PM2712151189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[SFRY President Drnovsek message of thanks to USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

[Text] To the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Dear Comrades,

On behalf of the SFRY Presidency and myself I thank you for the cordial congratulations to us on Republic Day.

I am confident that we shall continue to strengthen and develop our all-around cooperation and maintain the intensive dialogue to which exceptional importance has always been attached.

We wish you great success in the work of implementing perestroyka and the further democratization and development of the USSR.

[Signed] Janez Drnovsek, president of the SFRY Presidency

West Europe

TASS Cites Kohl on Changes in East Europe

LD2712181889 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Bonn December 27 TASS—West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has described reforms carried out in the Soviet Union and political changes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR as remarkable events of the outgoing year 1989 which would go down in history. These changes whose purpose is to achieve freedom, humaneness and economic wellbeing throughout the continent are in line with the interests of all the people in Europe, he wrote in an article published by the newspaper EINHEIT, organ of the West German Union of Miners and Power Engineering Workers.

According to Chancellor Kohl, a new period is beginning in the history of the continent which opens up prospects that were difficult to imagine several months ago. Chancellor Kohl believes that problems connected with it can be settled only through confidence-based cooperation of all European countries, and of great powers.

Kohl reaffirmed understanding he had reached in Dresden with GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow on a possibility to conclude an agreement next spring about large-scale cooperation and good neighbourly relations between West Germany and the GDR.

French Interior Minister Leads Group to USSR

Grants Interview Prior to Visit

PM2812112589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 12

[Interview in Paris with French Interior Minister Pierre Joxe by Yu. Kovalenko; date not given: "France-USSR. First Contacts. Can We Make Use of the French Experience in the Fight Against Crime?"— first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Paris—The French interior minister, the eminent politician Pierre Joxe, is coming to visit the Soviet Union. This is the first visit to our country by a head of the French Interior Ministry in the whole history of bilateral relations. On the eve of the visit, P. Joxe received a Soviet delegation headed by USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Demidov, which was familiarizing itself with Interpol's activity in France.

"Such contacts," the minister said, "are quite a new thing, because previously relations between certain services in our two ministries were not marked by great trust. But during 1989 I met with the Polish, Hungarian and GDR interior ministers—which had never happened before. These first contacts must become a normal thing from now on."

[Kovalenko] In the Soviet Union, everyone is extremely alarmed by the growth in crime in our country. In France, on the other hand, crime has been successfully reduced in recent years. To what extent could we make use of your experience?

[Joxe] Two attitudes must be combined in the fight against crime: repressive measures, which are unavoidable, and crime prevention, which is one of the main conditions for resolving this problem. It is in the sphere of crime prevention that we have done a great deal, and our policy has turned out to be extraordinarily effective. Of course, we are prepared to share our experience, but I am not sure that we are a model. The French police force has undoubtedly accumulated a certain amount of experience in the sphere of professional training and in acquiring the most up-to-date equipment, and it is now considered one of the best among the EEC countries.... The police force, like other state services, must keep in step with progress, have better-qualified and better-trained employees, be in constant contact with society, and be able to adapt to the changing situation and adjust to new tasks.

There is a real opportunity for cooperation in the sphere of civil security. This kind of cooperation is quite necessary, and solidarity knows no borders or political systems. We have at our disposal special subunits which can immediately be flown out to any spot on the globe to take part in rescue operations. But this did take a great deal of preparatory work. We have been creating a network of different services and subunits and acquiring the necessary equipment over a period of many years. And international cooperation helped us a great deal here.

[Kovalenko] To what do you intend to pay particular attention in the USSR?

[Joxe] We know that M.S. Gorbachev wants the democratization of the Soviet state and wants to form new structures. But we would like to know how these problems are being resolved locally—in the republics and oblasts. The transfer from a centralized to a decentralized system takes a long time. However, local democracy is very important, because that is where the experiment is carried out and where important decisions that concern everyday life are adopted. So we want to visit not just Moscow but also other cities in the Soviet Union.

Welcomed by Bakatin

LD2612230189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Dec 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A delegation from the French Interior Ministry, led by Minister Pierre Joxe, has arrived in Moscow. They were met at Sheremetyevo Airport by USSR Interior Minister Bakatin. The aim of the visit is to discuss the development of cooperation between the two countries in the fight against crime. The program for the French delegation's stay includes acquaintance with the work of the Soviet Union's internal affairs bodies, trips around the country, and the signing of joint documents. [video shows Joxe and delegation meeting Bakatin and others]

Received by Kryuchkov

LD2712232689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1645 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 27 Dec (TASS)—Yesterday Vladimir Kryuchkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR State Security Committee, received Pierre Joxe, French interior minister, who is on a brief visit to the USSR. Jean-Marie Merillon, French ambassador to the USSR, was present at the meeting.

UK Vote on Prosecution of War Criminals Viewed

PM2712165189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[TASS political observer Ye. Babenko article for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Without Limit of Time"]

[Excerpts] The positive changes taking place in the world, notably under the influence of the peaceful revolutionary processes in the socialist countries, are making it possible today to resolve problems on which it had previously been impossible to make headway. This relates to the most diverse aspects of modern society's activity.

It is really in this light that one should view the discussion held this week in the British Parliament's House of Commons, after which parliamentarians by an overwhelming majority of 225 votes advocated formulating a law enabling the prosecution of Nazi war criminals now living in Britain. Until now it has not been possible to try these persons because they committed their crimes outside Britain and were not British subjects at the time. [Passage omitted]

The British parliamentarians demonstrated an attitude toward Nazism that it deserves. And they are not alone in their intentions in contemporary West Europe. During this period the well-known neofascist J.-M. Le Pen, chairman of a European right-wing group, was deprived of parliamentary immunity at a European parliamentary session. This is the first time that anything like the ballot in London's Parliament has happened. A pronounced drop is noted in the earlier-identified increase in neofascist influence in the FRG.

It is difficult to say yet whether British legislation as applied to Nazi war criminals will really be changed. The final decision rests with the cabinet. And it is not certain to be positive. Earlier the House of Lords, in contrast to the House of Commons, voted "against" on this question.

But a positive trend has been revealed—and this is the significance of the vote in the British House of Commons.

Latin America & Caribbean

Reportage, Reaction to U.S. Actions in Panama

Perfilyev on Soviet Attitude

LD2712201889 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] [Announcer] Our attitude to the United States' invasion of Panama is definite: We condemn the U.S. action. Nevertheless, one sometimes hears assertions that the Soviet Union is waiving its principles for the sake of maintaining good relations with the United States. What does the USSR Foreign Ministry think about this? We telephoned comrade Perfilyev, first deputy chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate today. Here is what he said:

[Begin Perfilyev recording] Firstly, it must be said that we are not dealing with just our principles when we comment on what has happened in Panama in connection with the United States' armed intervention. We are dealing with generally recognized norms of both international law and morality—principles which are also enshrined, in particular, in the United Nations Charter.

Attention needs to be paid here to the fact that, besides the Soviet Government statement—which has, of course, become widely known in the world and is itself already an important step in the chain of political efforts to avert an expansion of that aggression—a whole series of steps has been taken. In particular, our foreign minister has met Matlock, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow. There have also been meetings by Bessmertnykh, our first deputy foreign minister, and Petrovskiy, a deputy foreign minister, with the U.S. Ambassador; and each time stress was laid on this principled stance—the impermissibility of such intervention and the need for it to be stopped. In addition, the Soviet Union has actively and repeatedly pronounced condemnations of that operation at the UN Security Council in the last few days. At the Security Council, our representative, Comrade Belonogov, supported the resolution which condemned the U.S. action. As you know, that resolution could not be adopted because of the veto imposed by the United States, Britain, and France.

In addition, you know that a whole series of violations of generally recognized norms of international law has occurred in Panama, characterized by that armed intervention—but there have also been operations regarding several foreign embassies, including, for instance, Cuba's and Nicaragua's and, recently, the mission representing the Vatican. In connection, with statements by the Cuban authorities and us, in particular, the whole groundlessness of the United States' attempts to dictate their conditions for the work of a foreign embassy on the territory of another country has been demonstrated. Today we commented on possible further discussion in the Security Council of the issue of encroachments upon the rights of other diplomatic missions, including the Cuban mission.

Those are just some of the efforts which have been made. It should be said that they are well known. Just 1 to 1 and ½ hours after it became known, our condemnation of that action also became known to the whole world. When we are told that the Soviet Union is perhaps not making sufficiently energetic efforts, it should be born in mind here that contemporary international relations are characterized by the fact that they are predominantly political relations. To be sure, there are also coercive actions in the arsenal of the contemporary international community, but they are taken where it is necessary, with the agreement of the international community. The United Nations international forces can be used if an appropriate decision is adopted at the level of the United Nations.

That is what I would like to say in this regard, and I would like to stress that this principled stance of the Soviet Union has been received throughout the world with due understanding. The Soviet Union's reaction has already become an important factor in foreign policy which, we hope, will make it possible, if not to end that intervention completely in the immediate future—which, of course, we demand—then at least to stop that action from growing and to prevent even more negative consequences arising from it. [end recording]

U.S. Said Acting Against Media

LD2212204789 Moscow TASS in English 2009 GMT 22 Dec 89

[Text] Panama City December 22 TASS—By TASS correspondent Eldar Abdullayev:

Despite promises of self-styled Panamanian President Guillermo Endara to ensure normal functioning of the media and freedom of the press, the first measures of U.S. occupation units are directed against the activity of local and foreign press.

The offices of all newspapers, radio and television, and the Intel Telecommunications Company have been seized or blocked by U.S. military.

U.S. journalists only have an access to the communications.

Colombian, Costa Rican and Cuban radio stations are being jammed, just as the local radio stations operating in the provinces that try to inform Panamanians of the setting up of the Patriotic Resistance Front.

Last night there were sporadic skirmishes and bombardments. Pockets of resistance in the capital and other key cities of the republic have been crushed.

Combat operations are being conducted in highlands of Veraguas and Chiriqui provinces.

It is there that the main forces of resistance are now concentrated. U.S. units are airlifted there or are heading there in vehicles.

The presidential palace situated in the old part of the capital has been looted at night.

U.S. units are blocking the Embassies of Cuba, Nicaragua and Libya. They open fire from time to time, so the personnel of the embassies is in constant tension.

In the territory of the Panama Canal Zone which under the Torrijos-Carter Treaty had been turned over to the Panamanian side stage-by-stage, U.S. troops make wholesale arrests among civilians. They believe that it is in the Panama Canal Zone that supporters of Noriega and the Rodriquez government reside. The arrested are subjected to interrogation.

According to the information of journalists, President Francisco Rodriguez and his family, as well as members of the cabinet are safely in hiding. General Noriega's whereabouts are yet unknown.

Soviet, Cuban Officials Cited

PM2812111589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 11

[TASS dispatch: "Strengthening Ties"]

[Text] Havana, 22 Dec—V.G. Komplektov, special representative of the Soviet leadership and USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, who is in Havana, and C.R. Rodriguez, vice president of the Cuban Council of State and Council of Ministers, held a wide-ranging exchange of opinions on international issues 18-20 December. In the course of the talks the development of events in Central America, the prospects of a political settlement in the region, and the initiatives undertaken in this context, including UN initiatives, were discussed in particular.

Special attention was paid to the latest events in Panama and the unlawful actions in respect of that country, which were denounced by the Soviet and the Cuban side.

The talks passed in the friendly atmosphere which traditionally characterizes the close ties between the two countries.

Foreign Criticism of U.S. Action Cited

PM2712144189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 1, 12

[IZVESTIYA-TASS roundup: "Source of Crisis and Dangerous Tension"]

[Excerpt] The U.S. intervention in Panama is evoking mounting indignation in the world.

It has been condemned by the National Council of Churches and the Council of the United Methodist Church of America. In a letter to President G. Bush, James Hamilton, secretary general of the National Council of Churches, warned that the continuation of the aggressive course in respect of Panama will lead to more senseless human losses and the isolation of the United States in a world which is increasingly rejecting the use of military force as a means of settling conflicts.

Many Australian newspapers have condemned the invasion of Panama in their editorials. "The United States is dealing with the leader of a sovereign state, irrespective of what this leader is like," the Melbourne AGE points out. "Intervention in the affairs of another country is a step which inevitably raises alarming questions."

F. Castro, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee, appraised Washington's actions as a barbaric crime which calls into question the effectivenes of the current system of international law. The Cuban leader stressed the inhuman nature of the operation, pointing out that the U.S. invasion troops are preventing international organizations and states, including Cuba, which are ready to give medical assistance to the Panamanians from providing this services. "While the imperial mercenaries are being ferried by air to the best hopitals in the United States, Panamanian citizens—men and women, old people and children, are bleeding to death in the streets," he said.

Referring to the international consequences of the aggression, F. Castro stated: "It is a blow to peace in Central America and to stability throughout Latin America." [passage omitted]

Commentator Examines U.S. Motives

PY2712141689 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 26 Dec 89

[Commentary by Vyacheslav Rostovtsev]

[Text] According to the U.S. Secretary of State, one of the reasons the United States will remain in Panama for an undetermined time is to protect the Panama Canal. The question here is what is threatening or was threatening this inter-oceanic way? Despite the complex internal situation of Panama, the canal worked normally, not because it was protected by thousands of U.S. soldiers, but because the Panamanians themselves were interested in keeping it working without interruptions.

By the end of this century, the canal will belong to Panama according the 1977 treaty. Thanks to this treaty, Panama will free itself from the U.S. military presence. Panama will be able to exploit the canal and, more importantly, will exert its sovereignty over all the Canal Zone.

Will the clauses of this treaty be respected? This is not a crazy question because we understand that—according to the statements of the U.S. secretary of state—the U.S. troops will not leave Panama. This leads us to think that Washington's decision to remain in Panama is based on its wish to continue controlling the canal in the future. However, this is only one aspect of this problem.

Another aspect of the problem is the transformation of Panama into an invaded country. If these two aspects were compared, the reasons for the invasion seem to be incongruent. The essential point is: The United States occupied Panama under the pretext of guaranteeing the security of U.S. citizens there and to reestablish democracy in that country. Can the security of U.S. citizens be guaranteed by killing Panamanians? Is it possible to bring democracy to a sovereign state by attacking its territory with helicopters and tanks?

How does the United States have the right to decide on the governmental system adopted by any country? International public opinion has condemned the U.S. actions in Panama, describing them as openly violating the norms and principles of international coexistence. The public understood the real objectives of the U.S. military intervention, and that is why they have demanded the withdrawal of the interventionist troops and the end of the occupation of Panama.

U.S. Troops Storm Party Building

LD2712222689 Moscow TASS in English 2202 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Panama December 28 TASS—By TASS correspondent Eldar Abdullayev:

United States troops broke into the building of the Central Committee of the Panamanian People's Party (the Party of Panamanian Communists) on the night of December 26-27 and arrested people on duty there.

According to eye witnesses, several explosions followed inside the Central Committee building. American soldiers carried out bagfuls of documents and transported them away in armored vehicles. The building was surrounded with guards.

A day earlier, an analogous action was taken against the headquarters of the Revolutionary Democratic Party of Panama.

The situation in Panama City remains tense. U.S. military patrol the city and stop every passer-by and car to check their papers. The building of the Vatican's Embassy where General Noriega is hiding, is surrounded by troops, tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

Noriega's Bid To Avoid Capture

PM2712145589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report compiled by A. Shalnev in New York and M. Kozhukhov in Moscow under rubric "Panorama of International Events": "Panama: General's Fate Still in Balance"]

[Text] The question of the fate of Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Panamanian military leader, remains open. He is still sheltering in the papal mission surrounded by U.S. "rangers" and Marines.

Noriega, the "strongman of Panama" and "No 1 target" of the U.S. invasion of this country, is in total safety under the protection of the Holy See. He cannot be arrested on the territory of the nunciature, and the papal nuncio has no intention of handing him over either to the U.S. legal authorities or to the new Panamanian Government. At the same time, according to a statement by an official Vatican spokesman in Rome, Noriega has not been granted political asylum. According to his words, a final decision on the general's fate can only be adopted after clarification of "Noriega's personal role in all its aspects." Judging by appearances, this diplomatic formulation contains an allusion to charges of involvement with the international drug mafia, which have been leveled against the "strongman" by the U.S. legal authorities. Maxwell Thurman, head of the U.S. Southern Command, meanwhile told REUTER that the State Department order to detain Noriega remains in force and that troops are reliably blocking the nunciature and are ready to seize the general immediately if he leaves the territory of the Vatican mission.

It is reported from Washington that the State Department has asked the Vatican in the most categorical of terms to hand over the general, and the CNN television network has described the situation which is taking shape as an impasse. Judging by appearances, this demand was put forward immediately after the consultation on Monday between President Bush and General Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, at the president's country seat at Camp David, during which "various options for bringing Noriega to book" were discussed.

At the same time, there are grounds for believing that the demand for the extradition of the former Panamanian leader is no more than a bluff. The U.S. authorities can hardly be seriously interested in conducting an open trial of Noriega. It is known, and the Administration is not denying this, that Noriega worked for a long time as a secret and paid informer of the U.S. CIA, including during the time when the CIA was headed by the current President, George Bush. Privately, representatives of the Administration are voicing fears that were Noriega to be brought to the United States, he might start disclosing secrets in an effort to defend himself which might prove very tricky and inconvenient for the current head of the White House. As Leslie Stahl, a correspondent of the CBS television network noted, the Administration would not be put out if Noriega simply disappeared in some third country. But which country?

UPI reports that President Alan Garcia of Peru has declared readiness to accept the former Panamanian leader on the territory of Peru, irrespective of the charges leveled against him. According to a REUTER correspondent, Ricardo Alarcon, Cuban vice minister of foreign relations, has declared that Cuba also would be prepared, "without hesitation," to grant political asylum to the general. For his part, Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, Spanish foreign minister, declared that, in accordance with a convention to this effect between the United States and Spain, Noriega would be immediately extradited to the United States should he enter Spanish territory.

According to news agency reports from Panama, Noriega's emergence from hiding has weakened the armed resistance which his supporters were putting up against the U.S. invasion. At the same time, sporadic shooting took place Monday in the immediate vicinity of the U.S. Embassy in the Panamanian capital and also in other parts of the city, which are constantly being patrolled by U.S. helicopters. During his Christmas service, the head of the Catholic Church in Panama called on Panamanians to refrain from violence and "not to create problems" for the new government. It is hoped that by the end of the current week shipping in the Panama Canal, where some 100 ships have accumulated, will be fully restored.

At the same time, one Luis del Cid, one of the general's close associates who features on a list of 16 ranking Panamanians accused of involvement in the drugs business, has surrendered to the occupation forces and has flown to Miami.

The visit to Panama of U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney also is reported. He has declared at a press conference that the utilization of the super secret F-117A bomber equipped with "Stealth" technology helped to avoid unnecessary casualties in connection with the fact that, according to Cheney's words, "high-precision weapons" were used—900 kg bombs, that is. The official statistics for losses to date as a result of the use of "precision" and other weapons look as follows: 24 Americans have perished, 303 have been wounded, 1 is missing. Among the Panamanians are 290 dead and 121 wounded. There still is no information about civilian casualties.

Paying Christmas visits to U.S. subunits, the defense secretary confirmed that the troops will remain in Panama "as long as necessary" and until the objectives of the armed intervention—"the arrest of General Noriega, the protection of the lives of U.S. citizens, the defense of U.S. interests connected with the Panama Canal treaties, and also the restoration of democracy in Panama" are attained. This, according to Richard Cheney, are the Christmas gifts which the U.S. "rangers" have brought the Panamanians.

Panamanian President on Noriega's Fate

LD2712210489 Moscow TASS in English 2004 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Panama City December 27 TASS—By TASS correspondent Eldar Abdullayev: Guillermo Endara, who was proclaimed president of Panama, said at a news conference that his government did not object to Americans' seizure of General Noriega who took refuge at the Vatican mission in the Panama City.

According to Endara, if Noriega voluntarily turns himself in to the new Panamanian authorities, he will not be deported from the country under the republic's constitution. His trial will be held in Panama and Noriega will serve his prison term on national territory, Endara said.

Chilean Election Results Commented On

Solidarity Committee Statement

PY1612174989 Moscow in Spanish to Chile 2100 GMT 15 Dec 89

[Text] As soon as the vote count confirming the opposition's victory was released, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Latin American Countries released a statement congratulating the Chilean people. The statement is entitled: "The banner of liberty in Chile."

Loyal to its principles of internationalism, humanism, and solidarity, the Soviet society has condemned the illegal regime that for more than 16 years trampled on the people's power, treacherously assassinated the constitutional president, and turned Latin America's most democratic country into a huge concentration camp, the statement notes.

Today, as liberty is dawning on the tortured Chilean land, the Soviet people sincerely wish the courageous and martyred Chilean people success on the thorny road to restoring democracy, political pluralism, and civic peace, the statement indicates.

The statement calls the people's attention to the 3-month period until the inauguration of the new government and expresses the hope that the unity among the true patriots and democrats will be strengthened and that they will be able to break the reactionary plans of perpetuating Pinochetism without Pinochet.

The statement issued by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Latin American Countries concludes by stating: Long live the sovereign will of the Chilean people, who are worthy of freely walking the path that they have chosen. These people are worthy of this right.

In an interview with our program, Karen Khachaturov, president of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Latin American Countries, said the following:

[Begin Khachaturov recording] I would first like to congratulate the Chilean listeners on the victory of the opposition candidate.

I consider this to be an extremely important event in the life of the Chilean people; it demonstrates that all the years of resistance by the Chilean people, beginning on 11 September 1973, were not in vain.

If anyone wants to represent these elections as a lofty gesture by Pinochet.... [changes thought] I believe it is a mistake. I believe that the junta was mainly forced to hold elections by the pressure from the resistance of the Chilean people, of all the democrats, and of all the antifascist and nonfascist forces.

I believe that this event demonstrates that the word unity is not just a word but a concrete fact reflected by a coalition of all the patriotic and democratic forces, ranging from Christian Democratic Party supporters to members of the Communist Party of Chile. [end recording]

Commentator Rostovtsev

PY1612184389 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 15 Dec 89

[Vyacheslav Rostovtsev commentary]

[Text] I think that 14 December is a very important milestone in Chilean history. The election, the outcome of which was no surprise to anyone, was not the most important event. The most important aspect is the fact that the country has entered a new stage of development, firmly rejecting a tragic past in which violence and a lack of rights prevailed.

The nation is expressing its repudiation of everything that tarnished Chile's prestige and caused its international isolation.

The opposition's victory in yesterday's elections was the natural result of the development of Chilean events over this period. The 16 years of Pinochet's uninterrupted dictatorship have not made the people resign themselves or forget those times in which Chile considered itself a model of Latin American democracy. The Chileans also did not forget the brief period of Salvador Allende's government, as demonstrated by the preelectoral rallies.

The road to victory has been a difficult one. The antidictatorial movement was confronted by the fierce resistance of a governing military elite that was trying to stay in power.

The governing military elite, however, has realized that it will soon not have enough power to defend its position. At the same time, the increased activities [activacion] of the resistance against the dictatorship have enjoyed the support of international public opinion.

The electoral victory of the Chilean opposition has elicited broad international reaction. This is only natural because the country, which has great hopes, has entered a new period in its history.

It is understood that the battle for democracy in Chile is not yet over. There are many political, social, and economic problems that must be resolved. This will depend to a great extent on the domestic political stability and the activities of the civilian government that will be inaugurated in March 1990.

Patricio Aylwin's victory today prompted messages of congratulations and joy from the international community, which expressed its support for the new Latin American democracy. These messages also express their solidarity with the new Chilean Government.

There were also expressions of joy and congratulations for the president-elect from Latin America and [word indistinct] involving the complete political democratization of South America. In a congratulatory message to Aylwin, Ecuadoran President Rodrigo Borja said that this victory is not just for Chile but for all of Latin America.

TASS Correspondent

LD1512161589 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 15 Dec 89

["Chilean Elections Results—TASS Comment"—TASS headline]

[Text] Santiago December 15 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Anatoliy Medvedenko:

Patricio Aylwin Azocar has become the 39th president of the Chilean Republic and the first head of state inthe past 16 years to come to power through free general elections. According to preliminary data, he won 55.2 per cent of the vote on December 14.

Aylwin was supported by all the opposition political organisations, including the Communist Party of Chile, rallied in two anti-Pinochet blocs.

Presidential candidate Hernan Buechi Buc, who personified the present regime, suffered a smashing defeat. He got only 29.4 per cent of the vote.

The December 14 elections are of historic significance. They were made possible by the Chilean people's difficult and stubborn struggle to restore democracy. They drew a line under 16-year-long military rule and ushered in a new era in Chilean history.

The Chilean example confirms that progress towards genuine freedom and democracy cannot be stopped. The reactionaries are yet able to foist military regimes upon nations by armed force. But only for the time being. Democracy is bound to triumph sooner or later, and that is what happened in Chile.

Chile has shown that a democratic and anti-dictatorial movement can achieve its goals sooner if it is united. On October 5, 1988, the Chilean opposition proved that it was prepared for concerted action and won the plebiscite.

On December 14, united in a single front, the opposition parties again achieved victory and won the right to form their government which will assume office after March 11, 1990.

The victory of democratic forces in Chile was largely facilitated by the fact that the world public has supported them throughout the difficult years. This is why congratulation messages to President Patricio Aylwin are coming in from all over the world and the event is profusely commented by the mass media.

Of course, the struggle for democracy is not yet over. Many political, social and economic problems remain unsolved. They will largely determine the country's political stability and the civilian government's success in completing the democratic process and fulfilling the election programme, for which the Chileans voted.

The solution of these problems will depend to a large degree on the unity of the opposition parties that supported Patricio Aylwin during the elections, on whether this unity will continue after December 14.

Chilean Communist Party Issues Statement

PY1612141489 Moscow Radio Magallanes in Spanish to Chile 0100 GMT 16 Dec 89

[Text] In a statement issued in Santiago, the Communist Party of Chile [PCCh] has stressed that the election of Patricio Aylwin represents a victory for the Chilean nation and people, democracy, and liberty. His victory, the statement adds, reflects the hope of an entire nation that has resisted a terrorist and antidemocratic dictatorship for 16 years.

This triumph, it adds, represents a decisive step toward democracy, a cause for which we, the communists and the popular movement, have always struggled and have made and will make our best effort.

We communists, the statement continues, will support the work of the democratic government that is designed to strengthen and develop democracy. We urge the people to remain alert and mobilized in order to ensure the complete culmination of this victory in March 1990.

The PCCh statement also proposes bringing an end to any political or ideological discrimination in order to achieve the legalization of all the political parties, including the PCCh.

Chile's Pinochet Cited on Elections, Gorbachev

90UI0227A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 51, 20 Dec 89 p 9

[Report on interview with Chilean President General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent I. Khuzemi and NOVOSTI correspondent for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Santiago A. Karmen: "Pinochet: 'I Am Above These Elections'"; date, place not specified]

[Text] **Pinochet was in a dark grey suit with a pink tie. He stood with his head bent and his shoulders stooped. At the sight of the "guests," he straightened out and his look turned craftily suspicious, as in the many photographs of him. Standing next to No. 1 were his bodyguards who were rooted to the spot in readiness.**

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] We asked: The presidential elections are today. It is a great day, right? A phase in the history of Chile is coming to an end. What are you thinking about and how do you feel on this day, General Pinochet?

[Pinochet] Very well. (The general's old man's falsetto did not match his large, athletic figure.) I feel great because I am doing that which I remarked on as far back as 11 September 1973. This phase will be completed with the transfer of power on 11 March 1990. For this reason, I feel great. This absolutely does not concern me personally, I am above these elections, and I am observing their progress from the sidelines.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] What does the general see as his role and place in the history of Chile?

[Pinochet] I am not the one to be the judge of this. This will be shown by history itself. I am just one of the citizens of this country.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] We asked more precisely: How do you want to be remembered?

[Pinochet] I worked all of these 16 years to raise the country, which in 1973, when the communists sneaked in, was in a state of social, economic, and moral decay, and when its state institutions were destroyed. And now, after the passage of these 16 years, I am handing over a country whose level of economic development is envied by many if not all countries of South America, who would like to achieve the same thing. We also moved significantly ahead in a social sense. Previously, there were a lot of poor people, 8 million or even 9.5 million. There are fewer today. Previously, their homes were like shacks. Now they live in adequate, though small, homes with water, electricity, and sewerage. And with a toilet! I am pleased with what has been achieved.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Don't you think that from a social and humane standpoint the price was too high?

[Pinochet] For whom? (The general obviously became irritable.) For the country?

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] For the people.

[Pinochet] These are all stories told by the communists. His voice began to crack. They were even able to convince public opinion abroad. They even go abroad to lie. All of their cock-and-bull stories are false. The price would have been much higher if we had continued to live under a socialist-Marxist regime. In that event, I know that the country would have been completely destroyed and it would remain poor, hungry, and torn up inside.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Over the course of many years, your government was the object of criticism for the violation of human rights....

[Pinochet] (Pinochet began to fidget on the sofa. Offended, his voice trembled and he began to speak swiftly and inconsistently.) First of all, you have to criticize the Russians with respect to the situation on human rights. They actually violate these rights.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] What would General Pinochet want the future of his country to be and what would he wish for the new government?

[Pinochet] I want the country to develop the way that it has been developing until now and not to fall behind in a social, economic, or cultural sense. I want it to move forward along the same path. And we will end on this. (He got up from the sofa, letting us know that the conversation was actually at an end. An official photographer asked everyone to stand against the background of a large tapestry with the emblem of Chile on it. Unexpectedly, Pinochet, as if coming to himself, for no reason at all shouted: "And I do not believe your Mr. Gorbachev at all. Absolutely! Because he arranges this whole spectacle for the purpose of convincing the leaders in the West.")

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Why do you think this?

[Pinochet] Because I do not share his views and because I see how the problem of economic freedom sank, and right after it, the problem of private property. We will see what will come of all of this....

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] We went out onto the square, and Pinochet, like Koshchey behind seven locks [tall, thin old miser in Russian folklore], remained surrounded by his guards and bodyguards in the palace, which at this hour resembled a lonely island in a raging human sea. A few hours will pass, and the name of the new president will be announced, but the people have already filled the streets and have gathered in the squares. These are the same Chileans who, in the words of Pinochet, should be thankful to him for his concern for them—who just yesterday, on his orders, were sprayed with gas and dispersed with water hoses when they dared to protest against an impoverished existence. The very same people came out onto the streets of Santiago with portraits of their relatives who disappeared during the years of Pinochet's rule, demanding that an end be put to repression and the impunity of the executioners. These same people today are storming the gates of prisons with appeals to release political prisoners as fast as possible.

At midnight, from the balcony of the Hotel Plaza, which overlooks the main artery of the city—Bernardo O'Higgins Avenue, Patricio Aylwin, the newly elected president, once again addressed the huge crowd: "Today Chile has again met with its history! Chile is bringing freedom back! Chile is bringing democracy back!"

Hundreds of Chileans chanted: "Pinochet, go away." Portraits of his candidates were torn from poles, rockets flew into the air, and champagne corks popped. People were rejoicing because one of the most frightening phases in the history of Chile was receding into the past.

Pinochet 'Plan' Against New Government Alleged

PY2612023689 Moscow in Spanish to Chile 2100 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Excerpts] The Communist Party of Chile released a declaration after the Chilean electoral results were announced, saying that there is already evidence of a Pinochet plan to obstruct the democratization process by creating destabilizing elements against the future government.

For Pinochet, the best guarantee of Army loyalty to the new government is his permanence as Army chief. This is what Pinochet told President-elect Patricio Aylwin after their 1-hour meeting at La Moneda Palace. [passage omitted]

The public declaration emphasized the need for the release of all political prisoners, the dissolution of the CNI [National Intelligence Center], and the annulment of the 1978 Amnesty Law.

As the people were not able to elect a Congress under a full democracy because of the electoral law, some people believe that it will be important for the future government to reach an agreement with the National Renewal Party in order to carry out some reforms in Congress. However, these reforms, although necessary, would not change the basis of the dual power that the current regime is trying to establish.

The Communist Party believes that, since there is no congress fully committed to democracy, the process will run into serious obstacles. Under these circumstances, the people's social organizations will play a very important role in strengthening the victory of the people, in helping to consolidate the Aylwin administration to fulfill his democratization program for the nation, and in doing away with all the laws imposed by the government against the future administration.

The organizations of the Central Labor Union have also reaffirmed their positions about the worker's role in democracy and the need to do away with the so-called labor plan to enable the workers to recover their old gains, reestablish the negotiation mechanisms, and restore their economic, social, and political rights.

The Communist Party communique adds that Pinochet's political defeat is a historic victory toward ending the dictatorship and his entire terrorist institutional structure. The communique also refers to the possibility of a post-election rapprochement among the leftist forces and the fact that leftist unity will be a determining factor in the destiny of Chile. The communique also says that Pinochet's separation from all positions is necessary to establish the real democratic environment for which the people voted.

Congress of People's Deputies

Deputy Disputes Arbatov Defense Spending Figures

PM2712162289 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Dec 89 First Edition p 2

[Speech by Lieutenant General A. Ovchinnikov, USSR people's deputy from Chirchikskiy No 120 National-Territorial Okrug (Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) at Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, under the rubric "From the Congress Stenographic Record": "Responsibility for One's Word"—date of speech not stated]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Comrades, it is now fashionable to watch and believe in the healing force of [television faith healer] Kashpirovskiy's sessions. You will remember that in many of his appearances he claims that even a slight, attenuated contact with some part of the soul can evoke a storm of feelings and unpredictable consequences in behavior and the state of health. Yet today we sense and know from our own experience that the army is being subjected to blows that are not attenuated, but real and forceful, aimed at destroying forever the desire of young people to join the ranks of our Motherland's defenders. The magazine OGONEK, which is edited by USSR People's Deputy Korotich, tries to depict the army and service in the army as sheer hell. Furthermore, the slander against the army is accompanied by conjecture about the threat of a military coup, which has appeared in the pages of OGONEK and also in the speech here at the Congress by People's Deputy Comrade Tolpezhnikov from Riga. One can regard in approximately the same light some specific figures from Comrade Arbatov's speech. I quote verbatim: "The United States has already begun to cut defense spending, and will continue to do so." An official report by the U.S. Congress: "Spending on the military budget in 1990 is $6.7 billion higher than in the current year."

"Our army," Academician Arbatov stated, "even after the reduction, will have a numerical strength 1.5 million larger than the American army." But, first, the figure is not 1.5 million, but only 460,000, and if you take the blocs, NATO has 6.5 million men, while the Warsaw Pact has 5.1 million. That is indeed 1.5 million more, only on their side, not ours. It is important for the deputies to know this. (Applause)

As for future reductions, which were also mentioned, President G. Bush has an entirely different opinion on this point. At his meeting with Mitterrand on 17 December he stated that he personally sees no possibility or need for a sharp reduction in the U.S. military budget.

There is a similar discrepancy, to put it mildly, in the proportion of gross national product which military expenditure accounts for in the USSR and the United States. I will not fill your heads with figures, comrades. What was said was 9%, and for us, 7.5%. But one significant detail: Their gross national product exceeds ours not by 1.5%, if that is the only way to make comparisons, but by 500%. So U.S. defense spending is $305.5 billion, while in the USSR the figure is 71 billion, but in rubles, of course.

Comrades, we admire the professionalism and competence of Western parliamentarians, but we do not give much thought to the fact that the lofty title of people's deputy does not at all mean teaching the grain grower how to plow and when to sow and the worker how to smelt high-quality steel, extract coal, and build bridges. Yet some of our people consider themselves top specialists in the sphere of agricultural production without having lived a single year in the countryside or being familiar with its needs or its concerns. They talk about the principles of military building without having served a single day in the army. Here, if it is not an abuse of your attention, I would like to recall the words of Nikolay Vasilyevich Gogol, who wrote: "Everyone nowadays thinks that he could do much good in someone else's place and someone else's job, only he cannot do it in his own job. That is the cause of all evils." That is what that great writer thought, and I agree with him. (Applause)

Authoritarian' Methods To Combat Crime Ruled Out

PM2712110989 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 23 Dec 89 p 4

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondent S. Zharkov: "In the Congress Press Center"]

[Text] Despite the thoroughness of the reports delivered at the Congress of People's Deputies 22 December by USSR Minister of Internal Affairs V.V. Bakatin and USSR General Prosecutor A.Ya. Sukharev, journalists had many questions. This is perfectly natural—the growth in crime and activation of the black economy worry everyone and public attention is riveted on these extremely complex problems facing the country. They were discussed at the Congress press center, to which the two speakers went after the end of the morning session.

The situation in this sphere is extremely grave. It is no accident that society is increasingly often calling for emergency measures and for "order to be imposed with an iron hand." But the position of the minister of internal affairs is unequivocal: It is impossible to speak of introducing a state of emergency until such time as the legal basis for it exists. As yet there is no law precisely regulating the authorities' powers, rights, duties, and responsibility. This follows logically from the concept of the formation of a rule-of-law state. But by what measures is crime to be fought now?—was a question asked at the press conference. Either a return to authoritarian administration or...

"I don't know what the second option is," V.V. Bakatin replied without pausing for thought, "but I prefer it to the first."

Despite the extreme situation in certain regions, the USSR general prosecutor echoed the minister, law enforcement organs advocate the speediest introduction of laws guaranteeing citizens' rights. Fundamentals of judicial administration have been adopted, and the next step is the adoption of fundamentals of criminal legislation which will formalize these guarantees.

The activation of the black economy in the country is causing serious concern, it was noted at the meeting. Its considerable funds are already finding an outlet in the financial market, exerting a destabilizing influence on the national economy.

V.V. Bakatin recalled that half the criminal groups uncovered recently had widespread connections, including in law enforcement organs. In this context he stated that the statute on the performance of military service in Ministry of Internal Affairs organs may be toughened up in the very near future. In particular, one possible reason for the dismissal of staffers must be mistrust of them. The militia must primarily be cleansed of corrupt elements.

The minister of internal affairs advocated expanding international cooperation in the fight against crime and joining "Interpol." This is especially important in conditions where procedures for entry into and exit from the country are being simplified. Contacts with other states' police organs are becoming a necessity, he noted.

Both participants in the press conference categorically opposed the existence of private investigation in the Soviet Union as lacking any procedural basis.

Ryzhkov Talks With Deputies From Uzbekistan

PM2712105589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "N.I. Ryzhkov's Meeting with USSR People's Deputies from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, met a group of agrarians who are [USSR] people's deputies from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. The main topic of the day—the government program for the country's economic recovery, backed by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies—determined the approaches of participants in this meeting toward specific questions concerning the development of the republic's agrarian sector. N.I. Ryzhkov emphasized that, with a view to the program's successful implementation, all our actions and the efforts by all republics must serve the goals of creative building and of augmenting the country's national wealth.

USSR People's Deputies S. Mamarasulov, A. Abdurakhimov, P. Khudayerov, T. Kirgizbayev, R. Ubaydullayeva, B. Ergashev, A. Khusanov, M. Sarsenov, D. Yadgarov, A. Kalandarov, and others devoted chief attention in what they had to say to questions of cotton growing and of enhancing the efficiency of this most important sector of Uzbekistan's economy. It was noted that many socioeconomic problems are associated with the imposition of "single crop" cotton cultivation for a lengthy period and the neglect of the processing industry's development. This led to serious imbalances and negative consequences in the development of the republic's national economy, and exacerbated the problem of the population's employment. In some of the republic's regions—and especially the Amudarya Valley, Karakalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and Khorezm Oblast—the ecological situation is becoming increasingly complex.

The USSR people's deputies asked a series of specific questions concerning the rational utilization of products from raw cotton processing, the development of industrial production units directly on collective and state farms, land reclamation construction work, the provision of a main gas supply to population centers, material and technical supplies, and the improvement of price formation. Special emphasis during the conversation was placed on problems of women's labor and life, the family, the protection of motherhood and childhood, and medical services.

At the conclusion of the meeting, N.I. Ryzhkov expressed thanks to the people's deputies for their support for the government's efforts to normalize the country's economic situation. He told them what is being specifically done along this avenue, including as regards the questions raised by people's deputies from Uzbekistan. Appropriate instructions will be issued to union ministries and departments.

V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food Supplies and Purchases, took part in the conversation.

Leningrad's Ivanov Addresses Congress 23 Dec

LD2412214189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2227 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Remarks by Nikolay Veniaminovich Ivanov, people's deputy from Leningrad city, from the recorded relay of the Second Congress of People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 23 December]

[Text] I would consider it beneath my personal dignity to enter into an argument or to try and justify myself in the face of accusations that have been heard in this auditorium today. I can state with sufficient responsibility that we can be physically destroyed, but we will never be brought to our knees by the mafia or its protectors. I can take complete responsibility for saying that we are and will always be the curse of the country's mafia groups. I am absolutely convinced that the time will come, and come fairly soon, when we will begin to bring our own Honeckers, our own Ceausescus, and our own Zhivkovs to book and will ultimately make our assessment of those fathers of stagnation who have brought the country to its crisis today.

I believe that what is happening here, when all the might of the law and order bodies is being hurled at an infinitesimally small investigative group, while at the very same time a single corrupt Muscovite and not a single corrupt part of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee has faced criminal charges, that talking of any kind of objectivity in these conditions is very, very complex. At the time when we were engaged in argument and various theoretical investigations into what and how we should carry out checks, the case was divided into dozens of smaller cases immediately after the session and the combined evidence was broken up and to date we have individual negative phenomenon.

How are decisions being made today? I'll give you a number of examples. Only very recently [objections from the hall] One moment. Only very recently, (Yesin) first secretary of the Navoinskiy Oblast party committee, was sentenced for large scale bribe-taking. Before that, he was sentenced to 6 years' deprivation of liberty. Before that, his subordinate cotton people had proceedings brought against them and were sentenced to 14 or 15 years' deprivation of liberty. And their boss got a mere 6 years. Is this the policy of governing by the law as well?

In 1986 Rakhimov Samshi had criminal proceedings instituted against him and was sentenced by Uzbekistan's Supreme Court. That same Rakhimov's name appeared as our exposer at Commission No. 2, the Supreme Soviet Commission that was headed by Procurator General Sukharev which was to check up on him in his capacity as procurator general. Where do you think Rakhimov is today, with his 14 years in 1986? He's at home. Because to this day he is an ally of the corrupt part of the apparatus. And the examples can be endlessly cited.

Comrade Dukhanin has only just recalled that the publication in the papers of the last press conference at the USSR Procuracy was objective. So how can you explain that there are dozens of people at a press conference but only one TASS correspondent has provided an article and this publication was carried in IZVESTIYA, TRUD, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA? What is this? Publications like this, and incidentally, they do not carry the TASS logo, can only come from the CPSU Central Committee command. And one can carry on talking like this forever. One example after another. Really!

It turns out that the children were sorry, poor little things. And relatives were brought to criminal account and now it turns out that they are the victims of arbitrary rule. The example of Karimov has already been mentioned here and at great many other people. And on what grounds, if you please? In 1984 everyone was happy and was saying that there had been no violations and now it is already a violation of legality. How many similar instances do we have?

In order to be brief I'd like to mention once again what telman Khorenovich Gdlyan began with. You know that since the end of April a censorship ban has been placed on all our speeches in the Soviet mass media. For this reason, we earnestly request, appeal to the Congress, that we be given the air live. Only in this way will it be possible to speak about the essence of things comprehensibly, clearly, and precisely. You know yourselves about the fact that [bell rings] Just a minute. You know yourselves that today even our relay, in spite of the promise of our esteemed Presidium on the first day, is going out edited. I'd like to note the final question because there is no sense now in going over and over the vast number of facts that have been spoken about.

I would like to note the following—how and in what manner they started to wreck the criminal case. It was by using the sinister Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, by setting on an unlawful commission of the CPSU Central Committee. [dissenting noise from the audience; bell rings] And this kind of interference from the party apparatus used to happen before, too. I think that presumably deep inside Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev must feel very much ill at ease because of everything that is happening around this case, because of all this playing both ends against the middle. And I am absolutely convinced that our time will come. That's unavoidable, [bell rings] because the very development of events is going to lead to our having to make appraisals of the Grishins and the Romanovs, the Kunayevs and the Aliyevs and all the others connected with them. And let the esteemed Presidium tell us today why, why did it take 4 years of perestroyka merely to expell Medunov from his own party? And perhaps the Presidium can answer some other questions for us. Why is what has been taking place being appraised in such a restrained manner? [bell rings] Thank you for your attention.

Gdlyan Commission Reports on Corruption 23 Dec

Yarin Presents Report

PM2412195589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2-3

["Report of Commission for Verification of Materials Connected With the Activity of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Investigation Group, headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan" delivered at 23 December afternoon session of Congress of USSR People's Deputies by Commission Cochairman V.A. Yarin]

[Text] The report was delivered by V.A. Yarin, cochairman of the commission.

Esteemed deputies! Esteemed Chairman and Congress Presidium! I have been instructed by the commission, as one of its cochairmen, to report to the Second Congress of People's Deputies on the results of our work over the period between Congresses. This account from the commission was adopted unanimously and signed by all its members. I must nevertheless stress the interim nature of our account because the investigation of such complex problems on so many planes and which are attracting universal interest—which we have been instructed to look into—requires that many dozens of people be heard and also requires the scrupulous research of numerous documents.

Taking the public's impatience into consideration, we are, in turn, counting on its understanding, and on support from our colleagues—the people's deputies—in that the sole aim of the commission's work is to seek out and ascertain the truth. The commission is aware of the burden of responsibility placed upon it. Our conclusions and proposals will be of no small significance for the nationwide struggle against organized crime, and it will have a bearing on the building of a rule-of-law state. We have no right to permit overhastiness in work and still less to permit half-baked conclusions. Attempts to nudge and urge on the commission, or to exert pressure on it, wherever such attempts should originate, are unacceptable.

There are serious grounds for the setting up of the commission.

In 1983-1986 the Soviet public still had no knowledge of the work of the investigation group under the leadership of Gdlyan. But by 1987 the mass media had begun to give its work wide and exclusively positive coverage. Utterances by Gdlyan and subsequently by Ivanov appeared in the press and on television. Moreover, the public's attention focused especially on the sums of money and quantity of valuables confiscated in the course of the investigation. Gdlyan and Ivanov's names became known all over the country and beyond its borders, especially since mid-1988, following the publication of the article "Opposition" in the journal OGONEK, which was discussed at the 19th all-union party conference whose delegates, according to Gdlyan's claims, included people who had received bribes. This became something of a political sensation.

There were also sensational reports of the arrest of Churbanov, former USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs and son-in-law of the late head of the party and state Brezhnev, the investigation of Churbanov's case, and the outcome of the hearing of this case in the USSR Supreme Court.

Later on it became known that the indictment drawn up by Gdlyan offered a political evaluation of the case under investigation. Contrary to the law, as many commission members believe, it was not read out in open court.

It is well-known that the court found Churbanov guilty of only a small proportion of the charges filed against him during the investigation. One of the defendants was found not guilty, while the case of another one was remitted for further investigation.

The opinions of authors of newspaper and journal articles about the investigation group's work subsequently diverged. Some claimed that the court had taken a prejudiced and untenable stance, and this view was considerably promoted by Gdlyan and Ivanov, who accompanied their statements with attacks against Marov, who had chaired the case hearing, and Terebilov, former chairman of the USSR Supreme Court. In other published items there began to appear critical statements about the investigation group's work: Inculpatory bias, superficial investigation, insufficiently high professional standards, and other such things. Articles appeared at the same time containing information which had not yet been proved by the investigation, even though they leveled the most serious accusations of abuses and breaches of legality by preliminary investigation organs in the bribery case.

It must be said that the first complaint about illegal actions by Gdlyan's group was received in Moscow way back in 1983. The number of such complaints grew with the passage of time, right until 1987. But the number of complaints noticeably increased after the USSR Supreme Court reviewed two decisions in the Khint case and issued an interlocutory order against Investigator Gdlyan on 25 April 1989. These complaints reached a massive scale following the interview with Pugo, chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, published by PRAVDA 30 April 1989.

The report that a USSR Supreme Court plenum had reversed all earlier court decisions on the Khint case, which was investigated in the early eighties, and that an interlocutory order about breaches of legality by the investigation organs had been issued, was published in central newspapers, and then in republic and oblast newspapers. This produced an open conflict between Gdlyan and the USSR Supreme Court. Moreover, Gdlyan leveled numerous sharp and gross accusations against the USSR Supreme Court and against USSR Supreme Court member Marov. But even the USSR Supreme Court's interlocutory order contained more emotion, for which there is no room in a court document, than proof of breaches of the law by Gdlyan. Furthermore, this order contained an allegation that did not correspond with reality and became a turning point in the attitude of many official mass media towards Gdlyan.

Right after this, society was stirred by Ivanov's statement on Leningrad Television that Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; former Politburo members Solomentsev and Romanov; Terebilov, former chairman of the USSR Supreme Court; and a number of other persons from the higher echelons of power were accomplices in the Uzbekistan bribery case.

The CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, and subsequently the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, set up commissions in May 1989 which quickly arrived at conclusions unconditionally confirming gross violations of socialist legality by Gdlyan and Ivanov. The commissions' conclusions were immediately published in central and republic newspapers. USSR General Prosecutor Sukharev removed Gdlyan as leader of the investigation group, and later on he and Ivanov were removed from the case investigation.

Just before the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, KGB Investigator Dukhanin dismissed—due to the lack of a case—a criminal case against Smirnov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee, who was released from custody and received an apology. On 25 May, the day when the Congress of USSR People's Deputies opened, a criminal case was instituted involving instances of breaches of legality by the investigation group headed by Gdlyan.

The excitement was fanned, on the one hand, by the mass media and, on the other hand, by Gdlyan and Ivanov's statements at numerous rallies; their declarations from the congress rostrum acquired the character of political confrontation. Many cities set up committees in defense of Gdlyan, whose statements against bribery and corruption encountered a response and support among broad public circles. In these conditions, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies set up the Commission for Verification of Materials Connected With the Activity of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Investigation Group Under Gdlyan's Leadership.

The commission comprised 16 people's deputies. Even while the congress was sitting, Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev was elected its chairman, and since October the commission's work has been led by three cochairmen—Medvedev, Strukov, and Yarin.

From the very beginning the commission's work was complicated by the fact that its status was not defined at the First Congress. The commission's work was also adversely affected by the lack of status of USSR people's deputies. We came up against lack of understanding and concealed opposition by the USSR Prosecutor's Office, delays in the submission of necessary documents and materials by the Prosecutor's Office and other organs, and disrespectful attitudes toward some commission members by individual leaders of the Union Prosecutor's Office. It must be said, however, that recently the tension in relations between the commission and the USSR Prosecutor's Office has been easing and the documents have been made available to the commission.

The lack of status also enabled Gdlyan and Ivanov to make attempts to impose on the commission incompatible functions regarding the monitoring of further investigations into the bribery case, and later to accuse the commission of supposedly thwarting the case.

The commission declares with utmost responsibility that it cannot and is not empowered to supplant or supplement the activity of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. At the same time, the commission has taken certain measures. On its recommendation, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium appointed Prosecutor Martinson, independent of the USSR Prosecutor's Office and accountable only to the commission, to finalize the preliminary investigation of the criminal case of bribery in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR].

Proceeding from the presumption of innocence, the commission deems itself bound to refrain from legally appraising anyone's possible criminal actions. At the same time, some commission members believe that the hasty disbandment of the investigation group headed by Gdlyan and the splitting of the investigation into separate parts did not promote an objective and final completion of the case.

During the period between June and December 1989, commission sessions heard a series of officials from the prosecutor's Office, the KGB, the USSR and Uzbek SSR Supreme Courts, Party Control Committee Chairman Pugo, Gdlyan, Ivanov, and representatives of the public. The commission requested, obtained, and studied numerous documents and materials reflecting the investigation group's work. The criminal cases involving charges against Khint, Smirnov, and others were studied. Specialists' conclusions were obtained. Commission members worked with complaints and applications.

Since October this year the commission's sessions have been held in public. Representatives of the mass media and USSR people's deputies attend them. Gdlyan attended the commission's sessions on four occasions, and Ivanov on two. They were given an opportunity to question the persons being heard at the commission's session. The commission holds closed sessions only to discuss organizational questions.

A brief report on the commission's work was delivered at the USSR Supreme Soviet's first session. The commission attempted to describe the work it had done at the USSR Supreme Soviet's second session, but the USSR Supreme Soviet did not deem it necessary to hear the report in full.

It is obvious to us all today that organized crime is a dangerous fact of our life. Of course, Uzbekistan is not the only region to suffer from the ulcer of corruption. This can be seen from the criminal cases being investigated by the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], and the USSR KGB. The commission most definitely urges that the efforts by law enforcement organs along this avenue be stepped up and their collaboration consolidated. It urges that this struggle become really a matter for the whole state and the whole people.

At present there is no need to prove the fact that during the years of stagnation, and especially in 1976-1982, our country saw the spread of abuses of power, exaggerated reporting and embezzlement, economic crimes, underground dealings, and corruption. Dangerous mafia-style groups emerged in some republics, bringing together shadow economy dealers, individual leaders of Soviet law enforcement organs, and representatives of the economic and party leadership.

This was promoted by the monopoly of power, concentrated within a narrow circle of the top party and state leadership, safe from all forms of criticism and confident of its exclusiveness and impunity. The atmosphere of total license, abuse of power, and cupidity, which thrived among Brezhnev's closest associates, deprived the country's law enforcement organs of an opportunity to effectively oppose corruption which, like rust, was corroding the mechanism of party and state power.

The seats of corruption negating the fundamentals of socialism spread in Uzbekistan under Rashidov's leadership. Corrupt elements in the republic enriched themselves at the cost of merciless exploitation of peasants and workers, of students and school pupils, at the expense of the Uzbek people. According to experts' estimates, exaggerated cotton yield reporting in Uzbekistan amounted to 4.5 million tonnes in 1978-1983. According to various estimates, anything between R2 billion and R4 billion was embezzled from the people and ended up stashed away by newly hatched beys and feudal lords, who transformed the republic into a breeding ground for embezzlement of state funds and bribery. This is in no way the fault of the Uzbek people, exhausted by single-crop cotton cultivation; it is their misfortune.

As of 1983, the new leadership of the party and the country launched a decisive struggle against corruption, including in Uzbekistan. Initially, the new leadership relied on KGB organs. On 27 April 1983 Uzbek SSR KGB staffers instituted a criminal case against several Bukhara Oblast leaders. Money and valuables to a total value of R15 million were confiscated in the course of the investigation. It soon emerged that corruption had struck not only Bukhara Oblast, but also other oblasts in Uzbekistan.

The USSR Prosecutor's Office set up several investigation groups comprising investigators from different parts of the country. One of them—the largest in fact, whose staff was in excess of 200 in some years—was headed by Gdlyan, senior investigator for especially important cases under the USSR General Prosecutor. Ivanov, investigator for especially important cases, became his unofficial deputy.

More than 800 criminal cases of exaggerated reporting, embezzlement, and bribery were investigated through joint efforts with law enforcement organs in Uzbekistan during the following years. These cases resulted in the sentencing of more than 5,000 persons, including 600 leadership officials and 10 Heroes of Socialist Labor. Money and valuables to a total value of R100 million, acquired by criminal means, were confiscated from the accused.

This brief information report is necessary since today references to sundry omissions and breaches committed during the investigation of exaggerated reporting, embezzlement, and bribery in Uzbekistan are used in attempts to totally discredit the work by the investigation groups and to even deny the very fact that a widespread and ramified corrupt system did exist in Uzbekistan and other regions in the country. In this context the commission has no intention at all of denying the extensive work done also by the investigation group headed by Gdlyan, in difficult circumstances and under constant and fierce opposition from corrupt circles, to expose bribery, embezzlement, and exaggerated reporting.

About the investigation group's work. In 1983-89 the group headed by Gdlyan charged with bribetaking and locked up in custody 20 leadership officials of the Uzbek SSR MVD and USSR MVD, 4 secretaries of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, 8 oblast party committee secretaries, and a number of other senior officials, a total of 62 persons. By May 1989 cases involving 35 of the accused were sent to trial. They were all sentenced. The group's investigators confiscated from the accused money and valuables totalling R35 million, acquired by criminal means.

At the same time, three of the accused were found not guilty, having spent between 2 and 3 years in custody. Two criminal cases were remitted for further investigation due to substantial shortcomings in the investigation and the lack of sufficient proof.

Gdlyan and the group's investigators deemed it necessary, first and foremost, to "cut the roots" and render harmless the summit of the corrupt pyramid of power, exempting from criminal liability people who were lower down the pyramid and those who had paid bribes.

These investigation tactics (otherwise, and in view of the bribery which had spread far and wide in the republic, criminal proceedings should have been instituted against thousands upon thousands of people) proved at the same time to be fraught with breaches of legality and demanded thorough attention and supervision by the USSR Prosecutor's Office. The group adopted in its work the practice, long prevailing in investigation organs, of making deals with bribepayers and exempting them from criminal liability in exchange for their admitting that they had paid bribes, and thus exposing the bribetakers. Consequently, many bribepayers, including those who had paid sums of R100,000 and more, were exempted from criminal liability and some of them remained in leadership positions in the system of internal affairs organs, trade, and so on.

More than 100,000 people were detained and arrested during the investigation of suspected concealment of money and valuables acquired by criminal means, or were charged with committing this crime. It is typical that not a single one of these cases was sent to trial. Criminal proceedings against them all were suspended for lack of a case to answer, as a rule, even though they had spent periods ranging from 3 days to several months in custody.

The material concerning these people was often concealed from the courts, and materials concerning these people were extracted from criminal cases that were sent to trial without any procedural decisions being made. For example, the fact that Makdanova was arrested and detained in custody for abstracting procedural documents from the case file came to light only when the court heard the case of her husband. Another 50 people were detained and arrested without proof or established complicity in crimes, in gross deviation from the demands of procedural norms.

When detaining people in custody in such cases, the investigators and prosecutors were guided not so much by the grounds provided by the criminal proceedings law, but by the objective of achieving the surrender of money and valuables acquired by criminal means. It is to be assumed that the surrender of money and valuables was a condition for release from custody.

The investigation group, with sanction by prosecutors, made it a widespread practice to arrest family members and relatives of persons accused of receiving bribes, including sick and elderly people and mothers of large families. For example, 21 relatives were held in custody during the investigation of Karimov's case, 15 in Khudaybergenov's case, 9 in Usmankhodzhayev's case, and 8 each in the cases of Murusimenkov, Rodzhatov, and Kamalov. Saidova, a mother of 12 children; Daliyeva and Matgamova with 11 children each; and Alimova, mother of 9 children, were held in custody.

A number of arrested suspects were held in custody in temporary detention isolation centers in excess of the 72 hours stipulated by law, and even for periods of up to 20 days. Deputies of soviets at different levels, right up to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, were arrested without previous consent by the soviets. The terms of detention in custody, extended by USSR deputy general prosecutors and with permission from the Supreme Soviet Presidium, run into years. Often enough, however, investigation work involving a number of those arrested was not conducted for several months on end, while Kakhramanov, Gaipov, and Khaitov were subsequently found not guilty by the court.

As a result of cases being heard in the courts, the amount of bribes taken as shown in the sentence is sharply reduced against the amount shown in the indictment. There were times when courts found bribetakers guilty of receiving only one-fourth of the amount with which they were charged during the investigation, or accepted as proven only one or two of the dozens of instances cited in the indictment.

This proportion is largely attributable to the fact that, during the investigation process, investigators preferred to rely primarily on the accused's own admissions—the notorious "queen of evidence." No sooner had some of the accused withdrawn their own evidence in court than the charges immediately collapsed.

There are signs of serious omissions in the confiscation of money and valuables during the investigation, the maintenance of relevant records, and their storage. These omissions resulted in the link between many valuables and specific individuals being lost and consequently in the loss of any evidential value of their detection and confiscation, and offered grounds for interested parties to claim that the confiscated valuables belonged to them rather than to the accused. There were many instances when money, gold coins, and gold articles were not itemized and their individual characteristics were not specified. There are a number of testimonies to the effect that money and bonds had been confiscated without a protocol being drawn up or duplicates handed over to the persons from whom the property was confiscated.

Many complaints were received from convicted persons, accused persons, their relatives, and other persons both prior to the commission's formation and during the period of its work, alleging illegal actions by Gdlyan, Ivanov, and other investigators from the group: threats of execution by firing squad and other threats, insults, humiliation of citizens' honor and dignity, and physical influence.

Despite the fact that such complaints and statements deserve most serious attention and verification, the commission lacks sufficient proof of their veracity. It would be expedient to verify the information contained in the complaints in the form provided by the criminal proceedings law: Interrogations, confrontations, appointment of expert commissions, and so on, and the parliamentary commission cannot use these forms. The USSR Prosecutor's Office has instituted a criminal case regarding breaches of legality by members of the investigation group, and the commission is keeping an eye on its investigation. Moreover, and in view of the far-reaching conflict between Gdlyan and Ivanov and the general prosecutor and other leaders of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, the commission expresses fears that the interest of the leadership of the USSR Prosecutor's Office in its outcome might have an effect on its resolution. We would assume it necessary to take measures to ensure objectivity when investigating the cases in question, as well as prosecutor's oversight to ensure the strictest adherence to socialist legality.

Now, the work of the USSR Prosecutor's Office in exercising prosecutor's supervision of the activity of Gdlyan's investigation group. As a rule, the large groups of investigators set up by the USSR Prosecutor's Office and sent out to work in Uzbekistan from other republics did not know the language and customs of the people or the specific local conditions. The groups included many young investigators. This generated the need for constant supervision and monitoring of the group's work.

It was already reported that the USSR Prosecutor's Office received complaints and statements about breaches of legality by the group's investigators. But the majority of these complaints and statements were remitted for examination by Gdlyan and Ivanov, even though their own actions were often the subject of complaints. Some statements simply never reached their destination and remained with the investigators.

Former USSR General Prosecutor Rekunkov, his deputies Soroka, and later on Katushev, former chief of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Investigations Unit Karakozov, and Investigations Unit Prosecutors Popova and Mazurkevich did not give the due attention to overseeing the observance of legality during the investigation conducted by the group headed by Gdlyan, mainly leaving the course of the investigation of such an important and major criminal case to his own discretion.

Taking advantage of red tape, the investigations and the detention of accused persons in custody stretched over a period of years. Local prosecutors, succumbing to Gdlyan's influence and without studying the case materials, irresponsibly authorized orders for detention in custody issued by him and other investigators.

The commission believes that the main political and legal responsibility for the situation prevailing around the case under investigation rests primarily with former leaders of the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Many of the shortcomings we have discovered are typical of the entire law enforcement system to this day.

The commission also notes that USSR General Prosecutor Sukharev, who took office in May 1988, failed to promptly look into the prevailing situation and to organize proper oversight of the investigation group's work.

Gdlyan, taking advantage of the lack of monitoring and the connivance of the USSR Prosecutor's Office leadership, rejected all attempts to impose proper oversight of his work. Over a period of 6 years, separate inspections of the group's work were conducted only in connection with the suicides of Mirzabayev, Gaipov, and Khadzhimuratov while under investigation.

About Gdlyan and Ivanov's accusations against senior officials of party and state central organs. One of the main tasks of the commission's work is to verify the substance of accusations of complicity in corruption by people in the top party and state leadership, made by Gdlyan and Ivanov in their statements at rallies and the mass media. But neither Gdlyan nor Ivanov provided either the USSR Prosecutor's Office, or the public, or the commission with any evidence to substantiate the accusations.

Initially, they both explained to the commission that evidence is to be found in the criminal case. But a study of the case material by commission members, independent Prosecutor Martinson, and a group of investigators formerly of the investigation group headed by Gdlyan and summoned to Moscow at his suggestion, gives grounds to conclude that the case does not contain sufficient proof of the guilt of persons whom Gdlyan and Ivanov invariably describe in their statements as "Moscow" or "Kremlin" bribetakers. There are only sporadic and contradictory testimonies by some of the accused, and by Usmankhodzhayev in particular, which were subsequently withdrawn.

Later on, Gdlyan and Ivanov started claiming in public that they have cached somewhere documents exposing the people they have named. Gdlyan and Ivanov responded negatively to the commission's repeated suggestions that these documents be produced subject to guarantees for their safety and, if necessary, their publication. In this context, the commission cannot speak with any certainty about the existence or otherwise of any investigation material outside the framework of the criminal case.

It is well known that public attention focused on Gdlyan and Ivanov's accusation against Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

During an interrogation on 23 October 1988, Usmankhodzhayev, former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, testified to Gdlyan, Moskovtseva, and other Prosecutor's Office officials that he had given Ligachev bribes of R30,000 on each occasion during two meetings in Tashkent and Moscow. Usmankhodzhayev repeated this in his statement addressed to the USSR General Prosecutor and dated 25 October 1988. But during the 7 months since that time, neither Gdlyan nor the group investigators acquired any evidence at all confirming Usmankhodzhayev's testimony that he had given bribes to Ligachev. In November-December 1988, during interrogations by USSR General Prosecutor Sukharev and his deputy Vasilyev, Usmankhodzhayev no longer mentioned Ligachev, and in his statement to the USSR General Prosecutor dated 14 April 1989 he already claimed that he had paid no bribes to Ligachev and attributed his previous testimony to this effect to pressure from Gdlyan. The USSR Prosecutor's Office, having conducted an investigation, dismissed the criminal case against Ligachev because no crime had been committed.

The commission confirms that the criminal case does not contain evidence of any illegal actions by Ye.K. Ligachev. But it does note the formal nature of the investigation conducted by the Prosecutor's Office.

V.I. Smirnov, former section chief at the Organizational-Party Work Department, was responsible in the past for the selection and placement of party cadres in Uzbekistan. Later on he worked as second secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and was candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. Smirnov was arrested on 11 January 1989 following accusations of having received bribes from 20 persons.

Having studied the materials of the criminal case of charges against Smirnov, the commission finds that the case against Smirnov was dismissed prematurely, groundlessly, and hastily. Facts of Smirnov receiving money, gifts, and presents were not exhaustively investigated and there was no legal appraisal of his actions.

This conclusion by the commission also accords with the decision by the USSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium dated 19 May 1989 to continue the investigation of the criminal case of charges against Smirnov, setting an additional period of between 4 and 6 weeks. On 22 May 1989 KGB Investigator Dukhanin dismissed the case despite the aforementioned decision.

In this context, the commission assumes that Smirnov should not have been allowed to speak at the CPSU Central Committee September plenum. It is still unknown whether there has been a political and party appraisal of the activity of a number of high-ranking CPSU Central Committee officials who took part in the work of the 14th Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Plenum. They were sent there by the party to impose order among the republic's cadres.

It is possible that shortcomings in this activity by officials from the Organizational-Party Work Department Central Asian Region Section before and after the plenum would not have put an end to bribery and embezzlement by the republic's leadership, but the relevant conditions were not analyzed and appraised. Many comission members also believe that, not being on the plenum agenda, the report by the USSR General Prosecutor is not in line with the course of creating a rule-of-law state since neither the General Prosecutor nor the CPSU Central Committee have the power to supplant the Congress of People's Deputies on whose behalf and instructions the commission is working.

Material published simultaneously by three central newspapers (IZVESTIYA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and TRUD) toward the end of October and outlining the far from indisputable viewpoint of USSR Prosecutor's Office officials and KGB Investigator Dukhanin, was biased to a considerable extent and did not help the commission's work on objective investigation and appraisal of the prevailing situation. It is appropriate to say that the commission's work and its materials were given only the minimum coverage by mass media at that same time. All this, on the one hand, coupled with the behavior of Gdlyan and Ivanov who persist with their verbal and printed accusations and making insulting statements against a series of persons, including members of the commission, is of no help in the struggle against organized crime.

Taking advantage of shortcomings in legislation and the fact that it lags considerably behind the tasks of the struggle against organized crime, and of the personnel, organizational, and technical weaknesses of law enforcement organs, the criminal fraternity—beneath the banner of exposing actual and alleged breaches of legality by preliminary investigation organs—is keeping up its mass offensive.

In many trials and cases involving bribery and other crimes, one can notice two methods, often perfectly successful, to evade criminal liability: Withdraw testimony given in the past and discredit the investigation. This is promoted by what are not always objective and responsible statements by some mass media. Consequently, the investigation organs are demoralized, many honest and professionally skilled staffers have left, and there has been a sharp fall in the number of criminal cases involving bribery and embezzlement heard by the courts and in the number of persons sentenced for such crimes.

Comrades, different people work on our commission, and they did not always share the same position. But we are unanimous on one point: None of us needs to be convinced that corruption, bribery, and arbitrariness by those in power are an evil capable of decomposing any state. There can be no difference of opinion on this point. We need daily struggle, but not a struggle "campaign." On studying the materials, we realize yet again the great need for radical perestroyka in relations between party-state and judicial authority. There is need for legal and organizational reform of the entire system for the administration of justice, which has often been a tool for punishment, vengeance, and ambition by anyone who could have influenced it. Investigating these questions, we firmly bear in mind that all must be equal before the law—ordinary citizens and high-ranking officials alike. We have reported our preliminary conclusions to the congress. Moreover, we are aware of the justice and immutability of the tenet: A democratic state cannot be built by nondemocratic methods. Legality cannot be affirmed by illegal means. These are the principles by which we are guided, and any outside pressure on the commission is unacceptable. The commission's immunity and total trust in the commission are the foundations of our status, and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies must guarantee this. The people must be assured that the commission members will not compromise their honor as deputies and their sense of justice, that our main objective is to arrive at the truth no matter how bitter it might be. The document bears the signatures of commission members.

Thank you for your attention.

Gdlyan Speech

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[Address by Deputy Telman Gdlyan delivered at the 23 December evening session of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, with interjections from by session chairman Anatoliy I. Lukyanov—recorded]

[Text] [Gdlyan] Comrades, my difficult position—difficult, in the sense that to pack into 5 minutes the enormous mass of information which is contained in over a 1,000 tomes of criminal work, and for there to be an objective picture, as Public Prosecutor Martenson said, for everything in its entirety, with all its interconnections, to be represented, as you understand, is impossible. No, that is not the point. You understand that a self-respecting professional will not, you understand, talk in slogans or in, so to speak, simple accusations.

Something has to be said and backed-up with justifications. Anatoliy Ivanovich, how much time do I have, so that I can make a calculation?

[Lukyanov] Begin. We will see. Then we will consult the congress.

[Gdlyan] I understand.

[Lukyanov] I will consult the congress, Telman Khorenovich.

[Gdlyan] I know how you will consult. Comrades, if I am to talk about this case—we have been investigating it for six years. As you understand, at least 30 minutes for each year would be necessary. Consequently, three hours. If the congress does not have such an opportunity, I would of course ask the congress—I have a single opportunity to appeal to you, my colleague deputies—for the opportunity to be given tomorrow or the day after tomorrow on live central television, for the first time to express our point of view, justify it, and set everything forth. After which much will be clear.

Now, further. I ask this of you. Secondly, I ask, in order for everything to become clear, and all the unsubstantiated accusations which in the course of the year have been unilaterally aimed at us, for it to become clear, I ask the permission of the congress to publish all the materials, to make them open. Then it will be evident who did what. After all, we are not afraid of openness. This, actually, is the only way out, so that the people find out what in fact has happened. This is the second request.

Comrades, what then happened in Uzbekistan? I am not going to generalize. This is no use to anyone. What has been said in general is understandable. Thus I will begin from facts. First, we are accused of numerous transgressions, of all those, so to speak, which happened with the application of the law, and so on and so forth.

Comrades, this is completely at variance with reality. This is why. Our group—and I think that many deputies from Uzbekistan have been confused, and I want to inform my comrade colleagues—our group was the only one in Uzbekistan which literally fought a battle with this—comrades, I speak correctly—lawlessness which was taking place, I would say with mass terror in Uzbekistan, with minor genocide. This is not because I am now speaking and want to be liked. Do you understand?

We said this, beginning in 1984, battling against local bodies of law and order, headed by Buturlin, the former public prosecutor of the republic, under whose leadership all this took place; (Rekunkov), former procurator general; and (Sroke), former deputy prosecutor general. It is thanks to them and local involved persons among those who are under guard, and undergoing criminal proceedings, and certain officials at the center—they organized terror in a literal sense with regard to the people. Back in 1984 we even then came out against this, and started to expose it. You will say: Oh, now Gdlyan can say everything. I will refer to the document.

In the beginning of 1986, seeing this lawlessness taking place—it was necessary to be in Uzbekistan to see in what conditions people survived, including officials, to comprehend how people were breaking the law. There—you must excuse me—hundreds of thousands broke it, and wanted us to take part in this terror. Our group refused, and prosecuted only the organizers. Over six years, comrades, we have prosecuted more, slighlty more than 60. The figures speak for themselves. We did not take part in mass terror. Seeing all this (?bacchanalia) and lawlessness with regard to people who were twice punished under Rashidov's reign, and now, with the so-called justice with regard to people, we were forced in 1986, at the beginning of the year, to address to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary and president of the country, a 15-sheet report, in which all these unsuitable methods were revealed.

We know very well that Mikhail Sergeyevich acquainted all members of the Politburo with this secret document. After this we repeated these similar warning signals—as they say in the party—three times, and a number of Politburo members also wrote about this and protested; they said that it must be stopped because this is no use anywhere. I just do not understand today, as I have not yet understood why the Politburo remains silent and why Mikhail Sergeyevich remains silent; they do not say that it was precisely them who rose up against this. I do not like this.

The second thing, as far as not bringing, releasing from criminal liability is concerend, comrades, everything is confused. What happened in Uzbekistan in connection with the violations has all now been blamed on our group as well. Let us separate things all the same. If our affairs are being spoken about, we are prepared to answer all questions.

Recently, Comrade Pugo submitted to a commission of the Congress of People's Deputies and used the same method; he blamed us for everything. Comrade Pugo, what relation do we have to the arrest and taking into custody of pregnant women, etc? This has nothing at all to do with us or to our business. When we speak about the fact that the Supreme Court, in the person of Terebilov and other comrades report...it is not...the letter...a private view, but report that the group committed violations, they attribute to us about R1 million which—as the story goes—at the expense of our defendants who were released, three were returned to the state. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. To our...[changes thought] so far there is no relationship—not a single ruble has been returned.

When they speak about the mass...liberation, well the comrades were correct to say that; yes, in Uzbekistan, criminal charges were brought against individuals, 400 or so people, this is the team of the very (Ruturinat), the former procurator who is today working as deputy procurator of the Russian Federation. They were vindicated, rehabilitated, but after all, no one wanted to. When I was in Comrade Pugo's office, when they were setting up the first political commission with respect to...I reported-...when I was in many offices of the CPSU Central Committee, I said comrades, surely no investigation is needed, take the materials of the case, and 400 have been vindicated. Why are you not reacting to the fact that lawlessness was going on there? I ask today too: Why is there no reaction to these outlandish occurrences?

Now, the arrest of relatives, comrades. Yes, there were indeed cases of relatives being arrested. Let us understand what we are talking about. If our opponents were more flexible—I have in mind, in the juridical sense, the juridical positions; I defend these positions—they would certainly accuse us without a doubt. Wherever Gdlyan turns—using popular language—he will be pressured to the detriment of his investigative group. If they accused us of the fact that we—despite the extent to which guilt had been proven—had not committed them to court, and together with other, thousands of second-rate, third-rate, 200th-rate little men sent to Siberia from Uzbekistan, people who were forced to break the laws—I repeat this once again—then that is another matter. Do you understand, they may do this to us. So now you will say why, Comrade Gdlyan, together with your group, relatives, whose guilt was proven by the concealment of millions—quintals of gold and money and so on—I can't answer them. I have been caught, so to speak, together with the group. But the logic is very simple, comrades. It is possible to make such an accusation, but to accuse our group that we made arrests and held people under guard, and so on, this is completely not in accord with reality. Because their guilt as accomplices was proven—of concealing these millions—and we applied the law which is today in force. So I ask, of what then are we guilty? One can not pile it all on in this way. [noise from audience]

Now, with regard...[changes thought] well, when the general procurator, you recall, spoke at the September plenum, he cited, as a most convincing example, the following fact: That—and today, here, the independent procurator made reference to that fact—the relatives of the first secretary of the Bukhara Oblast party committee, Abduvakhid karimovich Karimov, were arrested. Yes, comrades, they were arrested, but, as a result of the measures undertaken on the basis of the requirements of the law—I will repeat this again—the requirements of the law. These people were arrested, and a total of R6.2 million were taken from them. These millions are in the care of state security guards. Now, all these individuals should be sent to court, but we felt that such a formal application of the law to these people, when...you understand, the head of the family so to speak, is simply, well, not expedient. It is possible to level the accusation that in a purely legal sense of course we had no evidence, but we felt that even from a moral point of view there was no point in sending them to court, because it was a mass phenomenon.

Now on the matter of the family of Khudayhergenov. Yes, comrades, relatives were also detained, arrested, but (Madyar Khudaybergenovich), incidentally a most upright individual...yes, you will laugh—but what the fear now is is that people may now settle accounts with him for his exposing—for his honesty, and for handing over these millions together with his relatives and so on, because, you understand (?it's a matter of honor). [sentence as heard] But he, after all, was just such a victim, along the lines that there was no other way out for him, and here already, so to speak is our other position: That of the advocate. So, in all, R200,000 less were taken from him—6 million. So I ask: What was he up to, comrades? [calls from the hall]

I will tell you that after we confiscated R6 million from Karimov, the first secretary of the Bukhara Oblast party committee, Comrade Chebrikov who, I think, is present here, and Deputy and Comrade (Rekunkov) reported back to the Central Committee and to the Politburo about the fact that that much had been confiscated from him. The KGB employees were rewarded for this, so to speak. No questions were asked. Today, for some reason, all this is being called into doubt. It is impossible to understand this.

Now, as regards the institution of criminal proceedings about which the independent procurator has spoken, comrades, I wish to cite two circumstances here. Incidentally, it is symbolic that it is on the day of the opening of the first congress, on the 25th, when we all came in here, including us, that the procurator-general brought an action against the investigative group. Yes, of course, it is aimed against Gdlyan and Ivanov; this is clear. But this is not the heart of the matter. The thing is that the proceedings are being instituted in violation and have been started in violation. Who ordered it, and on whose instruction is the investigation being held? So, at that time we, in effect, put the case of our procurator-general to the judgment of the public and said that his move is illegal. I can list the cases. It is just that there is no time now. Moreover, all of his actions are aimed at shielding the Moscow bribing group in every possible way, including unlawful.

After this the procurator-general violated Articles 59 and 60 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the RSFSR, where it says, literally, that people who have a vested interest in the outcome of a case cannot have anything to do with and have no right to take part in its investigation. How is that? The whole world knew that we were accusing him and our opponent, to put it mildly, and instituting criminal proceedings against them. This is not only unlawful, in essence it is immoral. Such things should not be done. Well, let's say I had something to do with it and (Ashayak) (?conducted the case), I simply consider that this should not be done, because I have a vested interest.

Second, he violated the instructions and decisions of the First Congress of People's Deputies that exclusive powers are vested in the commission of deputies which you elected, and that only the commission has the right to work on exposing all these circumstances. Because this was not a matter of the investigators, as you remember it was a matter of exposing possible violations by the investigating group, workers of the public prosecutor's office and the USSR KGB.

And third, as you remember, the most important question, to conduct the corruption case, so that it would not be ruined. Today I am reporting to you, respected colleagues, with regret that in essence the corruption case is in ruins, in the sense that not one of the corrupt people in Moscow, including those in the higher echelons of power, will ever be called to account. Thus, this is in essence proven. As regards what was said about there not being enough evidence and so on, I can assure you that all the interregional group could long ago have been convicted and sent to Kolyma [prison colony] on this evidence. There is too much evidence. You understand, this evidence.... Only it's a different matter as to whose hands it ended up in, and how, as a matter of fact it was dealt with by them. The fact that today soft-hearted advances are being made toward our Uzbek comrades.... You, after all, understand that the error introduced has nothing in common with legality. Up to the present day, the activities of these people have brought things to the stage where unobjectively the Uzbek republic turned out to be supposedly corrupt, but Moscow, it is claimed, the center, is purely devoted to the authorities and to the interests of the nation and people. This is what they were striving for and what, in essence, they have done. But I state categorically that that term which they thought up here in the heart of Moscow: The Uzbek Case; and how this was being exposed by us the whole time, a term which does not correspond to the materials of the criminal case, has been whipped up, up until now. And up until now, it is being conducted precisely...[changes thought] some comrades make reservations, they say, this is what we call it—what has what we call it got to do with it? Someone wanted to make it Uzbek. But the threads extended to the same degree into Kazakhstan, and to Tajikistan, and to the Caucasus, and to the northern Caucasus, but simply no one wanted to investigate this case. You understand. [bell rings for speaker to finish]

Adamovich on Ligachev Bribery Links

LD2412134789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2131 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Remarks by Deputy Aleksandr M. Adamovich at the 23 December evening session of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Judging by the report and the coreport, Prosecutor Sukharev will investigate Gdlyan and Ivanov. I want to say a few words about another name. I can indeed sympathize with Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev in a human way. Throughout the whole country his name is bandied about and linked with bribes. Here there is talk of 30,000, of 50,000, and, true, there are provisos that no firm proof has been made available.

I feel sorry for Ligachev; this I say honestly, but I feel even more sorry for the country. I am sorry for the country, which needs nothing today so much as it needs trust in its leadership. Without complete trust in the leadership the country cannot emerge from the situation of absolute crisis in which it finds itself. Under these conditions someone who occupies—I don't know what post it is there now in the country—is linked with questions as to whether or not he gave or took, or did not take bribes, and he is linked even more directly with the protection of such people as Smirnov, who is evidently well-and-truly smeared here. How do they act in these matters in other countries? In the United States quite recently, just 6 months ago, Wright, the speaker of the House of Representatives, was suspected of publishing a book—a very good book, furthermore, a very popular book, and one that sold well and that was perhaps too large: Were there not some firms involved here giving bribes to Wright by this means? Wright evidently did not want to leave this post, the third highest in the state. But the Democratic Party had an interest in Caeser's wife being beyond all suspicion, and with the leader of the state—the President, who also had an interest in this—without any whooping for joy, without throwing any mud, simply asked Wright to move to another work. In these cases one can say this: What can be done to ensure that things are fair both to the state and to Comrade Ligachev? Perhpas one should act in the same way as Wright. [applause]

Ligachev Rejects Corruption Claims

LD2412134489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2249 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Address by Yegor Ligachev, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, at the 23 December evening session of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies, I have asked for the floor first and foremost because on this matter, to which there has been a widespread public reaction, I spoke only once at the Party Central Committee Plenum, religiously observing the request of the commission not to hamper them in their work. As I indeed have the other side of the matter, I would like to say a few words a little later.

I am deeply convinced, since it is not a matter of myself—I am an ordinary Soviet citizen and a Soviet Communist—but from my point of view the fact is that to my great regret our society has again encountered a relapse into arbitrariness.

I would like, comrades, to inform you of the following: On the instructions of the Politburo, starting from 1983, in particular, following the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum—I would like without exaggeration to say—thorough work to put an end to the abuse of power in Uzbekistan was conducted by a large group of party functionaries. I was engaged in performing this task as a Party Central Committee secretary.

I categorically sweep aside the claims by those two smart investigators of ours that they raised the banner of the fight against corruption and bribe-taking. The banner of the fight against corruption and bribe-taking was raised by our party, above all following the April Party Central Committee Plenum. We acted within the framework of our powers and operated employing party methods, and with the support of the republic's communists and work collectives. Moreover, our task was to try to change the situation and create in Uzbekistan a social atmosphere that would facilitate the fight against corruption and against all abuses.

Allow me to specify a few facts. I was endorsed in the Party Central Committee as a Central Committee department head approximately mid-1983. Over some small period of time I was involved in the following circumstance: For the previous 3 years, over 30,000 letters from the working people of Uzbekistan on the abuses of the leadership of that time had been received by the Party Central Committee. I reported this to Comrade Andropov, and received permission, perhaps for the first time, as the head of a department, to talk with Rashidov, a member of the political leadership of that time. My talk only took place when I told him that I was holding it on the instruction of the Party Central Committee general secretary.

Then Rashidov passed away. Even earlier, a commission, or rather a large group of Party Central Committee officials, was set up, which started all this great, everyday, mundane work. When all this was finished we put forward the material to the Party Central Committee with the request either to discuss it or to make a decision, or to act as the Politburo considered. Unfortunately, it was not possible to make a decision, nor to discuss it. But a decision was made to charge Comrade Grachev, Party Central Committee secretary, to go to a plenum of the Uzbekistan Party Central Committee and there to report to the Uzbek communists on behalf of the Central Committee, and to do everything possible so that the party organization itself would start eradicating the abuses permitted in this republic.

After the plenum was held—incidentally, it is just here that the first bribe for Ligachev is ascribed. This is a paradox, but it is a fact—which people attempt to make into a fact—a fact in a criminal case. It doesn't sink in at all, but that is not the point. After I returned to the Party Central Committee there was set up for perhaps the first time in the Central Committee's practice a conference of practically the whole apparatus of the Party Central Committee, and I was charged to report on my address—it has now been published.

This was the middle of 1984. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev conducted the conference. I will say bluntly that a lot of effort had to be applied to persuade the leadership of the Central Committee of that time to go to it. It was then that all those remarkable words which were fully aired at the 27th congress of our party were uttered. Not one republic, not one oblast, not one zone should be above criticism.

After this, great, constant, and painstaking work continued, together with Uzbek comrades—I would like to underline this—together with Uzbek comrades, togther with the communists of this republioc of purging the leading cadres from unfit, demoralized people, and of reinforcing the whole moral atmosphere in the republic.

I should also like to report, in all sincerity, that the staff of the Committee for State Security, of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the investigative group of the USSR Procuracy, and the republican law and order bodies have presented facts about corruption, bribe-taking, and other abuses on the part of officials. I can recall a time, comrades, when the work of both party workers and lawyers carried great weight with the public, not only in this republic, but throughout the country, since people rightly saw in it the start of processes for the moral improvement of the whole of our life and, I would say, real steps toward everywhere asserting the triumph of the law. Unfortunately, as is now coming to light, two leaders of the investigative group are—I am deeply convinced of this—determined to exploit the mood of the people at a suitable moment, and to make a personal political gamble. The method had been tried and tested in the past, that is, accusing political opponents of criminal behavior. For this reason, the task of obtaining evidence, at any price, of corruption in the Central Committee apparatus and within the country's political leadership, was set. The law, as they say, was set aside. The end justifies, they claimed, any means. Libellous speeches constantly figured in the media, at noisy gatherings, and even on the Crimea's variety stages. And, all without trial or investigation, a considerable number of people were publicly accused of being criminals. Note that the people doing this were procuracy staff whose task was to see the Soviet laws were strictly observed.

Well, I think there is something rather more here than its being unethical, as one comrade has said. Here's an example for you, comrades, of how some people stand verbally for democracy and legality, but in practice live as parasites off democracy to the advantage of their personal ambitions and for the sake of, let me put it frankly, the adventurist aim and the aspiration, as they have said many times themselves, of going to the Kremlin. In my opinion, people like this are highly dangerous. It is my profound conviction that once they came to power they would launch, without even thinking, any method of reprisal against those who were not suitable. For the moment, unfortunately, it is slander upon slander, and no one can guarantee that a new lie won't appear tomorrow. I am also talking about this because it is my profound conviction that political careerism does not only manifest itself at the center, but at the local level, as well. Is it not the case that we are constantly running into attempts to discredit convinced communists and honest leaders, scientists, writers, the military and veterans, all those who, I would say, are true to the ideals of socialism, and are serving the socialist aims of restructuring and the renewal of society and the Party?

I think that every one of us must decisively struggle against these implausable actions, and with all our strengths protect worthy people. But at the same time I also consider, and would like to state it here so that there are no omissions—we must decisively eradicate bribery, bribe-taking, corruption, the extortion which people encounter in real life. I think, comrades, that it is precisely for this reason that some of our people believed the investigator's slanderous declaration in relation to workers of the Central Committee apparatus. I would like to emphasize in particular the disinterest—about which there are no doubts from my point of view. I would also like to draw your attention to two circumstances. From my viewpoint the entire story of the leaders of the investigatory group, testifies, on the one hand, to the fact that during the transitional period, when the law-based state is bein created and society is freeing itself from the grave consequences of the past, attempts to create lawlessness again are, unfortunately, possible. But on the other hand, comrades, and this is very good, it is, I would say, fortunate, that it is no longer possible to infringe on human rights with immunity. You must agree that before, justice only triumphed when heads had rolled and only after decades had passed. Now times are completely different.

And one more thing. The firm conviction has emerged in the Politburo that improving the moral health of society is both the aim and an important condition of the success of perestroyka. Permit me, on behalf of the Politburo, to declare that we reject attempts both from the left and from the right to split the Politburo and set the members of the Politburo at odds with one another. I state bluntly that in former times, such intrigues would have long since had their effect. This time, they are not working. The composition of the Central Committee is different; the composition of the Politburo is different; the leadership of the Party and State is different.

I decisively reject the attempt to compare our leaders with bankrupt leaders like Honecker, Zhivkov, and others. And I want to say with all responsibility that the leadership of our Party has done everything necessary and everything possible to spare our fraternal peoples from the corruption, bribe-taking, and illegality which has been perpetrated in these countries. [applause] Such parallels, are, I think, absolutely groundless.

Now for the question which, essentially speaking, has received publicity here, of why the Ligachev case was examined at the Party Central Committee Plenum. I should like, comrades—please forgive me for maybe holding your attention—to state the following to you: That our party's statute records the right of any communist to address questions, statements and proposals to any party authority, right up to the CPSU Central Committee, and to demand an answer on the essence of his appeal. I, as a communist and a member of the Party Central Committee, have made use of that right and believe that I have acted correctly.

I would like to say the following on comrade Adamovich's proposal. I do not intend to follow [former U.S. House of Representatives speaker] Mr Wright's example, although I have twice had occasion to meet him and am full of respect for that man. I want to say more than that. Since the situation has emerged like this, and attempts are being made to slander me—and not only me, perhaps they will try to mention a number of other names too, and this also applies, to a certain extent, to the present leadership—I consider it my duty, as long as I have the trust of the Central Committee and the communists, to work, and to prove by my labor my commitment to our common cause. [applause] I don't have my feet in two camps, as some do—in the opposition in parliament, and in a primary organization in the party. [Laughter, general murmuring]

As for my overall position, you, or some of you, may not agree with it, but it is a fairly clear and definite one. I want to inform you, Comrade Adamovich, that I receive [pauses]...I have received thousands of letters this year from working people and communists, who do not write to the order of any particular group, but, I will say, according to the prompting of their own hearts, in which they give me significant support, and that strengthens me in my belief that I should conduct myself in a manner becoming a communist, for we are dealing with the honor of our party.

As far as—I'm finishing—my position is concerned, I have been, and will be a convinced supporter of the socialist choice of perestroyka, democracy, and socialist legality.

I conclude, comrades, with the following words: I am proceeding from the fact that restructuring can occur even without each one of us individually. But we, together, cannot, as they say, do without restructuring. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Congress Passes Measures Against Organized Crime

LD2312154589 Moscow TASS in English 1424 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 23 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies today endorsed measures to combat organised crime, after completing the discussion of reports by Soviet Interior Minister Bakatin and Prosecutor General Aleksandr Sukharev.

The Congress instructed the parliament to consider at its next session changes in the criminal-proceedings legislation, aimed to ensure the inevitability of responsibility of all members of criminals groups, primarily their organisers, as well as the law on militia and other bills.

The government was instructed to elaborate a complex of measures to remove causes and conditions which give rise to the "shadow economy," a breeding ground for organised crime. To this end a system of effective control over incomes should be created and a system of clearing payments expanded.

The Congress made a point of emphasising that all efforts to combat crime should be based on the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of union republics, with the strict compliance with law.

Many deputies noted during the debate that it is impossible to achieve a fundamental change in combatting crime through legal means alone. The general improvement of the social, economic, political and moral situation in the country has paramount significance. This approach will form the basis of a nationwide programme to combat crime, which the government will finish elaborating next year.

Electoral System Amendments Law Adopted

PM2312160989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 1

["USSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law) on Questions of the Electoral System"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] With a view to further improving the electoral system, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies resolves:

To introduce the following amendments and additions in the USSR Constitution:

1. In Chapter 12, "The System of Soviets of People's Deputies and the Principles of Their Work":

Article 89 is to read as follows:

"Article 89. The Soviets of People's Deputies—Congress of USSR People's Deputies and USSR Supreme Soviet, Congresses of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics, and Soviets of People's Deputies of autonomous oblasts and of krays, oblasts, and other administrative-territorial units—shall constitute a single system of bodies of state authority";

Part 2 of Article 90 is to read in two parts as follows:

"Elections of USSR people's deputies shall be called not later than 4 months before the expiry of the term of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

"The timing and procedure for calling elections of people's deputies of union and autonomous republics and to local Soviets of People's Deputies shall be determined by the laws of union and autonomous republics."

Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 91 are to read as follows:

"Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics shall be elected directly by voters, and in republics where it is envisaged to create Congresses—by the Congresses of People's Deputies. Presidiums of Supreme Soviets and local Soviets of People's Deputies shall be constituted, and Soviet chairmen shall be elected, in conformity with the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of union and autonomous republics.

"Soviets of People's Deputies shall form committees and permanent commissions and shall create executive and administrative organs and other organs accountable to them.

"Officials elected or appointed by Soviets of People's Deputies, with the exception of judges, cannot hold office for more than two consecutive terms."

2. In Chapter 13, "Electoral System":

Article 95 is to read as follows:

"Article 95. Elections of people's deputies shall be held in single-seat or multiseat electoral okrugs on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot.

"Some people's deputies of union and autonomous republics, if so provided by the republics' constitutions, can be elected by public organizations";

Parts 1 and 2 of Article 96 are to read as follows:

"Elections of people's deputies from electoral okrugs shall be universal—USSR citizens who have reached the age of 18 shall have the right to vote.

USSR citizens who have reached the age of 21 can be elected USSR people's deputies";

Part 5 of Article 96 is to read as follows:

"Mentally ill citizens who have been adjudged incompetent by the courts and persons kept in places for deprivation of freedom following a court sentence, do not participate in elections. Persons who are remanded in custody according to procedures laid down by the Code of Criminal Proceedings, do not participate in elections."

Article 96 is to be supplemented by part 6, reading as follows:

"Any direct or indirect restriction whatsoever of the electoral rights of USSR citizens is impermissible and punishable under the law";

Part 2 of Article 97 and part 2 of Article 98 are to be deleted;

Article 100 is to read as follows:

"Article 100. The right to nominate candidate people's deputies in electoral okrugs shall be vested with labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher education establishments, voters' meetings at places of residence, and servicemen's meetings in military units. Organs and organizations with the right to nominate candidate people's deputies from public organizations shall be determined by the laws of the USSR and of union and autonomous republics respectively.

"The number of candidate people's deputies is unlimited. Every participant in an election campaign meeting can propose anyone's nomination, including his own, for discussion.

"Any number of candidates can be included in the ballot papers.

"Candidate people's deputies participate in the election campaign on an equal footing.

"With a view to ensuring equal conditions for every candidate people's deputy, the expenditure associated with the preparation and holding of elections of people's deputies shall be met by the corresponding electoral commission from a single fund created at the state's expense and from voluntary contributions by enterprises, public organizations, and citizens";

Parts 2 and 3 of Article 101 are to read as follows:

"The holding of elections shall be conducted by electoral commissions consisting of representatives elected by meetings (conferences) of labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher education establishments, voters' meetings at places of residence, and servicemen's meetings in military units.

"USSR citizens, labor collectives, public organizations, collectives of secondary specialized and higher education establishments, and servicemen in military units shall be guaranteed an opportunity for free and comprehensive discussion of the political, business, and personal qualities of candidate people's deputies, as well as the right to campaign for or against a candidate at meetings, in the press, and on television and radio."

3. In Chapter 17, "Higher Bodies of State Authority and Administration of a Union Republic":

Article 137 is to read as follows:

"Article 137. The highest bodies of state authority in union republics shall be the union republic Supreme Soviets, and in union republics where it is envisaged to create congresses—the Congresses of People's Deputies";

Article 138 is to read as follows:

"Article 138. The powers, composition, and standing orders of the highest organs of state authority in union republics shall be determined by the constitutions and laws of the union republics";

Part 2 of Article 139 is to be deleted.

Chapter 18 is to read as follows:

"Chapter 18. Higher Bodies of State Authority and Administration of an Autonomous Republic

"Article 143. The highest bodies of state authority in autonomous republics shall be the autonomous republic Supreme Soviets, and in autonomous republics where it is envisaged to create congresses—the Congresses of People's Deputies.

"Article 144. The Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic shall form a Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic—the autonomous republic's government—as the highest executive and administrative organ of state authority in the autonomous republic."

5. In Chapter 19, "Local Bodies of State Authority and Administration," Article 145 is to read as follows:

"Article 145. The bodies of state authority in autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krays, oblasts, rayons, cities, urban rayons, settlements, rural population centers, and other administrative-territorial units, constituted in conformity with the laws of union and autonomous republics, shall be the corresponding Soviets of People's Deputies."

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Moscow, The Kremlin, 20 December 1989

Hearings Discuss 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

Commission Assessment

LD2312163789 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 23 TASS—By TASS political correspondent:

The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies today started hearings into the results of the work of the Commission for the Political and Legal Assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German Treaty on Non-Agression, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The report was made by its Chairman Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the party Central Committee. There are varying views on the 1939 treaty in Soviet society. There are different assessments of both the aims of the treaty, the objective and subjective factors which led to its adoption, and the Pact's impact on the subsequent development of history. The question of assessing the Pact is especially poignant in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which link the conclusion of the Pact to the subsequent entry of these republics into the Soviet Union.

It was on their initiative that the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies set up this summer a commission for the political and legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German treaty on non-aggression. Along with the representatives of all three Baltic republics, it also included deputies from other regions of the country. They include writer Chinghiz Aitmatov, Academician Georgiy Arbatov, Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, historian Yuriy Afanasyev, editor-in-chief of the popular magazine OGONEK Vitaliy Korotich, Metropolitican Aleksiy of Leningrad and Novogorod and others.

Yakovlev Speech

LD2412103689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Speech by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev to the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on 23 December—recorded]

[Text] I will begin with some historical information: On 23 August 1939 the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty was signed and on 31 August it was ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet. On 24 August it was published, and on 24 Setember the exchange of the ratified documents took place. The existence of the secret protocol was first mentioned in 1946 at the Nuremburg trials. On 23 May 1946 the protocol was published by the SAINT LOUIS POST DISPATCH newspaper and in 1948 it appeared in a book published in the United States "The National Socialist Party of Germany and the Soviet Union 1939-41." The public did not know the contents of the protocol before this; neither did the USSR Supreme Soviet or the party's Central Commitee Politburo. Since 1939 no information concerning this was published here. The reasons for this silence are understandable. The essence of the secret protocol boils down to the fact that Stalin and Hitler divided up spheres of influence, which included neighboring sovereign states.

All this cost us dearly, both politically and morally. Until now all kinds of hypotheses have been devised as to how events would have developed in Europe without the treaty and the protocol. One particular question is whether war would have begun on 1 September 1939. Public opinion even today is being fed with ideas to the effect that certain aspects of the contemporary situation in Europe—moreover concerning not only the Soviet Union—look as if they were formed on the basis of, or under the influence of, the treaty of 23 August 1939 and the secret protocols of August and September.

All this spurred the First Congress of People's Deputies to create on 2 June 1989 a commission of 26 People's Deputies. I want to stress that we touched only on 1939, but not the following years. I stress this because many statements of various sorts and notes concerning 1940 and the following years were received by the commission. So I would like to stress once more that the competence of the commission is confined to 1939, and it is not competent to answer other questions or make judgements on events.

Such is background history. The commission came to an agreement on the conclusions, but I will say straight away that it was not easy to reach a consensus. There were many arguments and clashes of opinions, but they did not undermine the general constructive atmosphere of discussions. Notwithstanding all the variety of approaches, viewpoints, and emotional nuances, the striving to bring to light episodes of the past which are beyond contention did prevail. At the same time, there was the striving to interpret the prewar reality comprehensively, bearing in mind its real interconnections and the circumstances which bound it.

Nor were matters made easier by the fact that for a long time our official stenographic record avoided shedding light on many pages of the USSR's foreign policy during the whole post-October period.

Of course, there are conventions and restrictions here linked with the interests of third countries, but there are also a lot of things that lie under a bushel by virtue of the inertia of the stereotypes that came into being. At any rate, some key documents from the Soviet archives relating to the subject under discussion became available only very recently.

In passing let me observe that the current opinion that Britain and the United States allegedly revealed their file of documents without reservation is no more than a myth. London, for example, has established that a part of the government archives, considerable in its size and extremely important for grasping what happened, will remain secret until the year 2017. And Washington has not named any time restrictions whatsoever for a number of documents.

Nevertheless, the stock of reliable data that has already been accumulated makes it possible to reproduce a picture of the way in which mankind and individual states slipped into World War II and to make sufficient conclusions upon the basis of an analysis of the totality of the facts.

Some more observations of a preliminary nature. First, in embarking upon an analysis and assessment of the past we are understandably not in a position even for a moment to tear from our hearts the events that followed 1939. Our conscience is still tormented by grief for the millions and millions of workers and peasants, scientists, and poets who died and who are not with us today.

Nor does the anger against fascism and contempt for those who demonstrated their inability to curb the murderers abate. Here it is not easy to keep strictly to the clear channel of the facts and not give in to the onslaught of natural feelings. But it is too easy to reject something or condemn it. One must also understand—understand how agreements, deals, and compacts came into being, what moved those who inspired and created them—to understand in order to protect oneself from a repetition of what has already been gone through.

As applied to the past, time has stopped. It is possible to grasp any event, regardless of the emotional train that it pulls behind it, if the analysis of it is carried out in the specific context of historic development. But we often find ourselves in the power of a priori views, not of facts; the prisoners of schemes that are to our liking; tempted to whitewash what is one's own and blacken what belongs to someone else; or, what is no better, of ideologizing history to the extent that it loses its true content. Only a sober, honest analysis, devoid of blinding emotions and prejudice that lowers true worth, is capable of pacifying a troubled sea of passions.

Battles for truth are the motive force of history. The historical conscience is called upon to protect progress from equivocation and from the diabolical temptation to play hide-and-seek with the past. We would be committing a double error if we attempted to sweep inconvenient themes under the carpet. Justifying your own degradation by the sins of others is not the way to honest self-knowledge and renewal but to a lack of historical awareness.

Second, during the process of the commission's work we once again became convinced of how far the world has come over the past half century, of how strong is the difference between the political, legal, and moral norms of the contemporary world and of that in which Europe lived 5 decades ago. All of this had to be taken into consideration when we were delving into the past in the hope of returning to the politics of the present day. The main thing was not to confuse outward appearances with the real essence.

Of course, this report does not aspire to full coverage of the prewar period. Its logic and contents are bound up to the maximum degree with the events of 1939, although it is obvious to any unbiased person that it was far from being a suprise at the time. Therefore, without making a digression into the past, it is difficult to reach an objective assessment of what ensued. Everything of which I shall proceed to speak is based on documentary sources. The problem itself and its numerous nuances require detailed and sometimes minute analysis of the circumstances. And the congress undoubtedly expects well-constructed arguments from the commission.

So, what was the international situation in which the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty came into being? What occurred immediately prior to its being concluded? What were the aims of the treaty in the plans of its creators and initiators? It is impossible to find unambiguous answers to this. In evaluating the agreement we cannot fail to dwell upon at least three circumstances: the suddenness of the turn-around in relations with the fascist regime; the secret accords with it which affected the interests of third countries; and the concealment of the true content and meaning of the agreement from Soviet people, the party, and the constitutional bodies of authority.

How and why did all of this become possible? Germany's attack on Poland on 1 September 1939 was the start of the tragedy, but it was also the finale of a policy towards German imperialism, a course which, as a rule, was pursued without the Soviet Union and frequently against its interests. This was the root of the historical perfidy. British Prime Minister Baldwin declared in 1936: We are all aware of Germany's wish to move eastwards. If he—that is Hitler—were to move east, I wouldn't be heartbroken. If it were to come to a fight in Europe, I would like it to be a fight between the Bolsheviks and the Nazis. Paris subsequently came to echo what London was saying. This position combined into one the policy of appeasement of aggressors and indulgement of Nazism's plans for *lebensraum*.

This led to the annexation of Austria and the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in Munich in 1939. In sacrificing Czechoslovakia, London at that time considered that it had bought Berlin's promise to never again wage war against Britain and to remove possible sources of disagreement by means of consultations. That is parenthetical.

France, the other participant in the Munich tragedy, drew up a similar agreement with the Reich. For Paris the Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty virtually ceased to exist.

The Munich agreement radically altered the situation in Europe, substantially strengthened Germany's position, crushed the beginnings of the system of collective security, and opened the way to aggression on a European-wide scale. The Munich pact was no hasty improvisation: It continued the political line charted by the Treaty of Locarno of 1925 and the 1933 Quadripartite Pact. The small and medium-sized countries of Europe realized that the democracies had betrayed them, and in fear they began to lean towards Germany.

The USSR found itself isolated internationally. Taking account of the support for Munich from the United States, the direct participation of Poland and Hungary in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and Japan's approval of the agreement, the Soviet leadership could not but think of the threat of a single anti-Soviet coalition being created. Hasty decisions and a mystifying irrationality in perception of reality were a widespread disease at that time. The fact that London and Paris hailed Germany as a peacemaker guaranteeing the democracies comfort and tranquility for years and decades to come, was taken by Hitler to be a frank signal for a battle by force for hegemony in Europe.

After Munich there was in effect no question of whether or not there would be war: it was a matter of something quite different, namely of who would become the next victim, and when. The most amazing thing, perhaps, which confuses many people even today, is that the Western powers knew in detail about Germany's preparations for an armed encounter. They knew, yet thought that the Nazis would not encroach upon the interests of the Western democracies until they had settled accounts with the Soviet Union. They clung to their delusions even in the spring of 1939 when the Hitlerites occupied the remnants of Czechoslovakia and seized Klaipeda, and Italy attacked Albania.

What, from the point of view of Soviet interests, was the signifiance of the annexation of Austria, the transfer of Czechoslovakia to the control of Germany, the Nazi penetration of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the activization of the Reich's military intelligence services in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland if one takes these as a whole rather than separately? Soviet foreign policy was presented with the following basic possibilities:

- a) to try and conclude an alliance between the USSR, Britain, and France that might impede the aggressor;
- b: establish mutual understanding with neighboring states which also found themselves threatened.
- and c: in the event that it was impossible to avoid war with Germany, to try to avoid a war on two fronts—in the West and in the Far East.

Work began officially on the first possibility in March-April 1939, when the USSR tried to involve the Western powers in cooperation aimed at averting aggression. Second, during the visits of Potemkin, then deputy minister of foreign affairs, to Turkey and Poland in April-May 1939 and the diplomatic actions in March 1939 aimed at showing the governments of Latvia and Estonia that the USSR had an interest in averting aggression in the Baltic, the question of normalizing relations with Germany remained open. In the diplomatic documentation of the USSR for 1937 and 1938, no evidence has been found to suggest a Soviet intention to come to an understanding with Berlin. On Germany's part, from the end of 1938 or the beginning of 1939, soundings began of the possibilities of improving relations with the USSR. Hitler called this setting the scene for a new Rapallo stage. Judging by the documentary data, the Soviet leadership had reliable information of military preparations by the Nazi regime, and also of the line of conduct of the Western powers. For example, information on the contents of Hitler's conversation with Chamberlain on 15 September 1938 reached Stalin on the following day. The available materials gave reason to believe that if Germany's aggression against the USSR became inevitable, it would be carried out either in alliance with Poland, with a Polish rear loyal to the Reich, or with the submission of Poland. In any event, it would be with the use of the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The Weiss operation, the plan for the attack upon Poland which was confirmed on 11 April 1939, presupposed the seizure of Lithuania, the inviolability of which had in no way been guaranteed by Britain and France.

The appetites of the Reich were not satisfied by Lithuania, however. As early as 16 March 1939 the Latvian envoy in Berlin was told that his country should follow Germany, and then the Germans—and I quote—would not compel it by force to come under the protection of the Fuehrer. Speaking to the Generalitaet in May 1939, Hitler set the task of solving the Baltic problem as well as the Polish one.

As in other similar cases, Berlin had a minimum and a maximum program. If the West surrendered Poland to it without a fight, as it had previously surrendered Czechoslovakia, Hitler could stretch out the implementation of the Weiss plan time-wise; that data is available.

However, the leadership of the Reich understood that the run of easy victories was coming to an end, particularly when Poland, which had assisted during the Anschluss of Austria and the seizure of Czechoslovakia, became more stubborn. Indeed, as long as other people's territories were the object of the bargaining, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck and those who thought like him did not shun dialogue with Berlin. But when they were invited to give up Danzig to Germany and take out of Polish lands a transportation corridor to Eastern Prussia, the desire to share the Soviet Ukraine diminished. The Nazis' promise to reserve for Poland an exit to the Black Sea, with Odessa in the bargain, also stopped being so very attractive.

The British military proved to Chamberlain that the threat of Nazi aggression was no myth and that military cooperation with the Soviet Union was the most expedient means of countering it. The relevant documents for this exist. In reply Chamberlain said he would rather resign than enter into an alliance with the USSR. Describing this stance on the part of his government, (?Collier), a member of the staff of Britain's Foreign Office wrote: London has no desire to link itself with the Soviet Union, but it wants to give Germany an opportunity to carry out aggression in the East at Russia's expense.

In some contemporary publications, particularly in the most recent months, one encounters a lot of complaint about the inflexibility of Soviet diplomacy, about missed alternatives, and so on. That kind of thing possibly did occur. More likely, even, it evidently did occur. But something else, too, ensues from the documents. Whenever the USSR moved to meet the Western powers, instructions were given to the British and French delegates not to record a drawing together of the positions but to build up demands and aggravate the disproportionate nature of the conditions and thereby block an agreement. Finally, on 11 July Britain decided to reject the Soviet Government's invitation to sign political and military agreements simultaneously.

At the sittings of the Chamberlain cabinet, where the position of the British delegation at the military talks in Moscow was worked out in July 1939, it was determined that the main thing was to draw out the time: the agreement itself—and I am quoting the Foreign Secretary Halifax—is not as important as it appeared at first sight.

Extensive British and French documentation covering the period from May to August 1939 shows that the Chamberlain cabinet found partnership with the USSR undesirable and military cooperation impossible. Although the British leaders knew precisely from

Canaris, the chief of the Nazi military espionage service, that the attack on Poland had been fixed for the last week in August, the British delegation at the Moscow military negotiations was instructed to engage in arguments about wording until October, if possible.

The Anglo-French views were supported by the American representatives in Europe. The U.S. Ambassador in London, Kennedy, was convinced that the Poles had to be cast to the mercy of fate and the Nazis given the possibility to implement their aim in the East. A conflict between the USSR and Germany, to quote his words, would bring great advantage to the whole Western world. The U.S. Ambassador in Berlin, Wilson, also considered an attack by Germany on Russia with the tacit agreement of the Western powers and even with their approval to be the best alternative. The Soviet Union is now being reproached because it did not manage to induce the Polish Government to cooperate, conceding that part of the work to London and Paris. But even in a situation where there remained only a few days before the German attack, Poland did not want to hear anything about any cooperation with the USSR. On 20 August 1939 Beck declared: We do not have a military agreement with the USSR and we do not need such an agreement.

On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the attack by Germany on Poland, many hypotheses were put forward as to how events would have developed if the Soviet Union had adopted the tactics of Britain and France calculated to create an appearance of activity by the three powers in connection with the agreement, although there was no such thing, to act in response should there be aggression by Germany. Diametrically opposed views are being expressed on this subject. One of them says that there would not have been a war at all. Others imagine that in such a case the USSR could have fallen into the whirlpool of war as early as 1939 in which Britain and France, in the most optimistic scenario, would only have figured as our allies.

Now, of course, it is difficult to surmise. History does not recognize the subjunctive mood. History has already happened. Even suppositions are not subject to normal logic, insofar as the behavior of all the subjects of the policy could not be predicted. One cannot get rid of the impression that it was players and not politicians who were play acting on the stage of history. One thing is clear: A sense of responsibility, not to mention wisdom, was lacking in all of them, for which mankind paid a cruel price. In the same context one could examine this question: Was there a real threat of an attack by fascist Germany on our country in 1939? Naturally, an answer to this goes beyond the framework of the possibiltiies and aims of our commission. It is for scholars to answer. No real analysis of this problem was given either then or later. Nevertheless, the documents say that Soviet policy was then built more often on tactical reports than on profound strategic computations.

The question of Hitler's readiness for aggression against the USSR in 1939 has at least three aspects to it. Was Germany objectively ready for war? Did it consider its military machine ready? And was the threat of an invasion taken as probable by the Soviet leadership?

Only the latter can be answered with confidence. Undoubtely, yes. It can be assumed that this perception was remedied in Stalin's psychological make-up by the hope that Hitler might get bogged down in the European theater of combat, which probably had an influence on his capacity to see and assess the possible alternatives objectively. It is, of course, difficult to talk of these facts even slightly categorically, but we are within our rights in allowing for their occurrence. Allegations that the Reich would not have begun the Polish campaign if the nonaggression pact with the USSR had not existed cannot be proven.

To refute these assertions one can cite more than one statement by Hitler himself. Moreover, Germany had gone too far in its preparations for war, especially by the middle of August, for the Fuehrer to sound the retreat without serious political risk to himself. The argument of those who adhere to the view that Stalin had exaggerated the threat of war amounts to the fact that in August 1939 there was no plan of military action against our country prepared at the German General Staff. However, to start with, this was only discovered after 1945, and second, at that time there were no plans for operations against Britain and France either. The staffs received the task of preparing such plans on 10 October 1939, once the Western powers had rejected Hitler's proposal to make peace.

Third, the pause from preparations for combat action on the Western front is not without its peculiar subtext. In the euphoria of a quick victory over Poland, Hitler for some time nursed the idea of breaking off the recent nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union and making a sudden attack on our country. Fourth, the members of the Reich's General Staff sometimes needed only weeks to transfer conceptual developments into operational directives.

In analyzing the alternatives of 1939, it should be borne in mind that the Soviet leadership did have information on the content of the directives determining the line of the British and French delegations in war negotiations with us. Nor was the fact of the backstage contacts maintained between London and Berlin top secret. A careful reading of the documents reveals a fairly simple game. Berlin tried to get around us or, on the contrary, withdraw its advances, in precise correspondence with each twist in the Anglo-French-Soviet talks. So, after the first sounding out of Soviet intentions and Molotov's cautious reaction to the German appeal on 20 May, Ribbentrop gave the order to retire. However, it took only the differences with regard to the guarantees for the Baltic states that emerged at the tripartite talks in Moscow for the Germans to get moving.

In order to fix talks on an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military convention, it was sufficient for Berlin to suggest the idea on 26 July of renewing the Treaty on Neutrality of 1926, and to state its readiness to respect the inviolabilty of the Baltic states and to come to an agreement on finding a balance of their mutual interests. But when a date was fixed for opening military talks in Moscow, Ribbentrop immediately invited Astakhov, the charge d'affaires ad interim of the USSR in Berlin, to see him and he came out directly in favor of delimiting Soviet and German interests from the Baltic to the Black Sea. These ideas were repeated the next day, 3 August, by Ambassador Schulenburg in a conversation in Moscow.

The period from 26 July to 3 August 1939 is a landmark of fundamental importance. It was at this time that contacts were being stepped up in all areas, in both number and content. It was at this time that pressure from preliminary positions and real circumstances was growing, which led to the necessity for the final choice: Was there to be an accord or not? If there was to be, then with whom? With the Western democracies or with fascist Germany? It was at this time that those hazardous elements of the political game, which were in accordance with the psychology of the main actors in the drama, and as a result predetermined the appearance and essence of the secret protocol, were introduced into the political game.

How did events develop at this point and up to the opening of Soviet-German talks? The first move was made by the German side. For the first time Berlin legalized the idea of a treaty for a new settlement of interstate relations with the USSR, abandoning its slighting of our national interests. Let me remind you that after the coming to power of the Nazis, Germany sought to get the Soviets ostracized wherever it could. So the Soviet Union did not have any realistic alternative to cooperation with Britain and France before the beginning of August 1939, and had nothing to set against that cooperation. It is indicative that even after Ribbentrop's revelations, the Soviet side did not change its tactics. For another whole week it limited itself to listening to the German proposals, and Schulenburg was constantly sending telegraphs to Berlin about the profound mistrust by the Soviet Government of Germany, and its—and I quote—resolve to come to an agreement with Britain and France.

Now we know that Stalin suspected everyone and everything. His mistrust of Hitler was no less than his mistrust of Chamberlain or Daladier. And not only as a result of his personal vigilance: His concept of imperialist war focused on the lack of difference between the two groups that were competing on the world arena, seeing in each of them first and foremost an aspiration to remake the world and destroy the Soviet Union.

During the fateful days of August this concept played no small role. It is unlikely that Stalin was deceived about the real intentions of London and Paris, but it looks as if he was afraid of missing a possible chance for reaching an agreement. According to the testimony of (Dmitrov) on 7 September 1939, that is, 7 days after war began, Stalin, having referred to the talks with the Western powers, noted: We preferred accords with the so-called democratic countries, and for this reason conducted talks, but the English and the French wanted to treat us as farm laborers and at the same time to pay nothing for this. We, of course, would not become farm laborers, even less for nothing in return.

Schnurre, an official from the German Foreign Ministry, declared to Astakhov on 26 July 1939: Let Moscow think about what England has to offer it. At best, participation in a European war and hostility with Germany is hardly a desirable goal for Russia. But what can we offer? Neutrality and nonparticipation in the possible European conflict, and if Moscow wants it, a German-Soviet accord on mutual interests. What specifically was meant? Berlin replied: Germany's renunciation of claims on the Ukraine, of claims for dominance in the Baltics and plans for expansion in those regions in Eastern and southeastern Europe where the USSR has appreciable interests.

Soviet intelligence reported the fact that Germany's attack on Poland might occur at the end of August or the beginning of September to the leadership during the first days of July 1939. News was received from Ribbentrop's immediate entourage that in Hitler's opinion the Polish issue really must be resolved. Hitler said, I quote: What will occur if there is a war with Poland will exceed and will eclipse the Huns. This lack of restraint in German military operations is essential for demonstrating to the states of the east and southeast by example of the annihilation of Poland what it means under present day conditions to contradict the wishes of the Germans and provoke Germany into bringing in military forces. [end quote]

On 7 August 1939 it was reported to Stalin that Germany would be in a position to begin armed operations any day after 25 August. On 11 August 1939 the situation was considered by the Politburo of the VKP(B) [All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee. Not without taking into account the reports about Hitler's attempt to restore a direct link with Chamberlain and the pessimistic predictions concerning the Moscow military talks, it was recognized as expedient to join in the official discussion of the issues raised by the Germans and to inform Berlin about this.

As a result, the Soviet-German negotiations commenced with a meeting between Molotov and Schulenburg in Moscow on 15 August 1939. The Germans proposed either the confirmation of a neutrality treaty or the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty. Stalin settled for the latter option. The final stage of the Soviet-German negotiations does not lend itself easily to reconstruction, comrades. No shorthand records were made. All the preliminary drafts brought to Moscow by Ribbentrop were destroyed, on his instruction. It is known that Von Ribbentrop set off for the meeting on 23 August in complete doubt as to the outcome of his mission, although he had Hitler's authority to satisfy any conceivable demands from Moscow. Preparatory Soviet material on the treaties has not yet been revealed to exist: It has not been found in the archives. All that is known is that it was not intended at the start to make the document of intent secret. Evidently, there was no need to do so, for Molotov was talking about things which were fairly well-known: joint guarantees of the independence of the Baltic states, mediation by the Germans aimed at stopping Japanese military actions against the USSR, and the development of German-Soviet economic relations. No kind of territorial claims affecting Poland or anyone—and especially no sort of questions of the fate of any specific country—were raised at that stage. Hitler offered more than Stalin was expecting.

Is there an explanation for that? Some sort of light may be shed by the directive of the Comintern Executive Committee of 22 August 1939, the contents of which became known to Berlin. It noted that the USSR was entering into negotiations with Germany on the subject of concluding a nonaggression treaty, intending to impel Britain and France to get down to business at the negotiations on a military alliance with our country. By all appearances, Hitler decided to render worthless at a stroke any British and French maneuvers, seeking to prompt Stalin to burn his bridges. The stage favored the show performed by the Nazis. On 19 and 20 August 1939 Stalin received documentary confirmation that Britain, France, and Poland did not intend to change their positions. Evidently, Stalin hoped to use the nonaggression treaty to influence Britain and France, but he miscalculated. After the signing of the treaty, the Western powers lost all constructive interest in us.

Was it possible to limit the negotiations with Berlin to just the conclusion of the nonaggression treaty? The analysis shows that it certainly was. In the form in which the treaty was signed on 23 August 1939, it would have supplemented the extensive catalogue of settlements which were familiar in world politics. Germany had by that time exchanged similar mutual obligations, drawn up in different ways, with, in particular, Poland in 1934, Britain and France in 1938, and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1939. The conclusion of this treaty, obviously, altered the configuration of forces and enabled Berlin to close up one of the unknown quantities in the complex political equation. That is how it was.

But it would not be fair to break off the thought here. Stalin, for all his imperial ways, could not fail to understand the amoral and explosive nature of the secret deal with Hitler. Even after the war Stalin and Molotov covered up the traces of the existence of the secret protocol. The original of the protocol has not been discovered in our archives.

According to Khrushchev's testimony, Stalin's reasoning was as follows: A game is being carried out here, a game of who is going to outwit whom, who is going to deceive whom. And he added: I deceived them. By all appearances Stalin was not embarrassed by the price he paid in betraying the lofty moral foreign policy principles laid down by Lenin. Along with the German wording of the protocol, he accepted postulates like spheres of interest, territorial and political reconstruction, and other things which until then had been the offspring of the politics of imperialist divisions and redivisions of the world.

Hitler intended an exclusively territorial role for the second Rapallo, that of excluding the USSR as a potential enemy of Germany for up to 2 years. It is not clear why Stalin failed to attach importance to information received through various channels that in 24 months at most the Nazis would trample their obligations and attack the Soviet Union. As recently as July 1939, Soviet intelligence warned that the pretence of goodneighborliness toward the USSR and, in particular, respect for its interests in the Baltic, were intended to last just for a 2-year period. This was the same time for which the Germans concluded all their economic agreements with us. Stalin did not want to investigate these facts thoroughly.

In giving his wording to the protocol, Hitler was preparing the ground for bringing the Soviet Union into a collision not only with Poland, but with Britain and France, too. Thank God things did not go that far! Although at times our country was within a hair's breadth of a turn of events of that kind, particularly after units of the Red Army entered western Belorussia and the western Ukraine. All of this could have happened had the Soviet units not stopped on the Curzon line which, under the Treaty of Versailles, was determined as the eastern frontier of Poland.

Let us return, however, to the subject of 23 August. Hitler was not inspired by the scheme for the protocol set out by Molotov because it remained unclear how the Soviet side would react if Germany was to be on the western frontier of the USSR instead of Poland. Judging by intelligence material, the uncertainty of the Soviet position moved Hitler not to overstrain the neutrality of the USSR by unfolding the Ukrainian problem. Moreover, in August the Nazis let it be understood that they sympathized with the desire of the Ukrainians and Belorussians to live in reunited families.

The fact that the restoration of justice with regard to the Ukraine and Belorussia took place alongside social and political reconstruction in other lands did not worry Stalin. Let me summarize what has been said: Unlike the assessment of the secret protocols on which the commission was fully united, various opinions were expressed regarding the treaty itself. First: that in the specific conditions of the day the treaty was legitimate in political terms. The policies of Germany and Japan and the position of the Western democracies did not leave the Soviet Union with any other option. The leadership of the USSR was obliged to take measures to guarantee the country's safety, even if only to delay the start of the war and make use of the time gained to strengthen the economy and defense. Another point of view is that Stalin undertook to conclude a nonaggression treaty for other reasons. His main motive was not the agreement itself but what became the subject of the secret protocols, i.e. the possibility of taking troops into the Baltic republics, Poland, and Bessarabia and even, in the long-term, into Finland. That is, imperialist ambitions were the central motive behind the treaty. By weighing up the components of the past and drawing lessons for the future, the Commission of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies for a Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty of 23 August 1939 has reached the following conclusions:

In itself, the treaty did not, from the legal viewpoint, go beyond the framework of agreements adopted at that time and did not violate the domestic legislation or international obligations of the USSR. It lost legal force on 22 June 1941. All Soviet-German agreements in existence at that time were completely erased by the first volley of fire at dawn on 24 June. [corrects himself] I'm sorry, on 22 June 1941. This is not just our position, it is an accepted norm of international law. As for postwar Europe, it was built on international legal norms which have different sources, as is reflected primarily in the United Nations Charter and the Final Act of the all-European conference of 1975. It is another matter that Stalin and some people in his entourage could, even at that time, toy with imperialist designs alien to the principles of socialism. This, however, goes beyond the framework of the actual treaty as an international legal document. In the same way, the assessment has nothing to do with those people to whom Stalin entrusted himself, by all accounts, after the conclusion of the 1939 treaty, nor with those who did not allow the obtained breathing space of peace to be made use of properly, who, to a large extent, demobilized and disoriented the anti-fascist forces, which could not fail to damage the subsequent struggle against Hitlerism and its allies.

At the same time, it is clear that with the conclusion of the treaty some deep-seated elements in the democratic attitude as a whole were violated. Neither the communists nor the overwhelming majority of the other left-wing forces and movements of prewar days—without even knowing about and without suspecting the existence of the secret protocols—were willing to admit the very possibility of an accord with Hitler about anything at all. Failing to take into account the frame of mind and the ethical convictions of the public means taking up positions which, sooner or later, will turn into moral and ideological-social losses, which is what actually happened.

A political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty is given in the conclusion of the commission and in the draft decision put forward for the attention of the congress. This is the result of an analysis of the facts and a synthesis of opinions which the members of the commission believe adequately convey the particular features of the extremely contradictory situation of that time and our attitude toward it from the stance of the new political thinking.

The commission has also formulated assessments with regard to the protocol. These are as follows.

First: The secret additional protocol of 23 August 1939 did exist, although the original has been discovered neither in the Soviet nor in foreign archives. Copies in the possession of the Governments of the USSR and the FRG can, at the level of present-day knowledge, be considered reliable. Indeed, subsequent events unfolded precisely according to the protocol.

Second: The initial protocol was compiled in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accepted by Stalin and Molotov with small amendments. The Soviet participants in the talks—and this is not to their credit—forgot their original desires for two-fold guarantees of the independence of the Baltic countries. They did not insist upon Germany's willingness to bring Japan to reason being reflected in the protocol, being satisfied with oral promises by Ribbentrop to that effect.

Third: The political and state bodies [instantsiya] of the Soviet Union were not informed of the fact that the protocol was being prepared. Molotov did not have properly formulated authority to sign it. The protocol was taken out of the ratification procedures and was not confirmed by the country's legislative or executive bodies.

Fourth: Having been adopted in circumvention of the internal laws of the USSR and in violation of its treaty liabilities to third countries, the protocol in the juridical sense was an illegal document from the very first and was a deal that expressed the intentions of the physical forces that signed it.

Fifth and finally, the method of elaborating the protocol and the categories and concepts, such as territorial and political reconstruction, etc., applied in it were a patent diversion from the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy. It is true that the peoples of the Ukraine and Belorussia have regained their territorial unity. But using the same criteria common to all mankind, can one not understand the feelings of those who turned out to be a powerless plaything at the hands of the more powerful, and who started to assess their entire subsequent history through the prism of the injustices committed by Stalin?

Having embarked upon the path of dividing the loot with the predators, Stalin began to speak with the neighboring, especially small countries, in the language of ultimatums and threats. He did not consider it shameful to resort to force. This happened in the argument with Finland. With great power arrogance he brought Bessarabia back within the borders of the union, and restored Soviet power in the Baltic republics. All this deformed Soviet policy and state morality. Perhaps this is the first time that the events of the hard prewar times are described in such tough and unconditional terms. But the whole truth, even the bitterest, must be told some time.

The secret protocol of 23 August 1939 reflected precisely the inner essence of Stalinism. This is not the only one, but one of the most dangerous delayed action mines from the minefield we have inherited, and which we are now trying to clear with such difficulty and complexities. It is necessary to do this. The public mines do not simply fade away on their own. We must do it in the name of perestroyka, and for the sake of affirming the new political thinking in order to restore the honor of socialism trampled upon by Stalinism.

The commission believes that, as a result of the work carried out, certainty is being introduced into a number of issues which beset people's minds. A verdict correct in legal and moral terms has been passed, above all on the secret protocol. The commission members have conveyed their conclusions, weighing every word and checking them against their convictions. If the congress considers it possible to agree with the commission's proposals, this will provide additional service to clearing the atmosphere of relics of the past that are incompatible with socialism and justice.

Comrade deputies, in conclusion I wish to say the following. History is its own procurator and its own judge. But immersing ourselves in it, we must not lose sight of the fact that the prewar times were developing in different dimensions. At that time the countries did not yet think of themselves as part of the single stream of humanity. Neither the pan-European ideals nor the world ideals of justice and humanism made their way into the public, and especially the state, consciousness. The voice of the thinkers who saw the limit of civilization was drowned in the clatter of soldiers' boots and ovations in honor of leaders. The fate of the world was governed by the closed groups of politicians and pseudo-politicians with their ambitions, selfishness, demagogy, and detachment from the masses. Many wished to make service to these groups, as well as participation in mutual extermination, the lot of the peoples for ever.

It was necessary to cause the world to fall into the abyss of madness before the idea that destinies and collective action are interconnected in the name of ridding the earth of tyranny and restoring peace began to be asserted as an objective truth. Sooner or later the truth will win out on God's earth and deception will be unlocked. Without such moral cleansing the development of civilization is inconceivable. Today it is more important than ever before to recognize this. The peoples can live calmly and with confidence in the future only if everyone is together and in no way in confrontation with each other. Thank you for your attention.

Moscow, Kremlin, 24 December 1989.

First Draft Resolution Rejected

LD2312184589 Moscow TASS in English 1834 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 23 TASS—By TASS Parliamentary correspondent:

The draft resolution denouncing the secret protocol to the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, which divided the spheres of interests of the two countries, failed to win the required majority at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies today.

In accordance with the Congress regulations, the resolution had to win 1,122 votes, or more than 50 per cent of the number of all deputies, to be passed.

However, it received only 1,052 votes for, with 678 votes against and 150 abstentions.

The resolution contained the conclusion of a report submitted by a commission led by Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev.

The Congress proposed that the commission submit a specified text of the draft resolution on Sunday [24 December].

Most of the speakers supported the commission's conclusions and proposed that the Congress adopt a resolution giving a political assessment to the Soviet-German documents of 1939.

Deputies from Baltic republics spoke highly of the commission's efforts and called on the congress to extent the commission's mandate or to set up a new commission to consider international documents of 1940-1941, including those concerning the joining of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia of the Soviet Union in 1940.

However, some speakers questioned part of the commission's conclusions, specifically the fact of the existence of the secret protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, the original of which was never found either in the Soviet Union or in West Germany.

These deputies proposed not giving any political assessments to these documents but only taking into consideration the commission's conclusion.

Revised Resolution Published

PM2812113489 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

["Congress of USSR People's Deputies Resolution: On the Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty of 1939"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] 1. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies takes note of the conclusions of the Commission on the Political and Legal Assessment of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty of 23 August 1939.

2. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies agrees with the commission's opinion that the nonaggression treaty with Germany was concluded in a critical international situation, in the conditions of the growing danger from fascist aggression in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia, and had as one of its objectives to deflect the threat of approaching war from the USSR. Ultimately this objective was not achieved, and the errors arising from the existence of Germany's commitments to the USSR exacerbated the consequences of the perfidious Nazi aggression. At that time the country faced a difficult choice.

The commitments under the treaty came into force immediately it was signed, although the treaty itself was subject to ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet. A resolution on ratification was adopted in Moscow on 31 August, and the instruments of ratification were exchanged on 24 September 1939.

3. The Congress believes that the content of this treaty was not at variance with the international legal norms and the treaty practice of states that were customary for settlements of this kind. However, both in the conclusion of the treaty and in the course of its ratification, the fact that a "secret additional protocol" was signed at the same time as the treaty, dividing the "spheres of interests" of the contracting parties from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from Finland to Bessarabia, was concealed.

The originals of the protocol have not been discovered in Soviet or foreign archives. However, expert graphological, photographic, and lexical analyses of copies, maps, and other documents and the fact that subsequent events are in accordance with the content of the protocol confirm the fact of its signing and its existence.

4. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies hereby confirms that the 23 August 1939 nonaggression treaty, as well as the friendship and border treaty between the USSR and Germany that was concluded on 28 September of the same year, along with other Soviet-German accords, lapsed—in accordance with the norms of international law—at the moment of Germany's attack on the USSR, that is, 22 June 1941.

5. The Congress notes that the 23 August 1939 protocol and other secret protocols signed with Germany in 1939-1941 were a departure from the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy both in the method of their compilation and in their content. Their demarcations of the USSR's and Germany's "spheres of interests" and other actions were, from the legal viewpoint, in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of a number of third countries.

The Congress notes that in that period the USSR's relations with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were governed by a system of treaties. Under the 1920 peace treaty and the nonaggression treaties concluded in 1926-1933, the parties pledged mutually to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability in all circumstances. The Soviet Union had similar commitments to Poland and Finland.

6. The Congress notes that the talks with Germany on the secret protocols were conducted by Stalin and Molotov in secret from the Soviet people, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee and the entire party, and the USSR Supreme Soviet and Government, and that these protocols were left out of the ratification procedures. Thus the decision to sign them was, in form and in essence, an act of personal power, and in no way reflected the will of the Soviet people, which is not responsible for this act of collusion.

7. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies condemns the fact of the signing of the 23 August 1939 "secret additional protocol" and other secret accords with Germany. The Congress deems the secret protocols to be legally invalid and null from the moment of their signing.

The protocols did not create a new legal basis for the Soviet Union's relations with third countries, but were used by Stalin and his entourage to issue ultimatums and impose pressure on other states in violation of the legal commitments made to them.

8. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies proceeds on the basis that the recognition of a complex and contradictory past is a part of the process of perestroyka, which is designed to give every people of the Soviet Union the opportunity for free and equal development in the conditions of an integral, interdependent world and increasingly wide mutual understanding.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Moscow TV Relays 24 Dec Congress Proceedings

1300 GMT

LD2412132789

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1300 GMT on 24 December begins carrying what is captioned as a "live relay" of the closing session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

The relay begins with Gorbachev addressing the deputies. He sums up the debate on the economy. The government's proposals for moving toward a market economy were approved. The Supreme Soviet has now received a vote of confidence. Much has been said about the necessity for the Supreme Soviet to accelerate its adoption of measures for improving the economic system. Agrarian workers have given the impression that they do not feel that their sector has been given sufficient priority. He speaks about the problems which need to be solved—relating to ownership of land and conditions in rural areas and stresss his support for them.

Gorbachev speaks about the need for compromise in resolving interethnic relations. The federation needs to be strengthened as a voluntary alliance of free peoples.

Deputies have displayed concern about instability in the country. Corruption needs to be dealt with.

The battle against crime was considered and additional measures were adopted by the congress. The strengths of all of the supporters of Perestroyka need to be united in the battle. This will help order to be maintained and anarchy and chaos to be avoided.

Perestroyka is the path which has been chosen and panic about warnings of chaos will not lead to a deviation from it. International relations are developing under the new thinking of perestroyka. The atmosphere, especially in Europe, has changed considerably.

Gorbachev then expresses thanks to delegates and wishes them success in their political activities.

At 1316 GMT Gorbachev resumes the chair and declares the session closed. The national anthem is played.

At 1320 GMT Gorbachev announces that the CPSU Central Committee Plenum session opens on 25 December at 1200 Moscow time.

1350 GMT

LD2412145889

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1350 GMT on 24 December begins a recording of the 24 December session of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

The coverage opens with Gorbachev reading a report on the latest situation in Romania.

Lukyanov, in the chair, then invites Yakovlev to return to the subject of the report on the investigation into the secret protocol of the Soviet-German 1939 treaty.

At 1355 GMT Yakovlev says that he would like to reply to some questions put yesterday. He speaks about the nature of the evidence of the protocol that still exists in the archives of the Soviet foreign ministry in the form of notes, attested Russian-language typescript copies of the protocol that date from Molotov's time. Yakovlev proposes alterations to elements in the report which had given rise to complaint on account of their wording. Yakovlev says that a correct verdict has been delivered. There can be no relativity in the field of morals.

At 1405 GMT Deputy Obraz takes the floor, and says that he is categorically opposed to the report, and calls for a decision to be made on the first point.

At 1408 GMT Lukyanov asks for a vote as to whether the vote should be by name. He then puts the draft decision to the vote, the voting being by name. The resolution is passed: 1492 voting for; 252 voting against, and 234 abstaining.

At 1413 GMT Deputy Kobzon takes the floor. He calls for new structures for deputies in which they would be grouped not by nationality or territory, but according to profession. He proposes that an alliance of parliamentary associations should be set up, and calls for the proposal to be voted on.

At 1417 GMT Lukyanov is asked why there is no association on culture, and says it is because there is already a commisison which deals with culture, among other things. Ought we to instruct the supreme soviet to think about a special committee on culture, aside from science and so on? He asks, if the congress supports this idea we'll decide it at the next session. Voices from the floor call for a show of hands to vote now. The vote is carried.

At 1419 GMT Deputy Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov reports on the findings of the commission which has been investigating the various privileges enjoyed by some citizens.

1421 GMT

LD2412153889

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1421 GMT on 24 December continues its recording of the 24 December session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, with Deputy Primakov saying that there has been a great deal of public criticism about privileges. He describes the work of the commission has been doing on privileges. It received more than 1,000 letters from the public putting forward diverse points of view. Some demand the elimination of all privileges; others merely want to eliminate the abuse of privilege. Others say privileges are alright if they have been earned by long years of labor. He expresses thanks to all those who have written, and says that their views have been studied very carefully. He notes that it is not the task of the commission to deal with individual cases of abuse of privilege, but to work out recommendations for decisions and methods of monitoring the subsequent fulfillment of those decisions. The privileges of the nomenklatura are the ones we are talking about.

He says that the story of privilege in our country goes back a long way in our history. Gradually privileges lost their role of being an incentive to good labour. That is what happened during the years of stagnation, but it cannot be allowed to happen during the years of perestroyka. He states that many of those who enjoy privilege are honest people, but there are others who abuse their positions. A line must be drawn between the genuine cases and those which are merely intended to disguise theft from the public purse.

Primakov then talks about the work of the commission, saying that it intends to put an end to unfounded privileges. Good work must always be rewarded, but this must primarily be done through pay. The commission worked hard, but encountered difficulties in getting information from certain quarters. He then outlines its work in the public health field and the health care of children. He notes that the commission was unanimously in favor of abolishing the health ministry's fourth directorate by 1 January 1990. Primakov then goes on to speak about specific health centers belonging to the fourth directorate, and subsequent health service measures.

At 1446 GMT Primakov turns to the question of the use of official transportation facilities for private purposes. The commission has started an examination of the personal pensions issue. He notes that there is much dissatisfaction surrounding the way in which personal pensions are awarded. He says that considerable changes are proposed governing the use of state dachas.

At 1458 GMT Primakov turns to the issue of privileges enjoyed by deputies. In conclusion Primakov speaks of the need to democratize society. We have taken the first steps, and the response has been great, he says.

1500 GMT

LD2412161489

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 24 December continues its recorded relay of the 24 December session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

Primakov is handed a bundle of questions to look through and answer. Primakov deals with some questions, and in reply to a specific question about how Stalin's and Brezhnev's dachas are now being used he says that the commission does not deal with specific examples, but with the general situation. Primakov then answers a question about privileges enjoyed by senior KGB staff, and talks about the provision of cars for Politburo Candidate Members.

At 1507 GMT Moldavia Deputy Muntyan says the impression has been given that deputies are demanding that privileges be taken away from some people so that they can be given to themselves.

At 1510 GMT other questions are put from the floor.

At 1512 GMT Deputy Kutsenko talks about changes that have reportedly taken place in Kislovodsk.

At 1515 GMT Deputy Panov refers to a deputy's enquiry about a specific issue that he put to Primakov's commission a long time ago, but to which he has not yet had an answer. Primakov says the commission doesn't deal with individual questions, but in that particular case it did do something.

At 1517 GMT Lukyanov takes a vote on ending the debate. The debate is ended. He asks if we should vote on taking note of the report? He puts it to the vote: That the congress take note of the report.

At 1519 GMT Gorbachev speaks, telling congress that the situation in Bucharest is returning to normal.

At 1520 GMT a vote in favor of taking note of the report is recorded.

At 1521 GMT Lukyanov offers the floor to Nishanov to make a brief announcement. Nishanov holds up a thick pile of papers containing deputies' signatures proposing that a brief declaration be adopted as follows. Declaration of the congress on the impermissibility of blockading roads and railways within the soviet union. The congress condemns the blocking of transportation facilities by whatever means.

At 1524 GMT the congress calls for the necessary legal norms to be worked out to ensure freedom of transportation throughout the country.

At 1525 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote on the measure using the electronic equipment. The vote is 1642 in favor, 1 against, and 12 abstentions.

At 1529 GMT Comrade Dzasokhov takes the floor to deliver a 20- minute report from the commission which examined the issue of sending troops into Afghanistan. He opens by talking about the sources used by the inquiry—documents and interviews with those involved. The sending in of the troops deserves serious condemnation. Dzasokhov outlines the sitution at the time. On many occasions military assistance was refused. Later this position changed dramatically. The excessive ideologization of Soviet foreign policy activity played an obvious part in this. Our attitude to the April Revolution was influenced by this, but these circumstances cannot justify the decision to send in the troops. Soviet troops were in an escalation situation. East-West relations as a whole were affected. We found ourselves opposed by the majority of the world's public. Violations of these norms by other states could not serve as grounds for justifying such actions by our own state. The commission finds that the sending in of troops was contrary to the Soviet Constitution. He notes that the USSR Supreme Soviet and its presidium did not examine the issue of sending the troops into Afghanistan, nor did the full Politburo discuss the action. He names those responsible as being Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, and Gromyko.

He says that the party and people were faced with a fate accompli. Real control over the top bodies of power in forming the course of the country is the only guarantee that such things will not happen again. The Soviet Union's foreign policy which made possible the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is an integral part of the new thinking. The Afghan president supported the Soviet approach to the troop withdrawal. It seems expedient to continue assisting Afghanistan in accordance with international agreements. The commission states that its findings cast no shadow over the officers and men who served in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union lost thousands of dead. Let us stand in silence for one minute in their memory. Dzasokhov calls for support and assistance to the victims and invalids, and for provisions to be put into the Constitution spelling out the conditions upon which Soviet troops may be sent into foreign countries. He informs the congress that 15 february should, in the opinion of the commission, be a memorial day. Ending this report he says that much work still needs to be done to fully assess the historic event.

At 1549 GMT Lukyanskiy invites Deputy Goldanskiy to take the floor.

1550 GMT

LD2412175989

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1550 GMT on 24 December continues its recording of the 24 December session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

Deputy Goldanskiy, speaking about foreign policy, says the world recognizes that our foreign policy far outstrips our domestic policy. The withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan is one factor in this. He speaks of the enormous approval of Gorbachev's policy among people abroad. He refers to the anger of the United States military and industrial complex at perestroyka; as reflected on the pages of the WASHINGTON TIMES. He refers to Panama. He ends his address by saying that it is important that we should all know about what the reactionaries abroad are hoping for.

At 1556 GMT Lukyanov refers to the draft decision and says that he has received proposed amendments.

At 1600 GMT Deputy (?Adzhiyev) calls for fair treatment of servicemen who fought in Afghanistan and that they should not be blamed for the difficulties there. Proper provisions for the welfare of refugees should be made. Further economic cooperation between Afghanistan and the USSR should be promoted, with Herat border province as the first step in this direction. Much has been said at the congress about the problems afflicting the Soviet Central Asian republics, ranging from overpopulation to economic backwardness. The Afghan returnees are doing a great deal to help in these areas.

At 1607 GMT Deputy Sychkov looks at the plight of those who died in Afghanistan and who, without relatives, died unmourned. The war is still continuing in Afghanistan and will continue for the Soviet people while there are still prisoners of war and returnees who are not provided with welfare facilities. We can condemn the United States for Panama, but we must look to our own failings.

At 1610 GMT Deputy Matyukha asks for the floor for the families of Afghan disabled and dead to be provided with welfare benefits.

At 1612 GMT Deputy Ochirov, from Kalmykia, reiterates the view that the Afghan war was a mistake which cost the USSR dearly. The decision to take troops into the country was unfounded and unconstitutional. The Soviet Armed Forces are deeply in need of perestroyka and deeply interested in perestroyka. Providing the Armed Forces with everything necessary to do their valuable work will enhance their prestige. Dilettante decisions are a feature of the way the Armed Forces Command runs the forces. Perestroyka of the organizational structure is needed, in accord with the democratization of the whole of society. Relations are changing and must change within the Armed Forces, as economic and democratic relations change in society. The work of the political organs is in dire need of amendment: It should be precisely delimited. Cultural work in the Armed Forces is sadly neglected. Party committees should be responsible for the work of party bodies in the Armed Forces. Perestroyka in the Armed Forces should be aimed at furthering peace in the world and reducing the level of Armed Forces throughout the world. Ochirov proposes eliminating the benefits given to Brezhnev, Ustinov and company, and their families.

At 1622 GMT Lukyanov proposes a vote on the article under debate, with amendments: Votes for, 1678; against, 18; abstentions, 19. The question of the assessment of sending troops to Afghanistan is put to a commission for review.

1625 GMT

LD2412181489

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1625 GMT on 24 December continues its recording of the 24 December session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow.

Deputy Lavrov calls for condemnation of the introduction of troops into Afghanistan and for this to be stated in the decision, because the decision makes no firm political assessment of the act of sending troops in.

At 1629 GMT Deputy Karyagin begins by quoting Dostoyevskiy and calls for a moment to remember the widows of Afghans who died.

At 1630 GMT Deputy Boldyrev says that the decision to send troops into any country must be linked to the concept of military service and requires further analysis.

At 1633 GMT Deputy Omelyanenko proposes publishing a book in memory of those who died in Afghanistan. Lukyanov suggests this should be looked at by the special commission. Lukyanov then proposes a vote on handing these issues over for analysis by the special commission. Gorbachev reads out a proposal from Ukrainian deputies, proposing that the January allowance for people's deputies be credited for aid to children of Chernobyl and for those who suffered in the Armenian quake. Figures on the vote for a political assessment of sending troops into Afghanistan: For 1681; agaisnt 9; abstentions 11; total 1701.

At 1639 GMT Lukyanov reads out procedural matters and proposes a vote on the congress address to the citizens of the USSR; a show of hands approves this. The floor is given to Gorbachev.

At 1640 GMT Gorbachev takes the floor to give his concluding address.

Coverage concludes at 1705 GMT.

Report on Tibilisi Events 'Should Not Be Broadcast'

LD2412220189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Excerpts] As you are aware, comrades, the Second Congress of People's Deputies concludes today. Over to All-Union Radio's correspondents' post at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses:

[Ruvinskiy] Aleksandr Ruvinskiy here. We have told you, comrades, that by approximately 1500 it was proposed to bring the work of the congress to an end, but for the moment it is continuing, and I think it will go on for about an hour yet. [passage omitted]

At this morning's session, a report was heard from the commission formed by the First Congress of USSR people's Deputies to investigate the events that took place in Tbilisi on 9 April, 1989. In the deputies' opinion, this session should not be shown on radio and television. A report will be drafted for the press. I will say only that during one of the breaks, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev met a delegation from Georgia in the foyer, the deputies from the Georgian Republic.

So for the moment the work of the Congress of People's Deputies is continuing. In some time we propose starting a direct relay of the closing session of the Congress of People's Deputies. I think this will be in the course of the next hour.

That's all for now.

Congress Resolution on 1979 Afghanistan Decision

PM2812113689 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 89 Second Edition p 3

["Congress of USSR People's Deputies Resolution on the Political Assessment of the Decision To Send Soviet Troops Into Afghanistan in December 1979"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] 1. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies supports the political assessment given by the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979, and believes that this decision deserves moral and political condemnation.

2. The Congress instructs the Constitutional Commission, in preparing the draft new USSR Constitution, to take into account the proposal to clarify the basic principles of the adoption of decisions on the use of USSR Armed Forces contingents contained in points 13 and 14 of Article 113 and point 13 of Article 119 of the existing USSR Constitution, in conjunction with the formulation of the Provision on the USSR Defense Council.

3. The USSR Supreme Soviet is to examine the question of setting up a commission for the affairs of former servicemen of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

4. The USSR Council of Ministers is instructed to draw up a state program aimed at resolving questions connected with organizing the lives and living conditions of former servicemen and others who formed part of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, as well as the families of servicemen who died. [Signed]M. Gorbachev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, Kremlin, 24 December 1989.

24 Dec Speeches at Congress of People's Deputies

Yakovlev on 1939 Treaty Protocol

LD2512170489 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1355 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Remarks by Aleksandr Yakovlev at the 24 December session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] [Lukyanov] Comrade Deputies, we have to return to the examination of a bill on a political and legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German treaty. You know that a commission has been working on it, it worked during the night and it worked this morning. Comrade Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, chairman of the commission, has the floor for reporting proposals concerning the bill.

[Yakovlev] Comrade Deputies, the document presented yesterday for the attention of the Congress—the Commission has authorized me to repeat this—is the result of long, painstaking work equally by the members of the commission and numerous experts, scientists, organizations, and institutes. In accordance with the commission's, instructions studies were made of materials relating to the beginning of World War II from the archives of the USSR MID—Foreign Affairs Ministry—USSR Defense Ministry, USSR KGB, the Main Archive Administration, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and the General Deprtment of the CPSU Central Committee. At the Commission's request archive materials were conveyed, in accordance with its government's instructions, by the FRG Embassy in the USSR.

Last night the Commission again discussed the results of its work, its earlier conclusions and remarks and ideas expressed by People's Deputies in the course of the sitting. It worked together with representatives of the

USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry. On behalf of the commission we would like to ask you to examine once again the ideas presented by it with individual amendments which I shall report further on.

Now about the issue which yesterday provoked the greatest number of questions—about the secret protocols.

Indeed, the originals of the protocols have not been found, either in Soviet or foreign archives. Nevertheless, the commission deems it possible to find that the secret additional protocol of 23 August 1939 did exist.

I am very sorry that yesterday I simply did not hear—the environment for taking questions here is not all that comfortable—I did not hear Comrade Sukhov's question and consequently could not answer it. But I shall answer it today. "What at the MID would, according to the Commission, constitute evidence of this conclusion?" I wish to report that:

One. At the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry there is an official minute which records that in April 1946 the originals of the secret protocol were handed over by one of Molotov's aides to another—by (?Smirnov) to (Podsyrob). Thus, we did have the originals which were subsequently missing. Neither the commission nor anyone else knows where they went missing. Here is the text of the note.

This is the file, and here it says: "We the undersigned, (Smirnov), deputy head of Comrade Molotov's Secretariat, and (Podsyrob), senior aid to the foreign affairs minister, on the date given, the former handed over and the latter received the following documents from the special archives of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry:

"One. The original of the additional secret protocol of 23 August 1939, in Russian and in German, plus three copies of the aforesaid protocol." Further on we have another point concerning 14 documents and another about several more documents unrelated to this case. "Handed over by (Smirnov), received by (Podsyrob)." That's point one.

Next, certified, typewritten copies of the protocols in Russian have been found. An expert examination has shown that these copies also relate to the Molotov era in the work of the MID, the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Three. Forensic scientists have carried out an expert examination of Molotov's signatures on the original of the nonaggression treaty, the original of which, as you will appreciate, we have, and on the photocopies of the secret protocol. The experts have concluded that the signatures are identical.

Four. It transpires that the protocols from which the West German photocopies were made had been typed on the same typewriter as the original of the treaty which is kept in the archives of the USSR MID. You will appreciate that that's too much of a coincidence.

Finally, Five. There is a demarcation map. It is printed and initialled by Stalin. It delimits territory in strict accordance with the protocol. Stalin's signature appears twice on this map. Once as the original signature, alongside Ribbentrop's, and again at a point where Stalin in red pencil makes a correction in our favor and then Stalin signs again under the correction.

Consequently, Comrades, these considerations leave no doubt whatsoever that such a protocol did exist.

That is the first question. The second, on the basis of yesterday's discussion, and on the basis of what I have already told you, the commission last night discussed again the draft and asks for it to be examined once again with the following amendments: In the second point, which aroused criticism, instead of "and had as its declared aim" substitute—we've put it like this—"The Congress of People's Deputies agrees with the opinion of the commission that the nonaggression treaty with Germany was concluded in a critical international situation." And instead of the words "and had as its declared aim," to put "in conditions of growing danger from aggression by fascism in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia, had as one of its aims to remove from the USSR the threat of impending war." Writing "war" instead of "an armed conflict in Europe," which some deputies objected to yesterday.

Next, the next sentence: [which reads] "In the final resort, this aim was not achieved"—as was written here—"but was the fruit of an illusion;" instead of the fruit of an illusion [write] "miscalculations connected with the existence of obligations." And finally at the end of the sentence, supplement this paragraph with the following words: "At this time the country was faced with a difficult choice."

Next, the final paragraph of the third point where it talks about the protocols, put it like this: "The originals of the protocol have not been found either in Soviet or in foreign archives'" and add "But examination by handwriting, phototechnical, and lexical experts of photocopies made at the end of the war by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany, and the conformity of subsequent events with the contents of the protocol confirm the fact of its signing and existence." We are avoiding the word authenticity since lawyers say that for authenticity it is necessary to have the original, nevertheless for the reasons set out before you, the motives which I have just spoken of, it would perhaps be more accurate, as lawyers say, to write: "confirm the fact of its signing and existence."

Finally, to remove.... [changes thought] Remarks were made about the words "the prewar Soviet leadership." We consider, the commission considers its expedient to replace these words with "Stalin and his entourage," so that, as comrades said yesterday, the subsequent events should not extend to the prewar leadership.

And finally, to remove the eighth point, which speaks about its destabilizing influence on the antifascist forces, since this theme was sufficiently reflected in both the report and the explanatory note.

These are the ideas and supplementary proposals of the commission. With this the given commission exhausted its possibilities in its work yesterday. Dear comrades! The commission is convinced that the verdict which has been formulated is the correct one in a legal and moral sense, on both the nonaggression treaty and secret protocol.

A verdict that is necessary to socialism, perestroyka and the new political thinking, and that is necessary to each one of us. Whatever decision is made by the Congress—whether to support the will of the commission, to reject, or simply to take cognizance of it, or some other decision—it won't change history now. The past will remain as it was shaped in those years. This decision won't change the legal status of the treaty and protocol examined by the commission. As has already been noted, with Germany's attack on the Soviet Union any bilateral agreements that had existed to that moment were cancelled. But the postwar world was built on different foundations. Our mandate is limited by the year 1939, and there are no grounds for for drawing any conclusions on this basis with regard to other periods.

But the decision of the Congress can change our political and moral assessment of the specific documents, and no more than these documents alone, that is what I would stress. We shall be drawing, or not drawing, a clear line between a legitimate basis, like the treaty, which the treaty is, and something morally unworthy, unacceptable, incompatible with socialism, like the protocol. The theory of relativity, comrades, is a great discovery in understanding the universe, but there can be no relativity in the sphere of morals. We are obliged to return to the solid, healthy ground of unshakable moral criteria. It is time to recognize that lawlessness is terrible not only by virtue of its direct effect, but also by virtue of the fact that it cripples one's consciousness and creates situations in which immorality and opportunism begin to be considered the norm. Any decision of yours, of ours, Comrade Deputies, will be at the same time not only political, but also moral. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Primakov on Citizens' Privileges

LD2512194289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1419 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Speech by Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, Chairman of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, at the Second Congress of People's Deputies at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 24 Dec—recorded]

[Text] Comrades, at the First Congress of People's Deputies many of you expressed yourselves unambiguously in favor of a review of the system of privileges and concessions which has formed in this country for various categories of citizens. The purpose of such a review is the elimination of unjustified privileges. I particularly want to underline this epithet: unjustified. It is precisely the presence of such privileges which gives rise to particular criticism in society.

The decision of the present congress to listen to the work of the commission on privileges was added to the agenda recommended by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Originally we proposed, bearing in mind both the short time-span of the activity of the commission on privileges and the complexity of the issue, to report on our work at a sitting of the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore, we would ask you to treat this as interim information.

Now to the essence of the matter: As you recall, the first congress instructed the government to put forward to the Supreme Soviet by the end of 1989 an analysis of the system of concessions and priveleges, in all forms, which has formed. However, the Supreme Soviet did not limit itself to waiting. It set up a deputies' commission on privileges itself, with 28 members to carry out its own analysis of the situation and to develop recommendations.

Working groups were set up in the commission to study the state of affairs regarding concessions and privileges in such spheres of our lives as health care, sanatoriums and resorts, trade, transporation, consumer goods and services, housing, and pension provision.

It is natural that the commission began, from its first steps, to refer to the proposals of the public and the opinion of the population. It is sufficient to say that more than 1,000 letters from all corners of the country arrived at the commission from all social strata and groups. The most varied points of view were expressed in these letters, sometimes simply diametrically opposed, which actually reflects the vision of privileges in our society.

Some demand the complete removal of each and every privilege, practically advocating a lowest-common-denominator approach. Others reduce the issue just to the necessity of removing abuses in the application of present privileges is profoundly unjust since they have been earned by conscientious work over many years.

However, despite such a diversity of opinions, the majority approached the problem sensibly. In general, recognizing the logic and expediency of a number of concessions and privileges, the authors of such letters insist on them being brought, as a whole, into line with the requirements of social justice, and give specific proposals for removing this or that unjustified privilege.

Not having had an opportunity to answer all the letters, I want to thank from this platform all those who wrote to use their active civil position and to say that their proposals are being studied carefully and taken into account.

From the very beginning we determined that the work of the commission ought not to be reduced to an examination of those specific instances of violations of morals and the law in which individual leaders of various ranks, abusing their official position, have appropriated for themselves a part of the public wealth. Of course, it is simply essential to combat such manifestations and they have to be cut short decisively, but that kind of struggle is not the task of our commission. Nor must we take the place of the executive bodies; we must not, for instance, indicate specifically which santorium or hospital should be handed over to whomsoever. The main function of the commission is to work out overall approaches, to elaborate particular recommendations to facilitate official decisionnmaking on the elimination of unfounded privileges, and then to monitor the implementation of such decisions.

First and foremost, we had to make a principled assessment of which privileges are nevertheless unfounded and unjustified. It is perfectly obvious that the elimination of all concessions altogether is a premature measure. The state makes available certain advantages and privileges to such groups in the population as mothers with many children, invalids, war and labor veterans, young specialists and those strata of society with slender means. Also justified is the system of concessions linked to dangerous production, to climatic and other differences in working conditions. Some of these concessions are generally accepted in world practice. Others are explained by the state's limited social and economic resources at the present stage in our development. A number of these concessions have been instituted on a state-wide scale; others are at enterprise-level, by decision of the labor collectives, something which fits in fully with the economic reform.

Thus the extent to which social advanges linked to differences in working and living conditions are well-founded does not give rise to doubt. The fact that the practice of establishing similar advantages requires further improvement is another matter, and in this connection the commission intends to give its recommendations.

Let's talks frankly, comrades. Public passions boil not around the concessions given to mothers with many children or war veterans. At the center of these passions are the so-called nomenklatura privileges.

In connection with this, I would like to make certain elaborations. First, on the circle of persons enjoying all these privileges. At present, the brunt of public criticism is directed mainly against apparatchiks, the staff of local soviet and state institutions and party committees. In a number of cases, such criticism is not unjustified, since some such officials in the past—and in the present for that matter—have been and are being caught abusing their positions and transgress against professional and party ethics.

However, behind unspecific and sometimes groundless criticism in this area one can discern attempts to discredit party and local soviet bodies and mobilize public opinion against personnel of the state and party apparatus, which hinders the consolidation of society. We must talk quite definitely about this, since we must not remove injustice by the wrong means.

The basic mass of the personnel of the state and party apparatus are honest, conscientious people bearing a large and intense burden on their shoulders, frequently without days off, working 12-14 hours per day. The labor also should be suitably remunerated. Nevertheless, the degree and forms of such remuneration should be sorted out.

You understand, of course, that we are not discussing the lower or even the middle level of the state and party apparatus. As is known, the system of privileges itself in our country has a history of many years and has its roots in the period when we started rejected the idea of war communism. Lenin was already emphasizing on more than one occasion that highly qualified and especialy efficient labor should be stimulated by the creation of certain consumption advantages, as well. That, indeed, was how it was in the beginning.

However, with the creation and consolidation of the administrative-command system, the structure of privileges and concessions underwent profound deformations. From a method of stimulating labor, it turned more and more into a method of a sort of topping allowance for leading personnel, imparting the nature of some kind of closed group and insuring their loyalty and devotion.

As a result, the dimensions of many privileges went beyond sensible limits and detached certain members of the state and party apparatus from the cares of the world. This was how it developed in the years of stagnation, but it cannot and will not be like this in the period of perestroyka.

These conclusions are applicable not only to workers of the state and party apparatus. In the discussion of the problem of privileges, somehow the figures of the director of a major enterprise or scientific production association, the leader of a rich collective or state farm, the head of a trust or directorate and the commander of military units and rear services fall outside of the focus of public opinion. Of course, one also may speak regarding these categories of persons of basically honest, decent workers and people. However, also among them there is no small number who have personal use of (?banks) that are an affront to public dignity, guest cottages, hunting lodges, and private vocation hotels.

In this connection, an even greater necessity arises to delineate a boundary between set privileges for leaders of various ranks [time bell rings] and the frequent facts of abuse of an official post on their part. This is exactly how many privileges established independently, in situ and in departments which, in the conditions of relaxed or even absent state and public control, have become, in essence, a hidden form of bribery, and embezzlement of public funds should be classified, as abuses.

After all, there were never legislative acts or executive directives that would give their blessing to such anarchy which has arisen in practice, although up to now such practice simply has been connived at. This completely suited the double morals of the stagnation period and the atmosphere of complete licence and impunity of many leaders.

However, this is incompatible with the spirit of perestroyka and the ethics of a leader, especially a Communist. Society has risen against such abuses and there will not be a return to the past.

Reflecting the will of the electorate, the commission members intend resolutely and conclusively to put an end to the system of unjustified privileges and to bring order to this sphere of social relations. However, I consider it necessary to repeat once more that the ideas of social justice have nothing in common with the ideas of levelling down to the lowest common denominator. The latter proceed in essence from a concept of barrack socialism and are a brake on the path of the discovery and encouragement of everyone's individual abilities. They level down talents, infringe on an individual's rights, and in the end result lead to the individual's degradation. More complex, intense, responsible work should always be remunerated in a suitable way. However, the main thing is that such remuneration should be realised primarily in the form of wages.

At the same time, such an approach makes it possible to compensate for a number of services which go beyond the limits of purely official purposes via the personal funds of the employee. Moreover, these principles should be universal, also encompassing the higher echelons of power.

It also should be remarked that full openness should be established in such an important sphere. It was precisely in the conditions of the absence of openness that the presence of unjustified concessions and privileges became possible.

During the period beginning in July of this year, the commission thoroughly analyzed the system of concessions and privileges for individual categories in the sphere of health care, care at sanatoriums and resorts, and the use of official automotive transporation, and prepared corresponding recommendations.

The commission's work has been going quite intensively, although not without difficulties. Some of these arose because it was difficult to receive exhaustive information from certain departments, others because of the confused nature of the issue. I also will say bluntly that the insufficiently responsible attitude of certain commission members was felt.

We began with an analysis of the state of affairs in the field of pediatric care. The priority of this issue is indisputable. Where, if not among children, are social inequalities of any kind unacceptable? It is precisely with regard to children that injustice is perceived as particularly intolerable. It is precisely here that we need to put a definitive end to the situation in which a child's being in a particular treatment and sanatorium establishment is determined by whose son, daughter, or grandchild he is. We have come to the unambiguous conclusion that it is necessary immediately to hand over all children's treatment, sanatorium, and resort facilities that have been under the jurisdiction of the Fourth Main Directorate at the USSR Ministry of health, without exception, to the public health care system.

On the basis of recommendations from the commission, all children's establishments have been handed over for general use as of 31 August on the instruction of the Council of Ministers, and specifically the (Brigantina) children's sanatorium in Yevpatoriya has been handed over to the Soviet Lenin Children's Fund, the (Ilyinskiy) and (Odintsovskiy) children's sanatoriums near Moscow have been handed over to the USSR ministry of health, as has the Children's Department of the Dubovaya Roschcha Sanatorium in Zheleznovodsk. The children's polyclinics that used to be in the network of the Fourth Main Directorate already have been set up as consultant diagnostic centers, providing services to the children resident in the Baumanskiy and Sokolnichskiy Rayons of the city of Moscow.

I would like to lay particular stress on the fact that the commission has persistently recommended that the norms of material and technical provisioning, the medical equiment, the system of paying staff for their work, and the expenditure on catering and medicines already operating in all these establishments be maintained. In its turn, the Council of Ministers has recommended to the Councils of Ministers of the union republics that they adopt parallel measures. Work in this direction has, according to information available to us, begun.

Particular disagreement was evoked among the population by the existence of the system of treatment and sanatorium and resort facilities of the fourth Main Directorate at the USSR Ministry of Health, which were used primarily by a specific sector of society. True, in addition to local soviet, party, and economic leaders, prominent figures in science and culture, some personal pensioners, foreign guests and diplomats were treated there, but the elitist nature of such establishments was not removed by this. Many of them were striking in how fashionable they were, or rather by their tasteless commercial luxury, the expensive chandeliers no one needed, the splendid furniture and carpets, the imitation velvet wallpaper on the walls, the vases. How far removed these sanatoriums, rest homes, and some hospitals are, not only from their commonplace counterparts, but also from what a normal person really needs in order to rest or receive treatment. Such palaces were, for the most part, created or converted in the 1970's and at the start of the 1980's. The fact that all these fourth directorate facilities were effectively financed from the general health care budget, even though they were designated by a separate entry, is unacceptable. The fourth directorate's budget is not, of course, commensurable with the general healthcare budget. It amounts to a mere 0.5 percent of the latter. However, this ½ per cent was destined for treatment, including that in sanatoriums, and naturally covered the money for spending on buildings, construction, repairs and equipment, for around 100,000 people in all.

In carrying out its analysis of the many letters and appeals from citizens, publications in the mass media, and information provided byh the USSR Council of Ministers, the commission was unanimously in favor of abolishing the Fourth Main Directorate at the USSR Ministry of Health as an organisation created by the adminsitrative-command system using common budget funds to provide for a relatively narrow circle of people in our society. In accordance with the recommendation, the Fourth Main Directorate at the USSR Ministry of Health must be abolished by 1 January 1990, under Resolution Number 866 of the USSR Council of Ministers of 12 October 1989. A great many of the treatment, prophylactic, and sanatorium and resort facilities of this directorate are to be handed over to the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the USSR Ministry of Health in order to be used subsequently as treatment and rehabilitation centers for handicapped children and for invalid war and labor veterans. They include Kirov's Dubovaya Roshcha sanatorium in Stavropol Kray, (Belyye Nochi) in Leningrad, (Reshma) in Ivanovo Oblast, (Tsydurupa) and (Malaya Khun) in Krasnodarsk Kray, and (Gagra) in Georgia. In addition, the Second Polyclinic and Pharmacy No 2 on Ulitsa Zamorenova, which is one of the largest of Moscow's treatment facilities, equipped with up-to-date medical technology, is being transferred to the jurisdiction of the Moscow health care system. It is proposed to develop a major consultant diagnostic center to provide aid to the population of the city of Moscow on the base of this polyclinic. At present, more than 31,000 people attend this polyclinic. At this point, I no doubt should explain the prospects for the medical care of all those who make up the Fourth Directorate's contingent. About half of these people are being transferred to departmental polyclinics in Moscow according to their place of work. It should be stressed particularly that all who took part in the war, as well as labor verterans, will be retained in the place in which they were previously under observation. As for the places which become free, these will be allocated to people who live in a given territory, irrespective of their own departmental membership. We also believe that the collectives of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the CPSU Central Committee, and the Council of Ministers have the same rights as any other labor collectives in the country, and if any particular institution—for example, the Union of Writers or the USSR Academy of Sciences—or enterprise—the Zil or Kirov works, for example—maintains a departmental polyclinic at their own expense, it would be wrong to deprive the central bodies of this opportunity. It is another matter that it should not be at society's expense or to the detriment of health care for the masses.

The treatment and health associations under the USSR Council of Ministers, where it is intended that the staff at a number of central departments, the diplomatic corps, and the people's deputies will be catered for, will serve these purposes. Moreover, I am able to tell you that 1,225 people's deputies and 515 of their family members have already registered with the No 1 Polyclinic on Sivtsev Vrazhek Lane [murmuring in hall] a perceptible—just a minute, comrades; your attention, please—a perceptible contribution to the strengthening of the base of general health care is the decision to hand over to it a number of state dachas. [further murmuring, a bell rings] I understand that people are taking this figure, which is really quite an eloquent one, in stormy fashion. [Lukyanov interjects: We have all the details, you understand, about the deputies, so please hear it out calmly.]

Another perceptible contribution to strengthening the base of general health care is the decision to hand over to it a number of state dachas. In Moscow Oblast, for example, five state dachas are being given over for the establishment of a children's rehabilitation complex which subsequently will be extended through new construction. A dacha in Palanga is being handed over to the Soviet Children's Fund named after Lenin and its Lithuanian republican branch. A union republic children's treatment center will be set up here. This has been done on the direct request of the Children's Fund. Two dachas at Livadiya in the Crimea have been handed over to the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans. Taking into consideration their existing beach, pool, open-air cinema, and sports facilities, they are to be used as boarding accommodation for organizing recuperative rest for war and labor veterans. The building of the former Aleksandrovskiy Dvorets, with its adjacent parkland, has been handed to the USSR Ministry of culture. Here the intention is to set up a branch of the State Hermitage Museum. Working people coming to the Crimea for their holidays and residents of the city of Yalta and nearby regions will be able make use of its amenities. Two state dachas in the Caucasus have been made available for establishments in the social field. The state dachas and auxiliary economic facilities, equipment, and stock were handed over to the establishments and public organizations named without payment.

Overall, the analysis of the state of affairs in public health care brought us to the thought, comrades, that the need to create a new model of national public health care has become ripe. Obviously, it still is too early to draw final conclusions about what this should be like. Some people, for example, proposed that commercial establishments should be set up today on the elimination of the Fourth Main Directorate and using it as the basis. Pay for everything and enjoy the high-comfort service, but all those who cannot pay, let them go to the rayon polyclinics. Is it not clear that that kind of approach would lead to the formation of a new special contingent, the specialists of the shadow economy? And this is already a new category of privilege, the privilege of the large purse. That road is not for us, although this does not reject the expediency of the wide development of financially autonomous polyclinics, given guarantees of social protection for all strata of the population.

However, this is not the subject of today's speech. We have put forward a proposal that during the first quarter of 1990 a joint session of the Commission on Privileges, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on People's Health Care, and the People's Control Committee should hear Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, speak about fulfilment of the government's decision to eliminate the Fourth Main Directorate. There possibly will be some wider discussion there, too.

I think that there is still another area for cooperation between our commission and the Supreme Soviet Committee on People's Health Care. We need to establish monitoring—and this must not be just for one occasion, but on a continuing basis—to insure that the sanatoriums, rest homes, polyclinics, and hospitals being transferred to general public health care do not lower the level and quality of their work, and are used correctly for the intended purposes. At the same time, monitoring of the fair distribution of medical and diagnostic apparatus that is in short supply be seriously stepped up.

The next question to which I would like to draw your attention, comrades, is the use by officials of official motor transportation. The state of affairs in this area was examined at sessions of our commission attended by representatives of the USSR Council of Ministers. As long ago as January 1988, the government passed a decision regulating the use of official cars. Since then, matters have begun to improve. The number of official cars has been reduced. In union ministries and departments alone, they were cut by 600 last year, and they now number 1,400. In the current year, the Council of Ministers has allocated hardly any cars to the administrative bodies. That approach also has been maintained in the state plan for 1990. At the same time, the commission concluded that the decision of the USSR Council of Ministers is not being fully carried out; abuses, poor management, and blatant waste still are going on. According to our data, in the country as a whole there are about a million drivers engaged in serving personal motor transporation, which the total cost of running personal cars amounts to about R10 billion. Not one state in the world, even the richest, would allow itself such a luxury. It is true that more than 70 percent of the official personal cars in use are in financial autonomous enterprises or organizations. Their number is not centrally regulated, but has to be determined by the enterprises themselves in agreement with the labor collectives, but there is still the other 30 per cent, which makes up what you might call the departmental official motor transporation. If in the first case it is the labor collectives that must have the decisive say in putting matters to rights, in the second, it is principally the Council of Ministers and the public bodies. It is not, of course, a question of a minister or his deputy, or even senior officials of lower rank, taking a tram or a bus when travelling in pursuit of their official duties, but at the same time, we must root out such practices as these: The wife of some official drives to the market, or drives his children to work, or drives his grandchildren to school in an official car. To improve the use of official cars, the commission considers it necessary to reduce the number of personal cars to a minimum. Official transportation must be based on the conveyer system, with definite time limits. Such transportation can, where possible, be released for nonofficial journeys, but for payment. This innovation, comrades, already has been introduced, by the way, for officials of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee. Another loophole that needs to be filled is that whereby various officials in practice take possession of conveyer vehicles for their personal use. This is a widespread practice at the present time. In cases where it is possible, officials cars should be driven more widely by those who use them. We consider that the matter of official cars must be put in order immediately, as soon as the first quarter of 1990. In this connection, recommendations have been made to the USSR Council of Ministers to draw up a strict list of the persons who must, of necessity, use personal motor transportation. Corresponding proposals also could be made to the local organs of state power and administration. The commission also recommended to the USSR People's Control Committee that it should carry out a check on the use of official cars by officials and members of their families, and report to the Supreme Soviet before 1 March 1990. The USSR Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs State Vehicle Inspectorate have been instructed to tighten control over the use of official cars.

The commission began examining the question of personal pensions. Let me say bluntly that this discussion arouses the most bitter disputes, and it is also the subject on which we have received the largest number of letters. In connection with this, I'd like to give you detailed information on the real state of affairs.

Today we have about 600,000 holders of personal pensions at three levels in our country. 350,000 personal pensioners at the local level—their maximum pension is R140 and the average figure is R99—180,000 pensioners at the republic level—the pension ceiling for them is R160 and the average figure is R115-–and finally, 56,000 people hold a union-level pension—the pension ceiling here is R250 and the average amount is R130. Holding a personal pension carries with it a number of concessions: 50 percent housing and municipal services charges, free prosthetic appliances, reductions on medicaments, free travel on all types of urban transportation, free travel once a year to anywhere in the country, and free travel arrangement to sanatoriums.

There also is a limited category of personal pension holders, top leading officials in the past; who have a number of additional concessions: higher pensions, in the range of R400-500, and the right to use dachas and motor transportation. After the death of a personal pensioner, these concessions are transferred in part to the spouse.

It has to be said that, of itself, the singling out for personal pension provision of that kind of group of high-ranking state figures is reasonable and fits in with generally accepted world practice. This certainly does not mean, however, that the volume of concessions that it enjoys cannot be changed. It is precisely for this reason that a revision of that practice already is being carried out with regard both to state dachas and motor vehicles. In connection with a decision of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, provision for this group of pensioners now has been made the responsibility of the departments in which they worked before retirement.

What is it in the personal pensions system that mainly gives rise to criticism in society?

First, it is cases in which a personal pension is given to a leader who has compromised himself and made a mess of the work. Here, unfortunately, we still have a tenacious tradition of maintaining sham decorum and retiring on health grounds even people who should be brought to account in the full severity of party conscience, and in a number of cases, in the full severity of the law. The practice of awarding personal pensions to a fairly wide circle of relatives of top officials, which used to exist in the past gives rise to particularly sharp criticism.

Second, widespread dissatisfaction exists with regard to the procedure for establishing personal pensions itself. The relevant commissions, in considering applications, often still work in secret. The lack of glasnost gives rise to suspicion as to whether a person really has achieved merit in his office.

Third, a number of letters suggest that veterans of party and trade union work and of other public organizations should be given a supplement out of the resources of their own budgets rather than from the state budget. Such an approach, moreover, is also in keeping with that part of the practice of perestroyka we are now implementing in which personal additions to pensions are set by enterprises and other establishments for individual workers.

A number of members of the Commission on Privileges, having studied this issue, proposed that personal pensions and all concessions connected with them should be abolished in full.

It is considered that the new bill on pensions, while it does give rise to criticism in some of its parts, on the whole insures normal prosperity for all pensioners. At the same time, it is proposed that a system of distinction for people who have rendered special services to society and the state should be thought out. In the opinion of these people's deputies, the statuses should be precisely worked out and set down, for example, for the Hero of the Soviet Union and the Hero of Socialist Labor, the socialist benefits given to participants in and invalids of war and labour should be stepped up, and this will insure a personalized approached to additional benefits.

Such an approach, however, is not shared by all the members of the commission, and I want to talk about this perfectly frankly. In society, too, reactions are highly contradictory. Every day we receive a large number of letters on this subject expressing, figuratively speaking, a passionate outcry from the declining years. Here, in fact, is what was said by one person who wrote, and here I quote, this is what he wrote: We cannot, we have no right not to respond to this anxiety. No modernization of pension matters must strike at the interests of honest and merited people.

A draft pensions law that has been adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in first reading was published recently. It has begun to be discussed widely in the country. There are complete grounds for believing that the law will be passed during the third session of the Supreme Soviet. By that time, the commission intends to give its recommendations on personal pensions, which in our view, could be taken into consideration in the law. Consequently, here, too, it is a question of specific timetables for resolving the question.

At the request of the Commission on Privileges, the Council of Ministers has prepared ideas on regulating the use of state dachas. Some very big changes are being contemplated here. I have already said that the number of these has been reduced by a large amount through handing some of them over for public use. In addition, it is intended to revise the circle of people with the right to use such dachas. As a result, additional state dachas will be released for public use. Later, state and government leaders will be able to use dachas for work or recreation through the departments in which they work. Only the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers will retain the right to use state dachas.

To avoid false interpretations, it is necessary, comrades, to clarify a few points. We know that all over the world, the highest leaders of states and governments have state residences which are made available in accordance with their posts. We, too, use this approach.

I have to say with full responsibility that no member of the present leadership of this country has ever received or built any dachas as his personal or family property at state expense. The state dachas existing in the Soviet Union also fulfil representational functions: holidays for leaders of foreign states, meetings, talks, receptions, and so on, but such dachas were formerly also used by retired leaders and their families. As I have said, that practice is now being reviewed.

I also want to inform you that preparatory work is under way in the commission on examining the system of privileges in the sphere of housing, cultural, and everyday services, and shopping. We attach special importance to our recommendation to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the union republics to draw up and submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet in the first quarter of 1990 a draft law on the status of leading officials of state institutions, including the highest echelons. In our opinion, similar work should be done in all the country's sociopolitical bodies, including the organs of soviet power, the party, the Komsomol, and the trade unions. It is a matter of unequivocally and publicly determining and placing on record the right of a leader of a particular rank to be provided with the necessary working conditions, if you like, on the basis of reasonable sufficiency.

The commission also arrived at the unanimous opinion that it is desirable to set up in the union republics similar commissions to examine privileges which would work in close interaction with us. I would like to express, in particular, the commission's attitude to the privileges of the body of deputies. It is clear that people's deputies must have all they need for fruitful and efficient work, but at the same time, it is obvious that in exercising our powers we all are obliged to be extremely demanding and meticulous toward ourselves. Unfortunately, the behavior of a few deputies has given rise to the spreading of unfounded rumors about deputies privileges, and this has cast a shadow over the whole body of deputies. However, I do not want to encroach on the concerns of the Commission on Deputies' Ethics. On one matter, however, the commission does submit a concrete proposal: We submit to the Congress the recommendation that a house on Sivtsev Vrazhek Street, intended for occupancy by deputies who are members of the Supreme Soviet, should be handed over to residents of Moscow, first of all to invalids and war veterans, including veterans of Afghanistan. [applause] Naturally, this does not mean that deputies who are taking up permanent work in Moscow will be left without official living space.

In conclusion, let me say this: The commission has regarded its work as directly and immediately related to the processes of democratization of Soviet society and its renewal and reform. In the establishing of social justice is reflected the humanist nature of perestroyka. We have taken the first steps on that path, comrades, but even these first steps have had great social repercussions. They revive in people faith and truth. Awareness of this strengthens our resolve to carry out the instructions of the first congress completely. Thank you for your attention.

Dzasokhov on 1979 Afghanistan Decision

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[Report on the decision to send troops into Afghanistan, presented by Aleksandr Dzasokhov at the 24 December session of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed people's deputies! In line with the instructions of the First Congress of People's Deputies to formulate a political assessment of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs deems it necessary to report the following:

The committee members have acquainted themselves with Soviet government and CPSU Central Committee documents, and with material belonging to the USSR Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Committee for State Security, which relate to the commitment of the troops. They have had discussions with many people who, at the end of the 1970s, occupied high posts in party and state bodies, with military commanders, diplomats, and the leaders of various departments connected with the development of Soviet-Afghan relations. On a number of occasions this issue has been discussed at sittings of the committee in what has, at times, been a very hard-hitting manner. USSR people's deputies, representatives of other Supreme Soviet committees, soldiers who lived through the years of Afghanistan, and a whole number of experts have all participated in them.

Following detailed analysis of the available information, the committee has come to the conclusion that the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan merits moral and political condemnation. The overall international situation was, at the time when the decision was made, undoubtedly difficult and was marked by acute political confrontation. Given that situation, there was some idea that certain quarters in the United States of America were intending to take revenge for the loss of their positions following the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran. The facts indicated that such a train of events was possible. In the official statements that followed the deployment of the troops, one of the reasons for the action that had been taken was given as a desire to strengthen the Soviet Union's security on the approaches to her southern borders, and in this way to protect her positions in the region because of the tension that had developed by then in Afghanistan. Elements of armed interference from outside were on the increase, and the Afghan Government had issued appeals for help to the Soviet leadership. Documentary evidence has established that since March 1979 the Afghan Government had, on more than 10 occasions, asked for Soviet troop detachments to be sent into the country. the Soviet's response had been to reject that form of assistance, stating that the Afghan revolution must defend itself. However, in the long run this stance underwent what was, frankly, a dramatic change. The December 1979 decision was undoubtedly affected by the excessive ideologization of Soviet foreign policy activity which had occurred over a period of many years under the direct influence of the ideological tenets that held sway at the time. It was in light of this that, to a considerable extent, our attitude toward the April Revolution itself developed. It was a premise which accorded with this view that was placed at the heart of the address from the

Soviet leadership to the heads of foreign states in connection with the announcement that a contingent of our troops had been sent into Afghanistan. This pointed out that it was a matter of a limited task, assistance in protecting communications and individual installations. However, all these circumstances cannot justify the decision to send in troops.

Everyone knows how events actually developed further. The clashes became more intense and widespread. The Soviet military contingent found itself drawn into an escalation of large-scale military actions. International tension and distrust and military- political rivalry between East and West were heightened. The use of methods of force damaged the authority of Soviet policy among a substantial part of the world public.

By this action we set ourselves against the majority of the world community and against the norms of conduct, which should be accepted and observed in international relations. The numerous violations of these norms by other states—including recently, regrettably—which took place at that time, too, cannot justify such actions on the part of our state.

The committee concludes that the decision to send in troops was made in violation of the USSR Constitution, the provisions of article 73, paragraph 8, according to which—I quote—questions of peace and war, defense of sovereignty, protection of state borders and territories of the USSR, organization of defense, and the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces come under the jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the person of its supreme organs of state power and government. In this context, we report that the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium did not examine the question of sending troops to Afghanistan. The decision was made by a narrow circle of people. The International Affairs Committee has ascertained that the Politburo did not even assemble in its full complement to discuss this matter and make a decision on it.

In giving a political and moral assessment of the dispatch of troops into Afghanistan, it is essential, it is our duty, to name those engaged in dealing with the major foreign policy issues starting from the mid 1970s, who did indeed make the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. They are Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, who at that time occupied the posts of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of our country's Supreme Soviet, chairman of the Council of Defense, and supreme commander in chief of the USSR Armed Forces; Ustinov, former USSR defense minister; Andropov, chairman of the State Security Committee; and Gromyko, USSR foreign minister.

However, at the same time it would not be enough to reduce the matter to the personal responsibility of individual politicians alone. It was possible to carry out such a significant and truly dramatic action, circumventing the supreme organs of the country's state power, without the people's participation, as a result of serious defects in the very system of determining practical policy and the mechanism of adopting decisions. however, It must be pointed out that in accordance with the established practice at that time, had the aforementioned decision been submitted for discussion at any of the forums, whether political or state, it would most likely have been approved. The party and the people, and our foreign friends, were essentially presented with a fait acompli.

The policy based upon the new thinking intends excluding the possibility of any repetition of anything like the 1979 action. The determining guarantee should be the establishment of real control by the supreme organs of power over the processes of formation and implementation of the Soviet state's foreign policy course. Foreign policy should always be under the people's control. It seems to us, of particular importance is reliable and absolute control over the drawing up and adoption of decisions connected with the use of the USSR Armed Forces. Clear and precise constitutional norms must exist in this regard.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy, which made possible the conclusion of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country, corresponds to the spirit and tasks of perestroyka, and is an organic part of it. The time that has elapsed since the return of Soviet troops from Afghanistan demonstrates that the government and the Afghan national forces are capable independently of determining the destiny of their own country, and are rebuffing—and many reports on this have been coming in recently—the attempts of the armed opposition to impose a military solution. It should be pointed out that President Najibullah of Afghanistan perceived with understanding, and, most importantly, gave active backing to, the Soviet approach to the issue of a withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent.

Political and diplomatic activity is gathering strength in the Republic of Afghanistan. Taking account of all the circumstances, it is considered well-founded to continue political and moral support to the neighboring Afghan people and to continue rendering assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan and developing cooperation with that country, in accordance with the bilateral state agreements.

Esteemed people's deputies, in both politically and morally censuring the decision to send in Soviet troops, the committee deems it necessary to declare that this in no way casts any aspersion upon the men and officers who were sent to Afghanistan. True to their oath, and convinced that they were defending the interests of the motherland and rendering friendly aid to a neighboring people, they were merely fulfilling their military duty. The Soviet people lost thousands of their sons in Afghanistan. It is our sacred duty to preserve the memory of them, true sons of the fatherland. I beg you to observe a minute's silence in honor of the memory of those of our comrades who perished. [brief silence]

It is our duty to give due recognition to the courage of those who underwent grave ordeals, to show concern for them, to help them to realize their plans for their lives, and to render help and support in every possible way to the disabled and the families of the dead.

The International Affairs Committee considers it necessary to add a number of practical suggestions to the political assessment of the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. As yet, the USSR Constitution and legislative acts do not define the mechanism for adopting decisions on the use of the Armed Forces beyond the bounds of our country. The Constitution contains only general provisions, in accordance with which the Supreme Soviet makes decisions on employing contingents of the USSR Armed Forces in the event of the need to fulfill international treaty obligations to maintain peace and security. What is evidently needed is for the procedure for employing the Armed Forces to be specified by means of a special legislative act, and, furthermore, for the clauses on the USSR Defense Council to be brought solidly into conformity with constitutional norms. This urgent task could be realized in the context of the work on the future, new Constitution of our country.

The committee also deems it expedient to examine the possibility of setting up a commission, within the framework of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on the affairs of former servicemen of the contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Similar measures should also, it seems to us, be taken with regard to the USSR Council of Ministers.

We deem it necessary to inform the second congress of the suggestion from many people's deputies and representatives of the public of our country that the day the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was completed—namely, 15 February—should be made a day of remembrance.

Thus, esteemed people's deputies, the committee, basing itself upon the mandate it was given by the First Congress of People's Deputies, has striven to illuminate only the political assessment of the very fact of sending troops into Afghanistan. The existing documentation gives sufficient grounds, in our opinion, for the basic conclusions submitted to you by the committee.

Concluding my report, I will point out that in the historical retrospective, the war in Afghanistan is today's living history, of which many political and social forces are participants, in addition to the Soviet Union. A great deal of multifaceted work lies ahead on the part of politicians, diplomats, and scholars, to make all- around evaluations of this historical event so full of drama.

Thank you for your attention.

Congress Condemns Transportation 'Blockades'

LD2412142889 Moscow TASS in English 1418 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 24 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies today adopted, with one vote against, a declaration on the inadmissibility of blockade.

The document came into being in view of a blockade of transport in various regions of the country, primarily in Transcaucasia. The blockade was used as a method to put pressure on neighbouring areas.

The Congress firmly condemns a blockade of transport communications in any form, the declaration says in particular.

The Congress instructed the Parliament, government and the Procurator's Office of the USSR to work out the necessary legal norms and to take effective measures to ensure an unimpeded transportation of passengers and timely delivery of freight in a good state of preservation.

Gorbachev Briefs Congress on Events in Romania

LD2412090189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0822 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 24 Dec [TASS]—The TASS parliamentary correspondent reports from the Kremlin:

Today at the beginning of the morning sitting of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, Mikhail Gorbachev informed the participants of the congress on the situation in Romania. He noted, among other things, that the Front of National Salvation believes that help is needed from abroad to fill in the shortage of ammuntion. "Nevertheless, the chief of the Romanian General Staff has stated that the Army is controlling [kontroliruyet] the situation in the country and it needs no help."

"In general, the situation, in the opinion of our comrades who are there, is developing in favor of the people and the salvation committee.

There is no official confirmation of the arrest of Nicolae Ceaucescu and Elena Ceaucescu. The arrested Ceaucescu son, Niku Ceaucescu, has been shown on television."

Mikhail Gorbachev said that the USSR is carrying out measures of humanitarian aid at the level of government and public organizations. The Soviet Embassy in Bucharest is maintaining contact with the Front of National Salvation.

Terrorists using 'Guerilla Tactics'

LD2412145989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Excerpt of speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Second Congress of People's Deputies at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 24 December—recorded]

[Text] Comrades, the events in Romania. As of 0200 Moscow time, firing continued in Bucharest. The road to the airport was blocked in places and artillery fire could be heard from the Soviet Embassy. It was reported that the terrorists had switched to urban guerilla tactics. They are still hiding in the Palace of the Republic and occupying several houses around the television building. The group of ten men that was blocking the railway station yesterday continues resistance from inside the station and has not yet been ousted by Army units. The National Salvation Front considers that foreign help is needed to replenish ammunition supplies. Nonetheless, the chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, Gusa, stated that the Army was in control and needed no help. So those were the radio and television reports, and the official statement by the chief. In general, in the opinion of our comrades there, the situation is developing in favor of the people and the Salvation Committee. There is no official confirmation of the arrest of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. Ceausescu's arrested son, Nicu, has been shown on television. Pockets of resistance remain. We are providing humanitarian aid at government level and through public bodies. The embassy is maintaining contact with the provsional Salvation Committee.

Results of Congress of People's Deputies Summarized

LD2412151489 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 24 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Second Congress of the USSR People's Deputies that has been in session in Moscow for 12 days came to a close today.

The supreme forum bringing together more than 2,000 deputies supported the government's economic recovery program which combines a package of extraordinary measures with a stage-by-stage implementation of economic reform.

The congress introduced changes to the Soviet Constitution which make it possible to hold elections to republican parliaments and local government bodies on a democratic basis. In a majority of republics the elections will be held in the first quarter of 1990.

The participants in the congress adopted a Law on Constitutional Compliance and elected the leaders of a body which is new to the Soviet political system—a Committee of Constitutional Compliance (committee members will be elected by the parliament later).

The deputies endorsed a program to combat organised crime, and heard reports by a number of commissions that had been set up at the first congress as well as in parliament, including those for a political assessment of the decision to bring troops to Afghanistan and a political and legal assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression treaty.

The congress adopted an address to the Soviet people, calling on them to unite in support of the ideas and goals of perestroyka.

Before the congress came to a close, the deputies were addressed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev

People's Deputies Congress Issues Address to People

PM2412230389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Dec 89 Second Edition p 1

["Address 'To the Citizens of the USSR' From the Congress of USSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] Esteemed comrades!

Fellow citizens!

Completing its work, the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies addresses you, citizens of the USSR, our voters—workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, party members and nonparty people, women and men, veterans and young people, atheists and believers.

The country has arrived at a difficult and crucial point. Its future destiny depends on our decisions and actions. For all the multiplicity of views and opinions—at times contradictory—the unity of the Congress has has emerged as regards the main point: to move unswervingly along the path of socialist renewal which the party initiated, not to sit back, not to tag along in the wake of events, but to move reforms along resolutely in all directions. Herein lies, in our opinion, the way out of the situation in which the country has found itself.

Let us resolve the pressing issues of economic and political reform—let us move forward toward the dynamic, humanistic socialist society with a high standard of well-being for the people. If we get bogged down, if we permit any pause or failure in the reforms, damage will be inflicted both for the present day and for the future which will be difficult to remedy.

Having discussed and supported the government's measures for the country's economy recovery, the Congress, at the same time, has come to the conclusion that these measures will not work if the adoption of vitally important new laws which constitute the nucleus of the economic reform is not significantly accelerated. They are designed to ensure the transition to a socialist, commodity-based economy, and to impart to our economy new, more up-to-date qualities which are so essential: a multistructural quality, flexibility, ecological safety, and receptiveness to scientific and technical progress. They will help to eradicate leveling and free-loading, given the consistent pursuit of the principles of social justice and of the right of man to be paid for his labor strictly according to the results of that labor. The Congress has instructed the USSR Supreme Soviet to examine and adopt this package of laws at the next session.

The people's deputies consider it their duty to state the following: No laws and resolutions, even the most sophisticated, will solve the country's pressing problems if real actions by every citizen do not follow their adoption. Only as a result of common labor and common efforts will we be able to have a sufficiency of products and goods, and can prosperity be ensured for each and everyone. We cannot expect gifts from anyone. We call upon you to enhance organization, to do away with laxity, indiscipline, and thriftlessness, and to wage a resolute struggle against losses of the people's assets.

The Congress has provided impetus to the development of the political reform, to the enhancement of constitutional standards, and to fleshing out our federation with new content. The new election legislation is expanding the opportunities for electing active citizens to the soviets of people's deputies who can think in the new way and who are capable of actually fulfilling their lofty obligations.

Like the entire country, the deputies perceive with alarm and pain the flareups of interethnic conflict which arise in our society, and they address their voice to each of you, regardless of which nationality or religious persuasion you may belong to. We have approached a dangerous line at which it is essential to halt, to put an end to discord and misunderstanding, and to rule out the methods of pressure, blockades, and violence. Not blind embitterment, but humaneness, compassion, mutual respect, wisdom, and goodwill are capable of resolving any conflicts, even those that seemingly are the most deadlocked.

Assessing the atmosphere in society, we, the people's deputies are coming to the conclusion that we, all Soviet people, must strengthen our mutual trust and remember that there are no guilty peoples, just as there are no guilty generations. The unification of all healthy social forces is taking place under conditions of a determined reappraisal of our past and the restoration of historical truth. This process is not proceeding easily and it affects the interests and notions of many people, and throws their soul and memory into alarm. Moral cleansing and the condemnation of repressions, of the crude flouting of human rights, and of recrudescences of Stalinist thinking must not cast a shadow over whole generations of Soviet people. The Congress draws attention to the need for an ubiquitous respectful attitude toward the symbols of the state, toward historical monuments, and toward the spiritual values of the peoples.

We call upon all honest people to act in a united front against crime, corruption, speculation, and the embezzlment of the public wealth, and to support the strengthening of public order and respect for the laws. The Soviet man must everywhere feel himself to be safe: at work, on the street, and in the home.

The Congress is sure that the surmounting of any problems—economic, political, social, interethnic—can lie only on the path of the revolutionary renewal of socierty, and of mutual understanding between people and between peoples.

We call upon you, dear fellow countrymen, to rally around the ideas and aims of perestroyka, and to engage in energetic work for the sake of their realization!

On the eve of the new year we wish you all happiness, we wish you well, we wish you peace!

[Signed] The Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Moscow, Kremlin, 24 December 1989

Deputies, Yevtushenko Cited on Congress

PM2712164389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Dec 89 Second Edition p 4

[Interviews with USSR people's deputies by A. Gavrilov, S. Oganyan, and A. Shabashkevich: "Congress Is Ended: Mission for Tomorrow"]

[Excerpts] The second Congress of USSR People's Deputies ended last Sunday. For nearly 2 weeks we followed with strained attention what was happening in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

The problems of the economy were without exaggeration the main ones among the numerous points on the Congress agenda. How to overcome them? What steps should be taken to cope with the crisis phenomena in many spheres of our life? The deputy's role in the processes of perestroyka—how to make it more effective?

V. Yarin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Nizhniy Tagil:

"The key question for me personally in the work of the Congress was the government statement that its program submitted for the deputies' attention is based on the real state of affairs. It is this realism, this harsh realism, I would say, the rejection of the former bravado when they tried to persuade us that we were marching from one victory to the next, which most attracts me in the government draft. We have finally really turned to face man, assessed his needs, become imbued with them, and, having understood them, have decided to take steps in the right direction. Steps which are perhaps not as bold as some people expected but which are well calculated. Today we must strictly measure our potential. A 100 meter leap would be very dangerous under our conditions. People correctly assess the feasibility of the plan, it is very important as a truth which must be looked in the eye, however painful that is. Looked in the eye without squinting. The desire to deceive the people would be unforgivable on the part of us deputies. We must have a precise idea of the difficulties with which we are beginning the economic reform and beginning our advance.

"If we are speaking of how we worked this time, I must note that I noticed no improvement of political culture among my colleagues during the period between the two congresses. Many people, including myself, have shortcomings, but we must struggle against them. In that sense the Supreme Soviet, whose members work constructively and professionally, has the advantage. Here this can be said not only of the representatives of mental labor but also of those of physical labor. There are virtually no supernumeraries. Hence the respectful attitude toward colleagues." [passage omitted]

R. Medvedev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Moscow:

"The Congress should nonetheless be held once a year. I can see that the Congress is not adapted to passing legislative acts—that was shown by the discussion of the draft resolution on constitutional oversight during which it changed its concept.

"As a whole, of course, the Congress has adopted important decisions and been an important event. But to judge from the positions of a historian, it was not a turning point. As for the most important decision, it was the one which we took on A. Yakovlev's report. I am firmly convinced that we must expand the composition of parliament, that is of the Supreme Soviet, and it should examine questions, the same questions, in the chambers and hold joint sittings in exceptional cases when 'different readings' occur. That is how I see the future supreme organ of power."

I. Zhdakayev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Sakhalin Oblast:

"I shall say frankly that I feel no satisfaction from my work at the Congress. Many expectations were not justified. For instance, I hoped that decisions connected with economic reform would be convincing and more radical. That did not happen. In this case because there was essentially no alternative to the government viewpoint or else it did not get through to the Congress.

"I am also perturbed by the poor tone of our meeting. Although at the first Congress the deputies were accused of transferring the ardor of the election struggle to the rostrums, that feeling of concern and unease was closer to me.

"As for the deputy's status, if we want the deputies to be able to work their status must be clearly defined. And this law as a whole satisfied my expectations. And I think those of the voters too." [passage omitted]

Ye. Yevtushenko, poet:

"First I want to note with sadness what was not examined at this congress. I have in mind questions of the land, the lease, and the main question—ownership. Without their solution there can be no major economic headway in our country. Today the main task is economic perestroyka.

"I believe that the tense nature of interethnic relations stems to a considerable degree from the economy. If people now had pluralism of opportunity to display their enterprise and initiative, they would concentrate less on interethnic strife. Or take organized crime. It is born of the following chain reaction: boredom-hooliganism-crime-regular crime-organized crime. I believe that for many people infected from birth with constructive or entrepreneurial energy, this energy, when it finds no outlet or encounters too many barriers, becomes destructive. It is still complex right now for an honest man to find scope for his enterprise.

"But I return to the Congress itself. I believe that the Supreme Soviet is now considerably outstripping it in terms of political maturity. Many people's deputies who had no parliamentary experience have now acquired it, having immersed themselves in urgent problems in the Supreme Soviet.

"I see the Congress' achievement in the great degree of consensus. I believe that at the third congress there will be still greater headway toward consensus. And in my opinion the fourth will, in terms of its maturity, already be up to the level of today's Supreme Soviet."

TASS Assesses People's Deputies Congress

LD2712115189 Moscow TASS in English 1136 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—By TASS parliamentary analyst Andrey Orlov:

The time has come to stop searching for simple solutions to the complex problems facing the Soviet Union and to begin constructive work. This was the prevailing sentiment at the Second Congress of Soviet People's Deputies which has recently ended in Moscow.

The Congress was not sensational, but it heralded a victory of common sense over the temptation to make another "great leap."

It ended the lambast-them-all stage in perestroika, emphasising the importance of concrete actions to ensure perestroika's success.

Given the increasing political pluralism, a consolidation of all forces is necessary to stabilise society. Without this, even the most radical proposals will yield few results.

Evidently, the rapid polarisation of Soviet political life, even though this is a normal and desirable process, and the creation of an organised opposition at the congress do not serve to promote stability in the country.

The government is also calling for consolidation and has tabled a balanced plan to simultaneously end the current economic slump and deepen economic reforms.

The Congress's decisions reflect radical demands to speed up reforms: The Supreme Soviet has been asked to take up the major bills in the coming months—bills on land, ownership, enterprise, joint stock companies, competition, banking reform and others.

The public is likely to support the government, especially since the people's deputies gave it a vote of confidence at the Congress.

The decision to expand Supreme Soviet powers, allowing it to amend the Constitution is another major result of the congress.

A newly-set Committee of Constitutional Compliance, designed to provide legal ground work to perestroika reforms, will become an important part of the new political set-up.

Many feared that glasnost might be reined in at the Congress, but these apprehensions were shattered by the open debate of hot issues—the crumbling economy, mounting ethnic tensions, rising crime and corruption. Deputies scored another point for renewal by discussing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939, the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and an army clamp down on a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi in the spring of 1989.

Yeltsin Criticizes Outcome of People's Congress

LD2712112289 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Excerpts] Many people's deputies of the USSR have returned home after the session of the Soviet legislature, that ended its work recently. [passage omitted]

Asked by the news agency INTERFAX to comment on the outcome of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Boris Yeltsin has said that by refusing to discuss draft laws on property, land, and socialist enterprise, the congress put the country into an extremely difficult position. He said that wasting another few months may waste the whole of next year for the reform. Boris Yeltsin sees no point in submitting the drafts in question to a nationwide discussion, since there is no specific procedure for discussions of that kind, and the congress, which consists of more than 2,200 deputies representing the entire nation and the whole spectrum of opinion in society, is fully capable of making appropriate decisions.

Congress of People's Deputies

More on 25-26 Dec CPSU Plenum News Conference

LD2712153189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1945 GMT 26 Dec 89

[News conference by Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary; Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy, Politburo candidate member and CPSU Central Committee secretary; and Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary, in Moscow on 26 December at the conclusion of the 25-26 December CPSU Central Committee plenum—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Girenko] Neither the discussion nor any other circumstances provide a basis for saying that there were differences at the plenum. The plenum, indeed, adopted a unanimous decision. The desire to continue the work of the plenum after appropriate work in the party organization of Lithuania is caused precisely by the unanimous striving of all participants in the plenum to provide the necessary assistance and support to the party organization. It shows a kind of very profound concern of the Central Committee plenum as a whole and of every Central Committee member for the future of this party organization. That is why, indeed, the future of our party as a whole is related to the decisions adopted at the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. That's all I wanted to add. [passage omitted]

[IRISH TIMES correspondent, in English with consecutive Russian translation by interpreter] IRISH TIMES. If I understood you correctly, in the Soviet Union, or more accurately in Lithuania, there are now two communist parties and two central committees. Which of these groups has the right to make use of the buildings and property of the Lithuanian Communist Party? For example, who will occupy the offices of the Secretariat and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Lithuania?

[Medvedev] I think that the moment for the division of property has not yet arrived, because the question is still active, a question which has been postponed, which will be debated during discussions, in meetings with the communists of Lithuania. The resolving of the political issue will in itself predetermine the property question. I think that this is not the most important thing now—the main thing is to find a political resolution to the issue.

[Terekhov] I have a question for Comrade Razumovskiy—radio, Terekhov. Tell us please, am I right in my impression that in general, all the problems which have started in our country now in relation to the Lithuanian Communist Party unfortunately, it seems to me, also continue in some relations with other communist parties of the republics, and arise out of the fact that in recent years the rules of the CPSU and the party's organizational structure have practically not changed at all. That is, the restructuring of the party is lagging behind the restructuring of the state. Does it not seem to you that we must somehow, as quickly as possible, tackle the question of changing the party's organizational structure within the CPSU, and of elaborating new rules and new tenets and interrelations right up to a position where leaders of a republican Communist Party should, by virtue of their office, be included in the make-up of the Politburo?

[Razumovskiy] Without touching on the specific proposals, of a constructive nature, contained in your question, I would like to stress that the need for the democratization of internal party life and not merely a review of the tenets laid down in the rules, but the creation of new CPSU rules, has been repeatedly stressed by the leadership of the Communist Party—Moreover, under conditions in which the Soviet Federation is continuing to be filled with new political and economic content—and in the second part, as you well know, the Baltic republics now prevail, or rather possess even certain advantages. Quite recently they received a document which the Supreme Soviet adopted in the sphere of economic independence. So the CPSU Central Committee advocates the extension of the rights of the communist parties of the union republics. This line is being followed in our approaches and in work on those documents which are being prepared for the party congress.

Again, replying to the question, I want to stress to you the need—irrespective of the fact that in the process of the preparations for the 27th Congress of the Party—our rules went through not a few changes, and in those days practically not a single one of the proposals, of basically everything which had been stated, was left out of account, and more than 2 million proposals were considered. You can imagime, this was on the eve of the 27th congress. We took into account and submitted more than 100 corrections. But life has shown that this document today, clearly, should in fact be renewed, in fact redrafted. The Central Committee and party committees at all levels and sectors are today working on this. All those involved—whoever is capable of taking an active and constructive and useful part in this task—are being drawn in. We have alternative documents in the party Central Committee prepared by individual communist, individual party organizations. We are doing everything to take into account the variety of views which would reflect the will of the majority of communists—believe me. In this regard, the document will of course, be renewed; it will practically be a new document.

[Afanasyev] Afanasyev, of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY. I have this question. Why, in your view, did the Lithuanian comrades resort to a such a dubious measure as the separation of the party at a congress, and not by way of a referendum of their party? Why not propose holding a referendum on this matter?

[Girenko] If I may, Vadim Andreyevich. I think that we could open up a discussion with regard to whether or not a party, a partywide, referendum is possible or not, and what kind of role it might play as applied to the situation in Lithuania. But I also think that it is well understood that a referendum could reveal which communists consider it possible to form a party outside the CPSU, and which consider it necessary to remain on the positions of the CPSU. But this does not, however, confer the right for these decisions which emerged at the 20th Congress of the CPSU to be recognized as a right...[corrects himself] of the Lithuanian Communist Party...to, so to speak, recognize them as valid and to implement them. So a referendum, in the case in question is not something which could get the situation out of...present it in another light. After all, in essence, a decision has been taken for specific communists on transferring them from one party to another—from the CPSU to some other kind of party which has, which has stated its program, its rules differing significantly, resolutely differing from the rules and programs of the CPSU. This is another party, and someone has taken...and, on behalf of the communists transferred them from one party to another. This of course, is not acceptable in intraparty relations.

[Medvedev] That is, even if a referendum were to produce such results, then that is still no basis for making a decision. The expression of the will of each communist and each person is required all the same. Since I have already inserted my response here, I will continue for a bit. From my point of view, there are more effective means than holding a referendum. A referendum is basically ad hoc and, to a certain extent, well, a formal revelation of a view on this or that issue. But what is intended is to discuss in detail, to hold discussions in each organization and with each communist in order not simply to give a formal "yes" or "no" reply, but to have a talk with him in order to reveal all the pros and cons, to place all the arguments on the table in order to conduct this matter in a considered way, in a discussion, and to discover views. And not bypassing a single person, not bypassing a single party organization. I think that this is even more effective than just asking for a referendum, although, of course the holding of such polls is not ruled out. But they, it seems to me, should not be set against other methods including the method of such a broad partywide discussion. This is even more effective from my point of view.

[Question indistinct]

[Medvedev] Well, why not, but to resolve particlar tasks of one kind or another. In the case in question, I think that it is not the most effective path. But, really, in that sense, so to speak, something along the lines of a referendum to get to every person—this, yes, this is correct.

[BBC correspondent] I would like to...perhaps you could explain to us when Gorbachev and the other leaders of the Communist Party will visit Lithuania.

[Medvedev] At a time suitable for all those....

[Razumovskiy] ...sides....

[Medvedev] ...sides involved in this matter, but not putting the matter off. I think that now is a fairly distinctive period in Lithuania, in a country which, with certain traditions—including Christmas traditions. But I think that after some, not a great many days, such a trip by members of the Politburo, members of the CPSU Central Committee, and of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee will take place. [video shows journalists and participants in the press conference]

Moscow Radio Report

LD2712202189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 26 Dec 89

[News conference by Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary, held in Moscow on 26 December at the conclusion of the 25-26 December CPSU Central Committee plenum—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Gostelradio correspondent] Gosteleradio [State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting], broadcasts for the United States. Vadim Andreyevich, you mentioned that the decision of the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress—I can't quote you exactly—removed the main restraining element for the separatist forces and tendencies in the republic. Since there are no representatives of the Lithuanian Communist Party present here, could you not give a few, as you said, explanations of the position which they represented at the last plenum? How was the decision of the 20th Congress explained from their viewpoint?

[Medvedev] In a number of republics there are forces and public groupings that put forward and advance the slogan of the complete state independence of the relevant republics. I believe that this is no secret for you. In some cases they receive more widespread support of more broad-based public movements of one kind or another. In other cases this is the view of a very narrow group of individuals. But in all cases except the case of Lithuania, the communist parties of the republics, that is, the republican party organizations of the CPSU unconditionally advocate that these republics form constituent parts of the USSR.

In the case in question it turned out that the party organization of the Union republic communist party had ceased to hold such a position, and moreover, in a certain sense, as a result of these decisions of the 20th congress, had turned into a force which even initiates this process, insofar as it is registered in the decisions of the congress that the ultimate goal of the Lithuanian Communist Party is the creation,—I am not quoting very accurately perhaps, but the sense is the creation—of an independent Lithuanian state.

[NHK correspondent] Japanese television, NHK. You said earlier that everyone, unanimously, was positive with regard to the report by Mikhail Sergeyevich. My question is: Is Mr Brazauskas one of these? Please tell us specifically what his attitude toward this matter was, and we want to know, because I think that he is a most responsible person, what specifically did he say?

[Medvedev] I can repeat again that the resolution, the decision of the Central Committee plenum, whose gist I read to you—it will be published tomorrow—was adopted unanimously. No one voted against it, and no one abstained. Everyone voted in favor of this decision of the Central Committee plenum including, of course, Comrade Brazauskas and other comrades. It is true that he is not a member of the Central Committee. He did not vote, but his comments were in the spirit of adopting this decision...

[Razumovskiy] He was in the commission...

[Medvedev]...of the Central Committee. He was a participant in the drafting commission where these decisions were prepared.

[Bojarski] POLITIKA, Belgrade.

[Medvedev] Comrade Bojarski.

[Bojarski] Bojarski, yes. Were there specific leaders in republican party organizations who openly supported the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress?

[Medvedev] So far as I grasped from the debate and speeches from comrades, no one supported the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress on creating an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and rules outside the CPSU. No one supported them, although there were speeches to the effect that it is necessary to take account of the conditions in the republic, the real state of public consciousness, intensified national feelings. This kind of leitmotif was heard in a number of speeches. I can refer to the speech by Comrade Vyalyas. He precisely and clearly expressed his position with regard to the development of the independence of the republican communist parties on the basis of and within the framework of a renewed and renewing CPSU.

[NOVOSTI correspondent] NOVOSTI press agency. I was at the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and I want to draw attention to the fact that an independent and democratic Lithuanian state was proclaimed as the goal of the Communist Party. According to the Soviet Constitution, all Soviet republics are sovereign, independent states. Moreover, the report by Brazauskas clearly stated that any kind of strivings for separatism and separation from the Soviet Union are categorically ruled out. There is a whole paragraph there about the red line and, for example, there is half a page of text published in SOVETSKAYA LITVA to the effect that under no circumstances will Lithuania leave the Soviet Union, or, moreover separate from the CPSU. Apart from that, the issue of independence was debated initially at party conferences. Thus, voting at the congress was a reflection of the view of rank-and-file Communists. As you know, 160 people voted in favor of the option within the framework of the CPSU. Of these only 144 joined the alternative party. The others remained in the party, although they voted according to the view of those Communists who had sent them.

Finally, my second question is concerned with the fact that the entire leadership of this alternative communist party consists virtually of people who have suffered during the period of perestroyka, who were deprived of posts, privileges, and benefits, with the exception of (Burdenko). So how is this? Do you understand?

[Medvedev] Well, that's not a question, it's a speech. [laughter] Yes. The concept of the independence of the republics does not exist in the USSR Constitution. It says something else: The USSR is a federation of sovereign republics, and the concept of sovereignty is, historically, specific. We are in favor of enhancing the republic's sovereignty with more weighty content. But here, too, I am certain that the formation of independence with regard to the republics does not have the right to be used in the Constitution, so that in this regard you are wrong. In our country the Union republics really are, according to the Constitution, sovereign republics, and this sovereignty has a thoroughly specific content. We are in favor of its development, but not in favor of each republic being independent. Then the Union falls apart.

So far as each delegate expresses the view of the organization that sent him to the congress is concerned, then the following has to be taken into account: in every organization there is the rayon party organization, but the elections were held at an even broader level. In each, or in many, or in the majority of organizations there are different views. Communists work or join from varied positions. If the majority voted in favor of the drafts of the 20th party congress, then that does not mean that on this basis it is possible to decide the fate of the minority, too, making a decision on their automatic transfer to another party. This operation, this method is unlawful. It does not stand up to criticism. It is antidemocratic. No one can decide for an individual to which party he should belong.

As far as the composition and the leaders of the conference of alternative organizations and delegations is concerned, I would refrain from a description of them as conservatives and so forth. Well, these are issues which relate to the real deeds, so to speak, which will follow after the adoption of decisions of one kind or another. To stick some kind of label on one Communist or another beforehand is not right, I believe. [passage omitted]

[Razumovskiy] Several times, in various permutations, questions have been asked of Vadim Andreyevich, with regard to the nature of which the following conclusion impresses itself upon me: We are here alleged in some way to be undertaking something unusual, extraordinary, and which does not fit in with our party's current rules. I can cite paragraphs of the rules where each, and only each person himself in his life, takes a sheet of paper and writes a statement in which he indicates that he recognizes the Program and Rules of the CPSU and would like to be in the ranks of the CPSU. So, I have heard that many of the participants in today's press conference took part in the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] My question, yes? Can you tell us when the trip [by Mikhail Gorbachev to Lithuania] will take place? Before or after the January plenum?

[Medvedev] I think before the January plenum. The January plenum, I should say, will be a very important political event, since it, the January plenum, will widely open up the pre-congress discussion.

At the January plenum it is planned to discuss the draft of the precongress platform of the CPSU Central Committee in which the main political guidelines will be designated. That will be some kind of skeleton of that program document which will be adopted subsequently at the congress. The main elements of the organizational restructuring of the party, that is, the rules, of which Comrade Razumovskiy spoke, will be laid down in it. At the January plenum there will be serious and profound discussions of our main political problems of today. That plenum will require certain further preparation so, apparently, it should not be expected at the beginning of January.

Baltic Fleet Officer Cited on CPSU Plenum

PM2712172589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Vice Admiral A. Korniyenko by "our correspondent" Captain 3d Class V. Yermolin under the rubric "Topical Interview": "On Positions of Unity"; date and place of interview not stated; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Vice Admiral A. Korniyenko, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Baltic Fleet, took part in the work of the CPSU Central Committee extraordinary plenum and addressed it. Our correspondent, Captain 3d Class V. Yermolin, met with him.

[Yermolin] Anatoliy Ivanovich, what were the thoughts and sentiments with which you came to the CPSU Central Committee plenum?

[Korniyenko] I was a delegate at the recent 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Naturally, it is impossible today not to think about what happened at that congress. After all it is not a case of private questions affecting only the republican party organization. The self determination declared by the majority at the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress affects the destinies of thousands of Communists in the republic and to a certain degree every Communist in the country. We military delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress stated our positions unequivocally—continuing perestroyka in the ranks of the CPSU. It must be said that the atmosphere of the congress was tense and nervy. The opponents of the idea of self determination had a hard time on the rostrum and the auditorium was noisy. You felt that the line toward separation from the CPSU was being steered toughly and vigorously. I know that many delegates felt a certain pressure. It seems to me that individual members of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee were under the thumb of the right, extreme wing of "Sajudis." Essentially there was no thorough consultation with the Communists or discussion of this question in the primary organizations. The party cannot be farmed out to those who have chosen the line of conciliation, of endless concessions instead of a principled struggle against the ideologists of secession, the separatists. As was noted in the report delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party has been seized by "organizational and political paralysis." As a result, as is well known, the 20th congress essentially fulfilled the instruction issued by "Sajudis," which back in April adopted a resolution on the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party. I think that there was a direct and very necessary talk about the fate of the party at the plenum. A most crucial moment, and the watchword of the moment for the country's Communists could be the basic idea of the report delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: "The fate of perestroyka lies in the unity of the party."

[Yermolin] Today the existence of two Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committees on the republic's territory is a fact. How, under these conditions, will the Baltic Fleet political organs and party organizations build their work?

[Korniyenko] The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress itself had already rejected the attempts of a group of military delegates to draw attention to this question. We appealed to the presidium, but we never got an answer. It is not today and not through our fault that ties have begun to be cut back between the party organizations of the military units and the local party organizations. It was not yesterday that a considerable proportion of Lithuanian party members adopted the course toward alienation. I do not even mention the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]. The former patronage ties have been lost. For instance, Lithuanian youths no longer visit the patrol ship the "Komsomolets Litvy" on Komsomol travel passes. On the other hand, young people are frequently in the front lines of those who carry out insulting actions against the Soviet Armed Forces.... But everything I have said does not mean that we have broken off our links with the local population, including rank and file Communists. We have good relations with the labor collectives and with workers and collective farm members. The Lithuanian working people treat the military uniform with respect and good will. In alliance with the republic's working people and with all healthy forces of the Communist Party of Lithuania we shall continue to stand guard over socialism, maintaining defense might at the necessary level.

[Yermolin] Did you say this from the plenum rostrum?

[Korniyenko] Yes, I shared my alarm with the members of the party Central Committee and described the conditions under which we military men are having to fulfill our military duty to the Motherland.

[Yermolin] Anatoliy Ivanovich, the plenum has broken off its work. What was the cause?

[Korniyenko] This was caused by the need first of all to consult with the Lithuanian Communists and to hear opinions locally—in the workers' collectives—and to set forth our views on the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress in open communication, to bring, as they say, the position of the CPSU Central Committee and its concern to the broadest masses of the republic's Communists.

Ryzhkov Hopes for 'Turning Point' in New Year

LD2712231289 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] And so the New Year is approaching fast. What will it bring to all of us? What are we expecting from it? We all give different answers. This is how Nikolay Ryzhkov answered the question. He is the head of the Soviet Government, a man whose point of view is evidently competent [as heard] to every Soviet person.

[Begin Ryzhkov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] I would like the New Year to be easier than the past year, not only to my splendid family. I would like the new year to bring the Soviet people more happiness than the one that is leaving in the past days. We should inspire confidence in the people. Everything should be done to make people see the prospects, to make them feel the changes that are taking place in the country, especially in the social sphere. If 1990, as we have planned, will be a turning point, then that will be the realization of my dreams. I as the head of the government consider it my duty before the people to carry out this process. [end recording]

Gorbachev To Visit Lithuania 6-7 Jan

LD2812092389 Vilnius in Lithuanian to North America 0100 GMT 28 Dec 89

[From the "News About Lithuania" feature]

[Text] According to unofficial reports, the representatives of the CPSU Central Committee will arrive in Vilnius on the afternoon of 2 January. Mikhail Gorbachev himself will visit Lithuania on 6 and 7 January. This will be M. Gorbachev's first visit to Lithuania in almost 10 years.

Lithuanians React to Gorbachev Plenum Speech

LD2812050289 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2301 GMT 27 Dec 89

[From the video news broadcast to the Baltic states—live or recorded]

[Text] [Announcer Aleksandr Gurnov] The initiator of perestroyka—the CPSU—remains the leading and directing force of our society. Today the main news story for all communists was the speech of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev that was published in the newspapers, and the results of the CPSU Central Committee's plenum, which generally condemned the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party as being directed toward a split of the party and the undermining of perestroyka. The CPSU leadership is preparing to travel to Lithuania, but how are people there reacting to today's newspapers? Here is what our correspondents have reported:

Virtually the entire republic is focused upon the political events of the past few days; that is, the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU Central Committee plenum. A wave of meetings has once more arisen in Lithuania. Thousands of people went out onto the streets of Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda. Posters and sharp speeches contain words in support of the decisions of the 20th congress.

But our correspondent also conversed today with those people who did not go out to the meetings, with the workers and communists at the factories. Some of the communists, and they were represented at the Congress, favor remaining in the CPSU. All have attentively read the report of the general secretary at the plenum and note the balanced nature of it. People in the Republic are awaiting the meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

The sitting of the CPSU Central Committee plenum will be resumed after the leadership and Mikhail Sergeyevich visit Lithuania, meet with the communists, and meet with the workers. After that, a decision will be made.

My personal impression from the plenum's documents is that the Central Committee is adopting a firm position but is ready for a calm dialogue.

Brazauskas Comments

LD2712115289

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0800 GMT on 26 December carries a 14-minute report by Benas Rupeika in Moscow on the CPSU

Central Committee plenum. Rupeika says that he interviewed Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, "this morning" and adds that on 25 December Brazauskas had looked exhausted. The report continues with a recording of Rupeika's conversation with Brazauskas.

Brazauskas says that the day has been especially difficult. "I had hoped that this very difficult day would be over yesterday. But the discussion got stuck, and that is why this plenum continued today. However, the most important reason for continuing is to decide what should be done. Discussion could go on for a long time, but at some point a decision should be made. When the time comes to make a decision then one is faced with great difficulties."

Brazauskas continues: On the one hand, the matter is that we have made decisions. These decisions have been made public. These decisions have been adopted jointly according to all valid rules and regulations. Therefore, these decisions cannot be made invalid. On the other hand, these decisions violate the currently valid rules of the CPSU."

Speaking about possible ways to resolve this crisis Brazauskas says: "it is absolutely unrealistic that the newly elected Central Committee and the bureau of the Lithuanian Communist Party [CP] would be declared null and void. To recognize only the old structure is unrealistic either."

On the composition of the invited delegation A. Brazauskas says: "Despite my efforts to get other newly elected secretaries, Comrade Paleckis and Comrade Glaveckas, invited to the plenum, their invitation was not approved. This fact of course does not make the situation easier, perhaps it makes it more difficult."

Benas Rupeika voices his surprise that neither Estonaian nor Latvian CP leaders expressed support for the Lithuanian CP. Brazauskas replies: "Yes, indeed. I can say that there was nobody who directly expressed support. Well I would not like to dwell on the reasons why both Comrade Vyalyas and Vagris.... [changes thought] One has to be aware of the situation. I would not like to blame them, because both republics have their own specific probems and situations. Perhaps open support cannot be expected."

In conclusion Brazauskas says that he has felt the pulse of the republic and says that there is no direct threat to the republic.

Mixed Reaction Displayed

PM2812153689 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 3

[N. Lashkevich report under the rubric "News From the Republics": "A Time of Choice"]

[Text] Vilnius—It is no exaggeration to say that the whole of Lithuania is today living under the influence of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress and the CPSU Central Committee plenum. During the days of the plenum our correspondents' office was constantly receiving telephone calls from colleagues, acquaintances, and total strangers, who all asked one and the same question: "Is there any news from Moscow?" The radio was tuned to the frequency of the plenum and interviews on its progress and results were given by leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

There were rallies of many thousands of people in Vilnius, Kaunas, Shyaulyay, and other cities. An emergency session was held by the Sejm council of "Sajudis," which came in for so much criticism at the plenum. Communications workers were very busy during those days, sending some 3,000 telegrams from citizens to Moscow. And after the appeal by People's Deputy A. Chekuolis, on Lithuanian Television's evening news program, for support for the reorganized party, some Vilnius communications centers were working all night because of the huge influx of people.

On Tuesday evening, immediately on their arrival from Moscow, V. Berezov, second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, and B. Zaykauskas, former secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, met with journalists from republican and central newspapers accredited to Lithuania. They spoke about the content of the debates at the plenum, noted the critical tone of the speeches of the majority of Central Committee members, and announced the forthcoming visit to Lithuania by a CPSU Central Committee group and M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the party Central Committee, in order to study thoroughly and in detail the sociopolitical situation in the republic and to meet with [Lithuanian Communist Party] congress delegates, labor collectives, and representatives of various social organizations and movements. In V. Berezov's opinion, the plenum decisions reflect the desire to understand the situation in the republic and in the Lithuanian Communist Party.

The reaction in the republic to the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum is mixed. Thus, for instance, in order to determine the position of Communists more clearly, the idea of holding a partywide referendum is being put forward. Incidentally, this proposal was also made in a number of delegates' speeches at the congress itself, but at the time it did not meet with sufficient support. Now, however, when the CPSU Central Committee members have raised doubts as to the competence of the delegates to the republican Communists' congress to decide questions of such vital importance to the existence of the Lithuanian Communist Party on behalf of rank-and-file party members, and when opinions have been voiced at the plenum concerning moral pressure on the delegates, the possibility of a referendum, it is thought here, is by no means excluded. In any event, in the 3 months following the congress every Communist will be obliged to decide for himself personally the main question: Whom to join? With which party to associate his future: the autonomous Lithuanian Communist

Party, or the Lithuanian Communist Party within the CPSU? A highly dramatic question, to be frank, in particular for the Russian-speaking population who are party members, because it cannot be denied that the split in the party took place mainly on national lines...

Apart from the already familiar resolution and declaration of the congress, the program, and the statutes, the Lithuanian Communists' forum adopted a special statement. It notes, in part, that Lithuania's Communists, critically examining the party's past, condemn the mistakes in its policy and activity which had grave consequences for the Lithuanian people and state. Communists, the statement says, categorically dissociate themselves from those party members who committed crimes against the people and humanity, irrespective of the circumstances and the personal motives by which they were guided. An appeal is also published from the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress to Communists and working people of all nationalities and to all voters, which can with justice be called the Lithuanian Communist Party's election platform. It defines the Communist Party's aims—the creation of a Lithuanian statehood, a free, democratic, rule-of-law state, socialism for man, and a civil society. In the election period the Communists, having abandoned the "monopoly right to decide the future of Lithuania's inhabitants," will nominate to the republic Supreme Soviet people who are competent and attentive to every person's destiny, patriots and innovators. And the elections are not far off. It is less than 2 months to the day on which it will finally become clear what the distribution of political forces will be in the republican parliament and how fruitful the decisive step taken by Lithuania's Communists at the congress will prove to be.

CPSU Plenum Cited on Lithuanian CP Separatism

PM2712180089 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "The CPSU's International Unity"]

[Text] Throughout its history of nearly 100 years, our party has invariably been guided by the principle of internationalism. The CPSU sprang up as an organization of like-minded people, a voluntary association of the leading, most highly conscious representatives of the working class and the working people, irrespective of their nationality. The party resolutely rejects all restrictions based on nationality, parochialism, and corporate interest. It was, is, and will remain international in its composition, with a common Program and with Rules that are binding on all its members.

In laying the foundations of the new union state, Lenin constantly stressed the need for the utmost patience and caution on this matter, so as not to spoil things and arouse distrust, and so as to allow the distrust among nations and peoples that was engendered by the inhuman practice of oppression in czarist Russia to disappear. He noted that interethnic relations in the Soviet land should be based on full equality, sincerity, mutual respect, friendship, fraternal cooperation, and mutual understanding.

Unity of action on the basis of the principles of internationalism is particularly necessary now. There are many very serious obstacles in its path. One of the greatest dangers today is posed by manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, the exacerbation of interethnic relations, and attempts to kindle acute conflicts on this basis.

Soviet people view outbursts of interethnic conflict with anxiety and distress. We have reached the danger point, and we must stop there, put an end to discord and misunderstandings, and rule out the methods of pressure, blockades, and violence. Who, if not the Communists—members of the united Leninist party, should be the first to work toward purging the social atmosphere of the least manifestations of blind ferocity, national nihilism, and egotism. Who, if not the people who carry the card of a member of Lenin's party next to their hearts, should set an example in asserting humanity, sympathy, mutual respect, reason, and good will in resolving conflicts of any kind, however insoluble they may appear.

The CPSU platform "The Party's Nationalities Policy in Present Conditions," notes: "Communists should consider it their duty not to permit any demarcation on national grounds either in the party's ranks or in labor collectives and social organizations, and to combat manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, first and foremost in their own national milieu. Nationalist and chauvinist views and opinions are incompatible with membership of the CPSU." The CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum, at which this platform was adopted, rejected as unacceptable the ideas of federalism in the party's structure, and expressed the view that it should continue to be ideologically and organizationally united.

The majority of our country's Communists share this view. "In order successfully to resolve the complex and difficult tasks of renewing society," CPSU veterans A. Paulin, G. Arzhakov, S. Kylatchanov, and others, from Yakutsk, write to PRAVDA, "it is necessary today, perhaps more than ever before, to augment the party's forces and strengthen its unity. But there are people who strive to weaken the party and break its ranks. It is necessary to struggle resolutely and implacably against them, as Lenin struggled, teaching that 'the party cannot exist unless it wages an unconditional struggle against those who seek to eliminate it and destroy it, who do not recognize it, who repudiate it.'" "Attempts are now being made," N. Privalov, team leader at the Guryev administration of the "Tengizneftemontazh" Trust, writes, "to weaken the party by means of fragmentation, to split the CPSU into different national compartments. These attempts are not in society's interests."

All this, as was stressed at the CPSU Central Committee plenum, which examined questions connected with the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, determines the exceptionally crucial role of the CPSU at the present stage. As the initiator of perestroyka and the revolutionary renewal of society, the CPSU is also the guarantor of the success of the transformations that have begun and the implementation of the goals proclaimed. In guiding the processes of perestroyka and opposing everything that retards and delays those processes or deflects them from the chosen course, the party sees it as its task resolutely to renew its own structures and the style and methods of its work, and to strengthen its ideological and political influence on people's consciousness and on their deeds and actions. This requires activeness on the part of every party organization and unity of action by all CPSU detachments. Only thus—in a single formation, rallied by a common goal—can Communists fulfill their purpose of being the consolidating force in Soviet society.

The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, which basically proclaimed its separation from the CPSU, caused great concern in society. The documents of this congress are being presented as binding on all members of the republic's party organizations under the CPSU Rules, yet at the same time they themselves are fundamentally contrary to those rules.

This unprecedented decision is a step aimed not at the renewal of the CPSU, as the congress documents assert, but at an organizational and political break with the CPSU. It goes far beyond the bounds of intraparty relations, as the CPSU Central Committee plenum pointed out with the utmost frankness. Basically it strikes a blow against political reform, against our hopes and plans for the renewal of the socialist society in the spirit of humanism and democracy. The CPSU is being provoked to react in a way that could undermine many perestroyka processes. That is the assessment—sharp, but fair, on the whole—that the main bulk of the country's Communists and Soviet citizens have made of the position of the majority of participants in the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. In messages to the CPSU Central Committee and resolutions of party and workers' meetings they demand a principled assessment of these actions and vigorous measures to protect the party's unity.

Because they disagree with the decisions adopted at the congress, a group of congress delegates who adhere to the positions of an autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party within a CPSU that is undergoing renewal, in conjunction with representatives of a number of party organizations from Vilnius, Kaunas, and rural rayons, organized a Lithuanian Communist Party conference. A resolution and an appeal to the republic's Communists were adopted, and provisional leadership organs were elected. Thus two currents within the Lithuanian Communist Party have taken on an organizational form.

Having discussed the situation that has arisen since the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, the CPSU Central Committee plenum approved the assessments and conclusions contained in CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's report. Confidence was expressed that Lithuania's Communists and working people will receive with understanding the CPSU Central Committee's concern at the situation that has arisen in the republic's Communist Party.

It was deemed expedient for the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to visit Lithuania. A group of participants in the plenum consisting of members and candidate members of the Politburo, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, and members and candidate members of the Central Committee are to go there to meet with the republic's Communists, party organizations, and labor collectives.

Members of the CPSU's elected leadership organs, first secretaries of republican Communist Party Central Committees and kray and oblast party committees, and the entire aktiv are to take part in political work among Communists and the broad masses of the country's working people on the basis of the plenum materials. After this work it is planned to resume the CPSU Central Committee plenum session and adopt appropriate decisions.

The party thereby showed wisdom, consideration, and restraint in its approach to urgent problems, and an orientation toward political methods of working with the masses. It is opposed to strong-arm methods of resolving the complex situations that arise in the process of renewal, opposed to crude pressure on dissidents and hasty assessments and conclusions.

The Central Committee plenum stressed: The fate of perestroyka lies in the CPSU's unity.

It is the mission and duty of a Communist not to engage in name-calling or to whip up passions, but to analyze profoundly and promptly the causes of various social moods and centrifugal aspirations. It is necessary attentively to study the reason why the very idea of the Soviet federation was compromised, the seeds of distrust and bias against the central authorities were sown, and the intimidating image of the heavy "hand of Moscow" was created. Communists must not fail to see that this is the result of decades of Stalinist tyranny and gross distortion of the very meaning and shape of socialism in our country. It is their duty to do everything, with the support of the healthy forces within each nation, to clear away the accretions of the past and seek the realization of the potential opened up by perestroyka, the guarantees, autonomy, respectfulness, and freedom that it contributes to the sphere of interethnic relations.

Recent events and facts, which reflect the sharp exacerbation of interethnic contradictions, are an important reminder of the danger of Communists' forgetting their international duty. They show that party organizations lose out when and where they yield to pressure from nationalist and separatist forces and flirt with them. It is impermissible for Communists, still less leaders of party organizations, to show passivity and allow themselves to be swept along by events, losing their ability to see when the people's true interests are at stake and when they are replaced by different goals that are remote from the ideas and principles of perestroyka.

The ideological and political struggle in society has now become acute. It demands that Communists mobilize all their forces, knowledge, and experience. It demands considered and wise decisions. Every Communist's party character and the firmness of his ideological commitment are undergoing difficult tests. One cannot but be alarmed to find that by no means all party organizations have recognized the need to accelerate perestroyka processes in the sphere of intraparty relations. There are also indications of confusion in the face of the complex new problems and contradictions of a dynamically developing situation. Not everyone has managed to overcome the force of inertia and attempts to look back rather than forward and to return to the old ways and methods.

Perestroyka endows the concept of internationalism with new content and enriches it with modern ideas and common human values. Whereas formerly we have mainly paid attention to its international [mezhdunarodnyy] aspects, today particular significance is attached to the problems of the international [internatsionalnyy] cohesion of the peoples of our country and the cultivation of the sense of the USSR as our common home. That means the ability, on the part of the people of different nationalities who inhabit it, to listen and understand each other and respect the rights and interests of all nations and ethnic groups.

The integrating force of the ideas of perestroyka is capable of uniting in a single whole the energy and efforts of Communists of different nationalities. In unity lies the CPSU's strength and the guarantee of success in revolutionary transformations.

Lithuanian Government Registers Party Statute

LD2812114689 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 28 Dec 89

[Excerpts] At 1000 today the Lithuanian Council of Ministers Presidium began its session. Ceslovas Jursenas, a spokesman for the government, is on the telephone with a report on the sitting.

[Jursenas] I am phoning you from the session of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers Presidium and I would like, esteemed listeners, to break the main news urgently: The statute of the Lithuanian Communist Party has been registered. [passage omitted]

As there were no discussions, the statute was registered at precisely 1005 local time. [passage omitted]

Edmundas Balkinas has been appointed deputy chairman of the State Security Committee of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] by the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR. Henrikas Vaigauskas has been released from this post due to retirement.

Christmas Officially Celebrated in Lithuania

LD2512123189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 25 Dec 89

[Text] Today is not a working day in Lithuania. For the first time after a long interval, Christmas is officially being celebrated in the republic. This event is the center of attention of the mass media. In the afternoon there will be a theatrical performance around a sparkling Christmas tree in the center of the city.

Changes Made to Lithuanian Constitution

Article 50

90UN0386B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 10 Nov 89 p 1

[Lithuanian SSR law: "On Changing Article 50 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic hereby decrees:

Article 50 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR is promulgated as follows:

"Article 50. The Lithuanian SSR guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, religion or nonreligion and an equal right to investigate their convictions and views singly or together, to express them in a peaceful form, and to disseminate them.

"Nobody may force another individual or himself be forced to speak, conduct himself, or act against his conscience or convictions.

"State institutions, including training and educational institutions, are secular. In keeping with the procedure established by law these institutions cooperate with the church and other religious organizations in the matter of developing social morality.

"The church and other religious organizations are given the status of corporate bodies and are guaranteed the right to structure their activity independently."

[Signed] Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, V. Astrauskas.
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, L. Sabutis.
Vilnius, 3 November 1989

Article 57

90UN0386C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 10 Nov 89 p 1

[Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic law: "On Making a Change in Article 57 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic hereby decrees:

Part 2 of Article 57 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Lithuanian SSR is promulgated as follows:

"Citizens of the Lithuanian SSR are obliged to observe the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR and the laws in effect in the republic."

[Signed] Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, V. Astrauskas.
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, L. Sabutis.
Vilnius, 3 November 1989

Lithuanian 4 Nov Supreme Soviet Session Detailed

90UN0386G Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 5 Nov 89 p 1

[Text]

THIRD MEETING

The 14th session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th term continued its work on 4 November. The morning session was led by the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, Lenginas Shepetis.

Valeriyonas Kubilyus, a deputy and first secretary of the Kretingskiy Raykom of the Communist Party of Lithuania, on behalf of the secretariat of the session, informed the Supreme Soviet of of the requests and questions they had received from deputies and also the letters and appeals from citizens. The Supreme Soviet has received 415 letters, proposals, and telegrams from citizens, labor collectives, and social organizations. The secretariat of the session turned over all the personal and also the collective appeals from deputies and citizens to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers which, in turn, are making the corresponding decisions.

The floor was turned over the Kazimera Prunskena, a USSR people's deputy and deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers. She informed the Supreme Soviet of property relations of the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR. A draft declaration of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet was made public. The following people raised questions and spoke on the item of the agenda: Vitaus Statulyavinchyus, deputy, vice president of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences; Vladislovas Yankauskas, deputy, chairman of the state committee for statistics of the Lithuanian SSR; Kazimeras Antanavichyus, USSR people's deputy, section leader of the Institute of Economics of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences; Kazimeras Moteka, deputy, advocate of the Vilnius city legal consultation service No 1; and Egidiyus Bichkauskas, investigator for especially important cases of the Lithuanian SSR Procuracy.

Kazimera Prunskena, USSR people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, clarified certain aspects of property relations between the Lithuanian SSR and the USSR, coordinating the issue under discussion with the draft law on property in the Lithuanian SSR that is being prepared. The Supreme Soviet approved a commission for preparing this document.

The deputies adopted the declaration of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet by a majority of the votes.

The question of increasing the number of members of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet which was added to the agenda is being considered. The floor was turned over to the chairman of the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet, Vitautas Astrauskas. A draft decree was brought up for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet concerning adding the following deputies as members of the Presidium: Alfonsas Bernotas, chairman of the commission for legislative proposals of the Supreme Soviet, chairman of the ispolkom [executive committee] of the Ukmergskiy Rayon soviet; Vladislavas Domarkas, chairman of the commission of public education and culture of the Supreme Soviet, rector of the Kaunas Polytechnical Institute; Yustinas Martsinkyavinchyus, national poet of the Lithuanian SSR; Kazimeras Moteka, advocate of the Vilnius legal consultation service No 1; Romuldas Ozolas, editor-in-chief of the magazine ATGIMIMAS; Algirdas Zhukauskas, chairman of the planning and budget commission of the Supreme Soviet, vice president of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences. Additionally, Alfonsas Kayryalis, deputy and personal pensioner, suggested nominating as a candidate member of the presidium Algis Chuplinskas, a deputy and general director of the Sigma production association.

Because of the augmentation of the members of the Presidium, there was a partial change in Article 27 of the Regulations of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, according to which the chairmen of standing commissions may also be members of the Presidium.

The deputies decided to vote for each candidate individually. All the proposed candidates were elected members of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet by a majority of votes. A decree of the republic Supreme Soviet was adopted regarding this.

The question on the agenda of forming a commission for preparing a plan of action for restoring Lithuania's statehood was discussed. Alfonsas Zhalis, deputy and chairman of the ispolkom of the Klaipeda city soviet suggested instructing the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet to form a commission and inform them of its composition at the next session. The corresponding decree was adopted.

This item on the agenda was considered: Suspension on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR of the decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR government concerning questions of extending to individuals of certain categories benefits in providing housing. A report on this question was presented by Pyatras Ignotas, deputy and deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Participating in the discussion were: Povilas Morkunas, deputy, chairman of the ispolkom of the Shyulyay city soviet; Vitautas Chyapas, USSR people's deputy, docent at the Klaypeda faculty of the Shyaylyay Pedagogical Institute; and Kazimeras Anatavichyus, USSR people's deputy, section leader of the Institute of Economics of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences.

By a majority of votes it was decided to suspend the aforementioned decrees on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR.

Romualdas Ozolas, deputy and editor-in-chief of the newspaper ATGIMIMAS, suggested to the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet that it form a commission for supervising the establishment of the status of the higher schools and also for the Presidium in conjunction with the permanent commissions to consider the status of Vilnius University and, as an exception, present it for the approval of the republic Supreme Soviet.

After the discussions a decree was adopted to instruct the Presidium of the republic Supreme Soviet to form a commission to consider the establishment of the status of all VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and submit its conclusions to the Presidium.

At the suggestion of deputy Algimantas Brazaytis, participants in the session adopted a decree to form a commission for preliminary consideration of deputies' requests.

Vitautas Statulyavichyus, deputy and vice president of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences, spoke. He suggested considering the issue of direct elections of the republic's president and also revising the provisions of the Lithuanian SSR Constitution concerning the release of deputies of the Supreme Soviet from performing their immediate duties. These proposals were turned over to the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet.

Participants in the session were addressed by Mindaugas Stakvilyavichyus, USSR people's deputy and first secretary of the Shyaulyay gorkom [city committee] of the Communist Party of Lithuania, who suggested discussing the possibility of moving the elections to local soviets up to earlier dates. Having given clarifications regarding this question, the chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet vitautas Astrauskas reported that a new date for elections to local soviets is being discussed in the presidium and a report on this would be given to the Supreme Soviet at the next session.

FOURTH MEETING

The last point on the agenda was discussed—answers to requests and questions from deputies.

Mariyonas Viskavichyus, USSR people's deputy, equipment operator at the Ionav Azot production association complained to the ministries and departments about the fact that the requests and proposals from the deputies were not being given comprehensive consideration and incomplete answers were being given.

The requests and questions from the deputies were answered and information was given by: Yuozas Ashembergas, chairman of the state committee of the Lithuanian SSR for production and technical support for the agroindustrial complex; Algirdas Vileykis, deputy, chairman of the ispolkom of the Vilnius gorsovet; Ionas Prapestis, deputy chairman of the state commission for investigating the circumstances of the events of 1941 and other events, docent of the legal faculty of Vilnius University. Concerning the work of the deputy commission that studied the demands of the committee for saving political prisoners—Lenginas Shepetis, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet and Yuriy Rusenko, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet. Concerning the work of the commission for considering the economic and social problems of the village of Snechkuo—Gennadiy Konoplev, USSR people's deputy; Vitautas Sakalauskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, Vidutis Barauskas, Lithuanian SSR procurator; Genrikas Zabulis, deputy, Lithuanian SSR minister of education; and Domiyonas Shnyukas, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR state committee for television and radio.

Romuldas Ozolas, deputy and editor-in-chief of the newspaper ATGIMIMAS, drew attention to blocking the path to the possible destruction of certain archive documents and suggested that a decree be adopted regarding this issue. After the discussion the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet was instructed to consider this problem and inform the Supreme Soviet of the results at the next session.

The appropriate decrees and instructions were adopted concerning the questions and requests of the deputies.

The chairman will familiarize the members with the requests and questions received from the deputies at the current session.

With this the 14th session of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th term completed its work.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Opens 27 Dec

Economic Issues Discussed

LD2712230189 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Riga December 27 TASS—Starting from January 1, the Republic of Latvia will live in conditions of economic independence. This fact was reflected in the agenda of the session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet that opened here today. Thirty two items are to be discussed, mostly draft laws expanding the rights of local government and economic management bodies, as well as the articles of the constitution dealing with the status of public organisations.

At the first sitting the deputies again analysed the republic's plan and budget for the coming year whose draft versions passed only the first reading at the previous session. Opinions expressed there were taken into consideration during the finishing of the documents.

The session approved the 1990 budget. To cover its deficit, it permitted a republican internal loan. Deputies' commissions did not agree with the government's proposal to raise prices of alcoholic drinks and tobacco goods.

The session discussed the government's proposals on changing the structure of management bodies. It was deemed expedient to create a Ministry of Economy on the basis of the Latvian Planning Committee, the Committee for Prices and the Committee for Labour Resources and to assign to it the task of strategic, long-term planning. Changes also affected other branches.

The discussion ended with the adoption of a programme for the coming year in which the priority is attached to agriculture. The volume of food supplies to the republican reserve was determined. Supplies to the all-union reserve will be carried out proceeding from the volume of concentrated fodder received by the republic.

Agenda Viewed; Demonstration Reported

PM2712205089 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Dec 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent I. Litvinova report under the rubric "Sessions of the Union Republic Supreme Soviets": "The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)"]

[Text] Riga—On 26 December, on the eve of the opening of the 14th session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, a youth demonstration was held in Riga. The main demand was the immediate adoption of a law on alternative army service. "Red Army, go home!"—demonstrators chanted, in English, outside the headquarters of the Baltic Military District and the republican military commissariat. A discussion of a law on alternative service is not on the agenda for the session. Nor could it be: Under a decision of the previous, 13th, session a special commission is due to finish work in a few days' time on a draft law, and submit it for nationwide discussion.

The session, which opened on 27 December, will discuss questions of great importance for the republic. Among them are a repeat examination of the plan and budget for next year and a discussion of the people's self-management system, and the adoption of corresponding laws. It is proposed to go over to a two-tier administrative system of people's self-management in Latvia from 1 January. The first level consists of volosts, settlements, and rayon cities, and the second—rayons and republican cities. Under the new laws, the rights of local organs of power are extended considerably.

The laws on self-management, like the laws on taxes, banks, budget rights, and the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, which are due to be examined at the session, will help to implement the republican government's action plan for the transitional period of the switch to economic autonomy.

In order to provide the inhabitants of Latvia with food products, the Supreme Soviet is to approve guaranteed volumes for deliveries of meat, milk, and dairy products to the republic's market stocks. Deliveries of meat, milk, and eggs to the all-union stocks will be directly linked to the quantity of feed concentrates received from there. An exchange rate has been set—1:1 for milk, 1:10 for meat, 1:0.2 for eggs.

Questions of amending Article 6 of the republic's Constitution and a new flag, emblem, and anthem are on the agenda for the session.

USSR people's deputies proposed that the Law on Constitutional Oversight in the USSR be submitted to the session for approval.

The session continues.

New Ministers Named

LD2812100789 Riga in Latvian to Europe
2130 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Excerpts] The 14th session of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation began its work in Riga this morning. [passage omitted]

The morning sitting ended with a debate on the question of changes in the system of the republic's state administration organs and in the Latvian SSR Government. New ministers were confirmed. The session confirmed Eizens Pocs as Latvian SSR minister of foreign affairs, Janis Abolitins as minister of the economy, Daints Gegeris as minister of agriculture, and Raimonds Pauls as Latvian SSR minister of culture. [passage omitted]

In addition, the question of changing Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Latvian SSR Constitution, thereby divesting the Communist Party of its right to a monopoly of power, is included in the agenda of the session. Voting on the changes in the Constitution will take place tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Latvian Radio Editor on Current Concerns

LD2712230489 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1430 GMT 27 Dec 89

[From the "News from Latvia" program; commentary by Latvian Radio editor Viktor Srudrits]

[Text] Strange as it may be, the more important events for the republic have been taking place outside its borders. First, there is the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and although the deputies from the republic did not deliver loud speeches, if one can put it like that, nevertheless, the speeches by Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, and the commentaries by our jurists I think have had their effect. Only on the issue of the Soviet-German agreements and actions of 1939 and 1941 did passions flare up, and although the issue is more of a symbolic one, nevertheless the recognition of historical truth, however bitter it may be, had a powerful psychological effect and the deputies from Latvia played not an inconsiderable role in this.

Since the deputies' return home, there have already been meetings and press conferences. At these the invisible struggle and the behind-the-scenes political play at the congress unfolds more fully. The voters are learning what the journalists covering the congress missed. For example, at a press conference in Riga yesterday, a talk about the role of Ligachev in the Tbilisi events provoked special interest.

The second thing which has most concerned the inhabitants of Latvia is the progress of the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Although the Lithuanian question was being discussed there, soon, or rather on 5 January a plenum of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will be heard at which evidently the issue of the independence of the Communist Party will also be resolved, all the more so since man primary and rayon party organizations regard this as the most important issue. The mood of some of the Communists in the republic was expressed by Ivars Stesbers, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, in his interview for a correspondent of the LATINFORM news agency. He said that the status of the Latvian Communist Party in the 85 years of its history has usually, in its basic features, corresponded to the state-status of Latvia. Elaborating a program of actions on the path toward the sovereignty of Latvia, those taking part in the Central Committee plenum took account of the declaration on the state sovereignty of Latvia adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet, and the popular support for its independence. This is not only a goal but a means. Only the status of an independent political organization, in my view, will make it possible for the Latvian Communist Party to implement a policy which corresponds with the interests of Latvia. Only this will provide the opportunity to aspire to the role of a real political force in the republic. This is what the secretary of the Latvian Communist Party says, but is also what the majority of the inhabitants of the republic probably think.

If we return all the same to the events in Moscow. It is interesting what prompted the CPSU Central Committee to so hastily organize a plenum so secret that even we in the radio were forced to get more detailed information not from Moscow, but from our correspondent in Lithuania.

Well, although the issues has not yet been exhausted and all kinds of unexpected things are possible, all the same, today in Riga, a routing session of the republic's Supreme Soviet began its work. On the agenda are such important issues as the discussion of the draft law on local self-government and the adoption of the plan and budget for 1990. Incidentally, this is already the second reading of the economic development draft which testifies to the fact that the deputies of the republic's parliament have a most serious attitude toward economics on the basis of political, material, and even moral independence.

Lastly, on 25 December, after a break of almost half a century, Christmas was celebrated in Latvia, and this has now become an official state holiday from this year.

Throughout the republic there were charitable actions and festivies, and despite the empty shelves in the shops and the social and political problems, in almost every home, if only for an hour, if only for a moment, there burned a small flame of conciliation and hope.

Estonia To Press for Independent State

LD2412113689

[Editorial Report] Talinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1800 GMT on 23 December carries a 3-minute report by political observer Raul Malk, who begins by saying that on 26 December, apart from the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenum continuing, an extended meeting of the People's Front Council will also take place. On 27 December when the Supreme Soviet continues its sitting, the consultative council attached to the People's Front will also meet.

Malk says that on 23 December a second conference of the all-republican cooperation teams took place to discuss cooperation in respect of the forthcoming Supreme Soviet elections at the local level. The conference views restoration of an independent Estonian state as a foundation for solving existing problems, and the role of the yet to be elected Supreme Soviet as a mediator with the Soviet Union in this context. The conference wants to set up a republican election union. Malk concludes: "What was decided today will definitely put pressure upon the forthcoming meetings of the People's Front and the consultative Council."

Estonian Trade Union Congress Abolishes Council

LD2212142489 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 21 Dec 89

[Summary] The 20th Congress of Estonian Trade Unions suspended its work today until 12 April. The Congress considered the Estonian SSR Trade Union

Council as having ceased to exist. From 1 January 1990, no monies will be transferred to the all-union trade union organization.

Until 12 April, the central trade union body in Estonia will be the Congress Presidium. Siim Kallas was elected its chairman.

He says: "In the future there will be a Central Assembly set up on the basis of republican committees and republican assemblies and they will then discuss how the Central Assembly should be put together. That was another reason why I was very much in favor of this idea not to disperse in order to come together again; in that case we might not get the thing off the ground for another 10 years. Well, I would say that this is a difficult process and it will not take off all that easily. I imagine that it will take quite a while before this turnabout will reach primary organizations, because the true change will indeed occur when being a trade union member ceases to be compulsory and will become voluntary. Well, then, by that time it will begin to become clear if we are needed, if we have the trust of the people or not, and then only the true change of this kind will begin."

Estonian Budget Rejected on Agriculture Issue

LD2712225689 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Summary from poor reception] Today's Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet session did not adopt the budget for 1990 because the procurement prices of agricultural produce do not correspond to their production costs. It would take more than R200 million to raise the procurement prices, a member of the commission of experts said.

Vello Lind, deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Agroindustrial Committee said: "I have stressed this repeatedly, and it was of particular importance today: Estonia must not go down to the level of Pskov and Novgorod Oblasts. We must not make mistakes of the sort that the big Soviet Union [word indistinct]. Today the esteemed people's deputies had enough sense not to adopt the budget in the form it was presented." Tonight a solution will be sought to the problem.

The session will continue at 0900 tomorrow.

Estonian Budget Sent to Supreme Soviet Commissions

LD2712224989 Moscow TASS in English 2031 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Tallin December 27 ETA-TASS—The 13th session of the Eleventh Estonian Supreme Soviet was continued today. The question of the economic policy of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1990 and the draft state budget for 1990 was high on the agenda of the session.

Since January 1, the republic will be living in conditions of economic autonomy, which presupposes totally new approaches to national economic management, including forming the republic's budget and its relationship with the Union budget. The process of drafting the budget, which differed from the way it was drafted in previous years, was caused also by the grave state of the economy and finances.

The draft envisages several rather tough measures to reinforce the budget, including the excise on alcohol and tobacco products. Deputies turned down the draft budget for 1990, which was proposed by the republic's government. It was passed to commissions and experts for consideration and the parliament will return to its discussion tomorrow, December 28.

The Supreme Soviet endorsed the appointment of district elders and mayors of the republican cities—this is how chairmen of district and municipal executive committees will be called under the new administrative structure in Estonia. Deputies also discussed several other issues.

Estonian Party Official Views Political Scene

WA2712202389 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 2

[Interview with Estonian Communist Party sector chief R. Palmaru conducted by N. Kuznetsova: "Time for Serious Politics"]

[Text] Our newspaper endeavors to consistently familiarize its readers with the processes occurring in the republic and the positions and viewpoints of party officials, politicians and representatives of various movements and organizations so that the readers may acquire a fuller picture of Estonia's social and political life.

Today a SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA correspondent talks with R. Palmaru, sector chief of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Kuznetsova] Your viewpoint, Rayvo, on the processes occurring in the republic are of particular interest inasmuch as you head in the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee the sector which is called analysis and forecasting of the ideological situation.

[Palmaru] I would say that both analyzing and forecasting are now very complex inasmuch as the situation is changing impetuously. The atmosphere is complex not only in our republic, it is complex in the country also. Economic difficulties have caused an abrupt radicalization of public opinion. The struggle between supporters and opponents of perestroyka has intensified. In the center particularly. This cannot fail to be reflected with us also. Although the political struggle in the republic is taking place on a somewhat different basis.

The alignment of political forces has shown itself more distinctly recently. "Muynsuskaytse" (the Society for the Protection of Ancient Monuments) and the PNNE [Estonian National Independence Party] and the Christian

Union connected with this bloc have proven to be surprisingly strong. What we supposed from the very outset has been ascertained: this entire movement of citizens' committees and the gambit involving citizens' registration—all this is aimed by no means at the restoration of the bourgeois republic.

[Kuznetsova] What then? How would you in general describe this movement?

[Palmaru] I agree with many of their opinions. With their moral opinions primarily. With the evaluation of 1940, for example. As far as their actual aim is concerned, this is, I believe, the creation of a social base for their organization and the broadening and strengthening of its influence. The recent television appearance of "Muynsuskaytse" leader T. Velliste confirmed this.

There are quite a lot of various movements and political organizations in Estonia. But it is a small society. So it is that a struggle for influence, for support, for a social base, that is, for people, is under way.

Declaring oneself a party or a movement is easy. But you only become a real force when people follow you...

[Kuznetsova] So the real aim...

[Palmaru] ...is participation in the election struggle. Accession to power via the Supreme Soviet. The creation of a "third republic," to employ People's Front terminology.

[Kuznetsova] Here also this bloc is linking up with the PF [People's Front], although it is quite sharply criticized in the People's Front's election platform....

[Palmaru] You see, as a consequence of democratization generally a situation has come about, it seems to me, where politicians' actions are determined by public opinion, although no one says this directly, of course. However, if a politician is asked what he contemplates doing in the future, he will answer that this depends on public opinion. And were he not to answer in this way, he could not, I believe, be a politician. The public movements also need to be evaluated from this viewpoint.

The People's Front is as yet the generally acknowledged leader of public opinion. But it has recently been experiencing a serious crisis, it seems to me. Public opinion locally has swung toward "Muynsuskaytse"—the PNNE, this bloc.

[Kuznetsova] And the People's Front's election platform was designed to restore support to this movement?

[Palmaru] Yes. With their election platform the leaders of the People's Front have changed policy in the direction of radicalization. But they have made a number of serious mistakes here, I believe.

What are they? Well, first, their vision of the political map of Estonia is somewhat artless, I would say: we in the center, some to the right, others to the left... The sole allies are the Estonian Workforce Council and small lawyer, physician and so forth organizations.

But I, for example, am firmly of the opinion that no movement in Estonia can achieve anything in isolation. The aims of virtually all the perestroyka forces in the republic essentially coincide. The sole path in the present situation is democratization. Here is a solution which could suit everyone, I refer to the national groups also. After all, the solution of many of the problems of non-Estonians lies on this path also.

[Kuznetsova] Yes. Progress can only be made together—we are all having a great deal to say about this currently. But, you will agree, much has already been done in practice to alienate the nonindigenous population.

[Palmaru] This is so, unfortunately. And I believe that it is a question here of many processes being accompanied and embellished by emotional surges, the roots of which lie in the past. But the time for emotions is past. The time has come for serious politics. Owing, apparently, to a certain inexperience, people are, however, behaving in a narrow party manner, if it may be so put. This applies to all movements: we alone, and no one else. This, incidentally, is one of the most flagrant errors of the People's Front's election platform.

Another of their mistakes is the fact that they have set course toward a social democratic party. Throughout the world social democratic parties have a certain social basis. This is mainly the urban strata. It does not include, for example, rural people. And the fact that by its election platform the People's Front has antagonized rural inhabitants was confirmed, for example, by the fact that almost immediately following promulgation of this platform the Agrarian Union met. This was a reaction to the error.

[Kuznetsova] And if you were a People's Front politician?

[Palmaru] I would obviously have sooner set course toward the formation of a popular party or something of this sort... The People's Front lacks a serious agrarian program. Yet this is very important today. The director of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Farming and Reclamation Scientific Research Institute spoke well, incidentally, in Saku when he said that many of the reformers of the countryside currently were like the revolutionaries of 1905, who called for the torching of the manorial estates, and then, as they said, we would all begin to live abundantly, like the landowners. The estates were torched, but there was no better living because of this. What do I mean to say here? Professional approaches are needed. In politics, in economics and in reformation generally.

[Kuznetsova] To speak of the People's Front in this respect, it has to be noted that it lacks a "Russian program" also, that is, a program for the nonindigenous population...

[Palmaru] Yes. The People's Front is being criticized currently on all sides. They remain essentially alone. But it needs to be understood also that the People's Front has a certain niche in society. And it is not objectively in our interests for it to cease to exist. Unless we wish people to swing to extremes, to extremism. In this situation the People's Front should be supported even, I believe. Perhaps they laid too much store by their popularity. Until recently even they were hoping to obtain approximately 70 percent of the seats in the future Supreme Soviet. But this was unrealistic arithmetic. You see, politics is now becoming an exact science. And many things now simply have to be tallied precisely.

[Kuznetsova] But let us return to the problems of the Russian-speaking population...

[Palmaru] These are complex problems. But once again it should be said that if some people believe that questions of Estonia's further development may be tackled without the participation of the nonindigenous population, they are very crudely mistaken.

[Kuznetsova] But how against the background of these affirmations does the proposal of a leader of the republic concerning the introduction of a 15-year qualification for the elections appear? Or the publication of the draft immigration law? We are currently receiving many letters in this connection.

[Palmaru] As far as this draft law is concerned, I simply do not know how it could have appeared in the press. As far as I know, the leader of the working group knew nothing of this.

[Kuznetsova] But he did not, after all, display anger, he did not renounce it...

[Palmaru] This is simply three people's opinion. There could have been another opinion also... Although, I believe, a short-sighted policy was displayed here. I would call this walking on the carpet with dirty shoes.

[Kuznetsova] Publication of this draft?

[Palmaru] Yes. As far as the residence qualification is concerned, here things are more complicated. Sociological surveys show that 80 percent of Estonians consider the 15-year qualification legitimate. On the other hand, 60 percent of the Russian-speaking population is sure that everyone who is a permanent resident of the republic should have the right of choice. Sharply opposed opinions, as we can see. And there can be no compromise here. There has, consequently, simply to be a political maneuver.

I, for example, believe that the introduction of temporary citizenship could be such a maneuver. For 10 years, say. And those who live here these 10 years would then acquire permanent citizenship, and with it strong social guarantees also. This would be unusual. But so are many of the processes occurring in the world currently. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR, for example. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it is hard, I believe, for many representatives of the Russian-speaking population to accept this. The way of thinking in a large nation is different.

[Kuznetsova] And in this connection how would you describe the movements of the Russian-speaking population?

[Palmaru] The Intermovement has, I believe, a strong, albeit small, social base. It is not diminishing and not developing, it simply exists and holds. This is what I would say.

As far as the United Workforce Council is concerned, there is a marked aspiration on the part of certain leaders, unfortunately, to rapprochement with the United Workers Front. And I would not say that this is a progressive movement. It is not opposed to Gorbachev but it is aimed against democratic people, and consequently, objectively, against Gorbachev also.

I know certain people in the leadership of the United Workforce Council, they are of a democratic frame of mind and could be allies of a democratic bloc. I believe generally that such a bloc—a bloc of democratic forces—must be formed before the elections to the republic Supreme Soviet.

It could incorporate the Estonian Communist Party, the "greens," the United Workforce Council, the Workforce Council and the People's Front. I would view the October Interfront hopefully also.

[Kuznetsova] It recently declared itself a democratic party...

[Palmaru] Yes. I generally know quite many democratically minded people in the Russian-speaking community. I sometimes concur in my thoughts and evaluations more with them even than with certain Estonians.

[Kuznetsova] And how would you define the Estonian Communist Party's position against this complex, patchwork background of Estonia's political map?

[Palmaru] The situation is currently complex here, of course. Since October 1940, perhaps earlier, the Estonian Communist Party has been an obedient instrument in the hands of the central authorities and the political system created by Stalin. This could not have failed to have been reflected in Estonians' attitude toward the party, which was reflected, incidentally, in the composition of the Estonian Communist Party also. After all, it was only in the mid-1960's that the proportion of Estonians in the Estonian Communist Party increased. This was when the younger generation deemed it possible via the party to change the situation in the republic. But when attempts to do something and change policy proved futile, disenchantment set in. The proportion of Estonians in the party declined once again.

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum was pivotal in the sense that attempts were made to turn policy toward Estonia and its interests. But it has remained dualistic, for all that. It is because the Estonian Communist Party has acted too cautiously that it has been unable to unite around it many people in the republic. Ties to the center have proved too strong. But this cannot go on. The situation is such that we have to tackle many problems ourselves, without backward glances at the center. Here is just one example. We are both journalists and know that some hacks are now leaving for the independent papers which are being newly created, where the pay is higher and conditions better. What is the position of party journalists against this background? But we are not allowed to increase their wages. Is this right? The same, for example, with money for the election campaign. The public movements are currently investing big money in this. And once again we cannot decide this question independently.

The Estonian Communist Party must, in my view, effect an abrupt change toward increased independence. There is no other solution.

[Kuznetsova] It is here that we have the main knot of disagreements... Independence up to what limit? Should the Estonian Communist Party remain part of the CPSU? What is your position here?

[Palmaru] Yes. Part of the CPSU. But as an independent organization. And this is recorded in the draft action program on which we have worked and which has been submitted for discussion.

[Kuznetsova] And, finally, a question which has to be put to you, a party ideology official—that of Article 6. Of course, arguments about this are going on throughout the country. But there repeal of Article 6 means primarily a diminution in the power of the apparatus, but with us, a multiparty system... What is your viewpoint?

[Palmaru] Repeal of Article 6 is inevitable. But the question generally is not about just this article. Without a multiparty system there is no democracy. I believe that the main problem with us is that of a coalition of progressive forces in order that the best people of the republic might enter the Supreme Soviet and make it sovereign.

Many people here are currently talking about the Hungarian version. A month, 6 weeks ago I also was delighted with this turn of events and believed that we should be taking this route. But now I am more guarded and believe that this would be unadvisable. After all, in Hungary many people have left the old party, but have not rehabilitated themselves in the new one. So there is food for thought here.

The question of the party generally is the key issue of perestroyka. How the governing party behaves, so will processes in society develop.

Parliament, Party Meetings in Minsk, Riga, Karelia

LD2712111789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] An hour ago, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia started work. Those taking part will discuss the platform of the Communist Party of Belorussia for the election of Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic people's deputies and local soviets of the republic.

In Riga, the 13th session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is continuing. On its agenda are draft laws on taxation, banks, on the regulations for import and export of goods, and also the confirmation of elders of districts [uyezd] and of mayors of towns.

In habitants of Karelia are awaiting with special attention the start of work of the extraordinary 15th session of the autonomous republic Supreme Soviet. An organizational question, which was announced previously, will be discussed. The session is to examine the requests for retirement of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Karelia, and also the candidacies for the expected vacancies. Five party, soviet, and economic workers have been nominated for these posts for the first time. They are all widely known and enjoy prestige as active supporters of perestroyka. The local press is publishing a list, the biographies and programs of the candidates, and responses and greetings to them.

Belorussian Party Adopts Election Platform

LD2712215189 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] The platform of the Belorussian party organization for the coming elections of people's deputies was adopted at the republic's Communist Party Central Committee plenum today. The Communist Party of Belorussia, the document notes, decisively opposes the federalization of the CPSU and advocates a sole and organized unification of its ranks and the approval of new approaches in cadre policies on the basis of equal opportunities, with the nomination of representatives of all strata of the population to leading posts. Special attention was devoted to the role and place of communists in the process of the republic's transfer to economic management methods on the principles of self-financing and the provision of sovereignty to the local soviets. The adopted platform seeks the further democratization of internal party life and the strengthening of links with all social movements that are striving not in words but in deeds to extend perestroyka.

Plenum Opposes 'Federalization'

PM2712205489 Moscow PRAVDA in Russia n 28 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[Report by PRAVDA correspondents A. Simurov, A. Ulitenok: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Minsk, 27 Dec—The Belorussian Communist Party platform for the forthcoming elections of people's deputies was adopted at a plenum of the republic Communist Party Central Committee held today.

Belorussia's Communists, the document notes, come out resolutely against the federalization of the CPSU and for the ideological and organizational rallying of its ranks. The plenum participants approved the assessments and conclusions contained in the report of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum held the other day, which examined questions connected with the decisions of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. The members of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee called on Lithuania's Communists to find the strength and courage to reject the decision adopted, which leads into the impasse of separatism.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report at the plenum.

Orthodox Church To Negotiate With Vatican

AU2712155189 Paris AFP in English 1532 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Excerpts] Moscow, Dec 27 (AFP)—The Russian Orthodox Church is to negotiate with the Vatican next month over the occupation of several of its churches by Ukrainian Catholics, known as Uniates, Orthodox Archbishop Kyril said here Wednesday.

A Vatican delegation would be in Moscow from January 14 to 17, to discuss the issue, the church spokesman told a news conference here.

The talks come after the Orthodox Church broke off scheduled negotiations with the Roman Catholic Church here last month after Uniates took over orthodox churches in the western Ukraine.

The Russian church's move came just before an historic audience at the Vatican between Pope John Paul II and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The archbishop said the Orthodox Church would be prepared to envisage the legalisation of the Uniate Church, to which much of the population of the Soviet republic of the Ukraine belong despite a ban by Stalin in 1946.

"We must give the Catholics of the Ukraine the opportunity to practise their religion", Archbishop Kyril told the press conference at the Danilov monastery here. He was speaking in the presence of Philaret, the Orthodox Metropolitan of Moscow.

The Uniate Church was incorporated by force into the official church by Stalin, who confiscated all their churches and handed them over to the Orthodox Church. [Passage omitted]

Archbishop Kyril, spokesman on foreign affairs for the Orthodox Church, said his church wished to discuss the matter with the Vatican "despite the violent action" of the Uniates in the Ukraine where the situation was "getting worse".

"The Orthodox community in Lvov only controls four out of the 19 churches in the city", Archbishop Kyril said. He deplored a lack of support by local officials who, he said, had handed over a cathedral to the Uniates on December 21.

Ukrainian Catholicism is closely related to Roman Catholicism but observes oriental rites. It has more than four million followers in the Ukraine, according to Vatican estimates.

The Vatican and Orthodox Church had held two earlier rounds of negotiations on the Uniate Church's legalisation, before the Russian hierarchy suspended the talks because of the church occupations.

Ukrainian Election Campaign Underway

LD2712215289 Kiev in English to North America 0030 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Excerpts] The election campaign for deputy mandates continues in the Ukraine. As we have informed you, the elections to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme and local soviets will be held on 4 March 1990. But even now one can say that the current election struggle advantageously differs from the previous one. My colleague Andriy Kovalchuk, Radio Kiev's reporter, shares my way of thinking:

[Kovalchuk] Of course there are lots of extraordinary and sometimes unexpectable things in the selection campaigns. Judge for yourselves: Lately many work collectives nominate mostly executives of different ranks to be candidates for people deputies, and I have the following figures to prove this information: In the Ukrainian SSR 1,300 candidates for people deputies of the Ukrainian SSR are already known. It means three pretenders for each mandate, and the party and soviet leaders, as well as industrial executives, are the majority among these contenders. The number of collective farmers makes up 13 percent; women less than 6 percent; workers account for some 5 percent; and representatives of youth less than 1 percent. Of course it is very good that people with rich practical experience will enter the higher legislative body of this republic, the people who know not only the reasons for economic and social problems, but the ways out of the situation. However, it is possible that among these people there are those who created such problems. That is why many voters are very anxious.

But there are voters who don't share this anxiety. For example, at the Chernihiv mechanic factory voters nominated their director and a metal worker to run for deputy. The latter lost only because he is a worker. Even his friend Gorbachenko didn't want to vote for metal workers. [passage omitted]

Kiev Rally Honors Sakharov, Appeals to Romania

LD2712092789 Kiev in English to North America 0030 GMT 25 Dec 89

[Text] A meeting in memory of Andrey Sakharov was held in Kiev today upon the initiative of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka]. Our correspondent reports:

[Unidentified reporter] About 40,000 Kievites and guests of the city gathered on one of the squares in downtown city. They represented almost all the public and political associations and movements. Taking part were also government and party leaders. The floor was given to Hulchevskyy, representative of the Ukrainian Language Society.

[Begin Hulchevskyy recording in Ukrainian with superimposed English translation] Citizens of Kiev, people of Ukraine. Nine days have passed since the day of death of Andrey Sakharov. Forty more days will pass, decades will pass and the world will enter the 21st century, but the name of Andrey Sakharov will never be forgotten. One can either share or not share the views of Andrey Sakharov, but one cannot but appreciate his sincerity and his principled stand. He died only several days before actually the last in Europe Stalinist regime was toppled in Romania, whose people embarked on the road of freedom.

I'd like to read an appeal to the people of Romania: "Fraternal people of Romania, we Kievites and guests of the city wholeheartedly welcome you with a liberation from the dictatorship of pseudosocialist usurper Ceausescu and his clique. We pay tributes to the memory of fathers and sons and daughters of Romania of all nationalities who died in the struggle against the dictatorship. [end recording]

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet To Meet 29 Dec

NC2712141289 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree on convening the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet:

The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a decision to change the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree, dated 24 November 1989, in order to call the 11th session of the 11th convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet in Baku on 29 December 1989.

[Signed] El'mira Kafarova, Chairwoman of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
Refiga Kaziyeva, Secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
Baku City, 23 December 1989.

Azerbaijan KGB Collegium Examines Situation

NC2712155889 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 26 Dec 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The collegium of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Committee for State Security [KGB] has examined the situation in the republic and the contribution of the organs affiliated with the committee in the work that is being carried out to normalize the situation. The collegium noted that the antireconstruction forces and (?forces opposed to restructuring in state and social establishments) are challenging the unity of society's steadfast forces. Antisocial forces and [words indistinct] greatly benefit from the (?situation) with the aim of creating a lack of confidence among the people toward the policy pursued by the CPSU and the measures being put into effect to stabilize the situation.

All this creates indignation among the people. Citizens frequently lodge complaints with the KGB organs and make appeals containing demands to the organs.

In view of this, the collegium of the Azerbaijan SSR KGB makes it known that the republic's [word indistinct] are taking every measure necessary to protect the constitutional restructuring and the rights and freedoms of the citizens, stabilize the situation, and prevent interethnic discord.

The newspapers today published detailed information on the collegium's meeting.

Azerbaijan Komsomol Plenum Discusses NKAO

NC2812110589 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 23 Dec 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] Today the newspapers published a report on the seventh plenum of the Azerbaijan Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]. The plenum heard a report by Sahib Alekperov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, on the situation of the Azerbaijan Komsomol and the current [word indistinct].

The report and the speeches made during the plenum discussed in depth problems with which the Komsomol members and the youths have to deal as a result of the republic's social and political situation. With deep emotion and uneasiness the meeting participants expressed their views on the incidents in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and on the worsening interethnic relations in the republic.

The resolution adopted called for internationalism, an effort to establish a dialogue and mutual reconciliation, [words indistinct] and respect for the rights of all nationalities. The resolution also stressed the need to resist nationalist and chauvinist activities.

The plenum examined the [word indistinct] of the students, established the way the delegates to the 21st Congress of the All-Union Komsomol will be elected, prepared the (?files) for the election of representatives from the republic's Komsomol to the central election organs of the All-Union Komsomol, and discussed other matters.

Ratib Zeynalov, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, participated in the work of the plenum. He also addressed the convocation.

Criminal Acts Continuing in Nagorno-Karabakh

NC2412102989 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 24 Dec 89

[Text] The next-to-the-last week of 1989 brings no less suffering to the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. The increased frequency of criminal acts keep people tense and do not allow them to proceed with the new year holiday concerns. Unidentified persons provoked intensive firing in Kirkidzhan on the night of 19-20 December. Unidentified persons stole 23 head of cattle from the dairy production firm of Sioletov collective farm in Askeranskiy Rayon on the night of 21-22 December. According to the preliminary information, these animals were driven in the direction of (?Aghuan) village of Agdamskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan republic. A criminal investigation has been launched.

Other cases of antisocial activity were also registered, including cases of hostage taking; later these hostages were exchanged. A mob of Azeri refugees in Shushi numbering around 2,000 to 3,000—who have come here from Armenia and Stepanakert—surged towards the Khazanchetsnots Armenian church which is under restoration. They set fire to the wooden structures around the foundation.

Despite all these, the economic and cultural ties between Armenia and Artsakh [NKAO] are being reinforced daily. The literature enthusiasts of Stepanakert recently met with Grant Matevosyan and Ruben Ovsepyan. As they say, life goes on and no one stops it.

Supply of Foodstuffs in Azerbaijan Improves

NC2212101089 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 20 Dec 89

[Text] The supply of foodstuffs is improving. It is common knowledge that the supply of provisions to the people of the republic, and particularly to the citizens of Baku, was very inadequate early in December. The required quantity of agricultural produce was not delivered to the production establishments affiliated with the republic's state agro-industrial committee because of the strikes in the railway network.

Immediate measures have been put into effect to rectify this situation. Normal work is being gradually restored in the establishments as a result of these measures. The production of a wide variety of foodstuffs is increasing. Particular attention is being paid to the supply of meat and meat products, sausages, canned fruits and vegetables, [words indistinct] milk, [word indistinct] products, and other foodstuffs which are in great demand. For example, the quantity of meat, sausages, and eggs made available is about 1.5 times more than the amount that was planned for the end of the current month.

The republic's state agro-industrial committee has told an AZERINFORM correspondent that (?plans have been made) to obtain meat and sausages from the meat processing establishments in order to meet popular demand fully prior to the forthcoming festive season.

Baku Media Criticize Armenian Journal Articles

NC2812113689 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 27 Dec 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] As earlier reported by AZERINFORM , several articles have been recently published in various central press organs, including the mass media organs in Armenia, on the demographic situation in our republic. Falsification, intentional distortion of [words indistinct], facts, and incidents, and fabrications, which cannot be equated with science, logic, and normal decorum, make up the common points of these articles. Even if we were to ignore this, articles of this kind constitute open interference in the internal affairs of our sovereign republic.

In Armenia, KOMMUNIST, the organ of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, figures prominently in maliciousness. On 14 December, KOMMUNIST published an article entitled "What the Statistics Say." You can read an AZERINFORM report in connection with this article in today's newspapers. The report is entitled: "Views or Fabrications?"

Turkish Refutations of Armenian Claims Noted

NC2112153689 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1900 GMT 18 Dec 89

[Text] The Armenian-language newspaper MARMARA, which is published in Istanbul, reports that the Turkish parliamentary budget committee has allocated 1 billion Turkish lira to the Turkish Ministry of Culture to combat Armenian claims and the resolution before the U.S. Congress declaring 24 April 1990 as the day to commemorate the Armenians killed in Ottoman Turkey between 1915 and 1923.

It has been reported that Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Sungur, in commenting on the resolution on the Armenian genocide endorsed by the U.S. Senate committee, told reporters that Turkey expects more effective and active effort from the U.S. Administration against this resolution before Congress votes on it after the present recess. Opposition party leader [name indistinct] has pointed out that, judging from the statements made by people in authority in the United States, there is a possibility that Congress will pass the resolution. He accused the government of doing nothing but talking and said the country needs leaders who will take action.

Dear compatriots, we repeat: 1 billion Turkish lira has been allocated for this struggle. With that 1 billion taken from the mouths of their poor, the Turkish authorities want to buy the U.S. Senate, turn facts upside down, make black into white, and deny the genocide of the Armenians committed in broad daylight before the eyes of the civilized world. Can their gambit succeed? Has this old weapon in the arsenal of the Turkish propaganda not become rusty? We should not rush to conclusions, but instead follow the course of developments.

Former Uzbek CP First Secretary Jailed for 12 Years

LD2712153689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1445 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 27 Dec (TASS)—The open trial of Inamzhon Usmankhodzhayev, former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, ended today in the USSR Supreme Court. He was sentenced to 12 years deprivation of liberty, with confiscation of property by the panel of judges. It says in the verdict that such a severe sentence has been imposed on Usmankhodzhayev for discrediting state and party bodies, and for doing great harm to the interests of the state and society.

The preliminary investigation bodies charged him with "using a position of responsibility for mercenary aims, and receiving bribes on more than one occasion to the total amount of R55,300."

Let us recall that from December 1978, Usmankhodzhayev occupied the post of chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet Presidium, and in November 1983 he was elected first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and worked in that post until he retired in January 1988. Ten months later he was arrested.

As is well known, on the very first day of his trial Usmankhodzhayev completely denied the charges against him, and retracted the evidence which he had given during the preliminary investigation. His motive is a well-known one—he had incriminated himself and others under the pressure of investigation. As a result of careful examination of the circumstances of Usmankhodzhayev's case, the Court Collegium found his statement untenable and deemed the evidence he had given during the preliminary investigation to be the truth. He was finally charged with receiving bribes worth R50,000.

The court also pronounced a separate decision, in which it placed before the USSR Prosecutor General, the issue of infringements of the law by bodies carrying out the preliminary investigation, in connection with the arrest and detention of Usmankhodzhayev's relatives.

The sentence has come into force.

Commission Reports on RSFSR Election Nominations

LD2712214589 Moscow TASS in English 1832 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow December 27 TASS—By TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov:

More than 3,500 candidates have been nominated in the Russian Federation, the largest of the 15 Soviet republics, to run in the general election scheduled for March 4. On the average more than three candidates for each seat were named in every one of 1,068 constituencies.

This was announced today at a regular session of the Russian Federation Central Election Commission.

The nomination concludes on January 2. Members of the Central Election Commission have visited a number of regions across the republic, including Tomsk and Kirov regions and the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia.

They told the commission session today about the progress of the election campaign in these regions and the difficulties the nomination had encountered. Although the situation gives rise to no anxiety on the whole it was noted with concern that very few candidates were nominated by citizens in residential neighbourhoods. Their share amounts to a mere 2 per cent in the republic. Women candidates account for only 6 per cent of the total.

The general election is scheduled for March 4 in the Russian Federation. It will elect 1,068 deputies to Russia's Congress of People's Deputies. The congress will form the republic's standing two-chamber Supreme Soviet (parliament).

Moscow Party Bureau Discusses Cooperative Debt

LD2712234289 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Dec 89

[Text] At the latest session of the Bureau of the Moscow City Party Committee [MGK KPSS] progress on the elaboration of the draft general plan for the Moscow region for the period up to 2010 was considered. The general plan is directed toward the further socioeconomic development of the capital region as a single political and cultural center and a very major national economic complex in the country.

At the sitting the issue of urgent measures to strengthen the party's influence and reinforce socialist legality in cooperative activities was discussed. It was noted that the cooperative movement is developing in Moscow spontaneously. There are now 15,000 cooperatives in the city. The proportion among these cooperatives producing consumer goods and offering consumer services has gone down. At the same time cooperatives oriented toward serving enterprises and organizations are developing at an accelerated pace. During the last 3 months of the current year alone, the volume of such work according to contracts with state establishments has increased almost three-fold.

The violation of financial discipline, accounting procedures, and sanitary regulations have become widespread in the cooperative sector of the city's economy. The number of crimes uncovered in the cooperative sphere has more than doubled. Civil legal norms are being applied loosely. In every fifth cooperative checked there were excessive prices on products and services. Many cooperatives are not fulfilling their contractual duties. Overdue cooperator debts on on credits are growing—they comprise more than R3.5 million. Last year the figure was R342,000.

The MGK KPSS Buro recommended to the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet that it together with the City Union of Cooperators elaborate during the first quarter of next year an all-embracing program to stimulate the priority types of cooperative activity, having strengthened them with organizational, legal, and economic measures.

Gorbachev Pays Last Respects to Mazurov

LD2312194189 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1420 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] Moscow, 23 Dec (TASS)—Moscow today bade farewell to Kirill Mazurov, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, and a personal pensioner of union designation, who embarked on his final journey today. Mikhail Gorbachev and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state, USSR People's Deputies, leaders of a number of ministries and departments, representatives of party, local soviet and public organizations and military leaders, were in the honor guard.

There was a funeral meeting at the Novodevichi cemetery, where Mazurov was buried.

Leaders Attend Funeral

LD2312214189

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 23 December in the "Vremya" newscast carries a report on the funeral of Kirill Mazurov.

The report lists the following as present at the funeral: M.S. Gorbachev; V.I. Vorotnikov; L.N. Zaykov; V.A. Ivashko; Ye.K. Ligachev; Yu.D. Maslyukov; N.I. Ryzhkov; N.N. Slyunkov; A.P. Biryukova; A.V. Vlasov; A.I. Lukyanov; Ye.M. Primakov; B.K. Pugo; O.D. Baklanov; A.N. Girenko; V.A. Manayenkov; Ye.S. Stroyev; G.I. Usmanov; I.T. Frolov; and R.N. Nishanov.

No further processing planned.

Youth Paper Publishes Sakharov Interview

90US0311A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Dec 89 p 2

[Excerpts from a question-and-answer session at a students' forum by S. Sokolov and D. Kukunov: "One Man's Truth"]

[Text] Late last fall the All-Union Students' Forum was conducted in Moscow. As it usually happens, students talked a lot, fumed over issues, set up factions, fought over problems, and approved resolutions. I am sure, though, that most of the people remembered the forum not because of the resolutions but because of the unprecedented meetings with the country's top leaders. Members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Ligachev, Medvedev, and Shevardnadze, Ministers Yazov and Yagodin, a secretary of the VTsSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council] Mishin, and, of course, secretaries of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee,—all of them withstood for several hours the storm of students' contrasting questions. The newspapers published the minutes, detailed reports, and short pieces of information from those meetings. But there was one encounter that was not included in the list of official events and, therefore, was not covered in the press. It was a meeting with Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov.

Do you remember the lines that everybody had to memorize in school: "To the young man who is contemplating his future life and trying to decide who to model it after...?" To these I will not add: "Without thinking, model it after A.D. Sakharov." Do think. On that evening a 68-year old man was talking in the hall of Moscow University. This man had known recognition, persecution, and world-wide fame and he was disclosing to us his concepts of life; he talked about his principles, his views and guidelines which made it possible for him to comprehend and evaluate everyone and everything around him. Mainly he spoke about the present and the future, about moral and judicial laws of a society; he spoke about his constitution the way he, Sakharov, saw it. And it seemed that together with all of this he was reading to us the provisions of his inner constitution which, by the way, should govern each of us, but... And we were asking our disconnected questions in an attempt to fill this gap. The answers to these questions could make up a one-man constitution of a kind which will have the preamble and articles on power, war, peace, and human rights.

[Sakharov] First, I want to talk about the state of things in the country in general—the way I see it. In my opinion, the present moment is one of the crucial ones in our history. It is of utmost importance for the Congress to pass or, at least, to discuss several basic laws. We are not sure that the Congress will do that. First, it is necessary to pass the Law on Land and the Law on Property; the Law on Socialist Enterprise should be next. It is a must to discuss Article 6 of the Constitution so that we have a political guarantee of the irreversible character of perestroyka. The point is that, for instance, a land reform is impossible if the people do not believe in the irreversibility of the changes. Seventy percent of peasants and workers said that they fear another round of de-kulakization. New forms of agricultural economy cannot develop under those conditions and that is the reason why it is so important to support the perestroyka politically. Unfortunately, the policy of the leadership aims at prolonging the work on these laws which means that we have to fight for them. If the year 1990 does not see any economic changes, the country will develop total disbelief in perestroyka and we will find ourselves in a very difficult position. We do not know what results might follow. Maybe we will have to declare a state of emergency. Maybe that is the goal of the leaders' policy. We do not know or understand it so far but, in any case, we have to fight and for this we need the support of all levels of the population. The students can do their share by taking part in the election campaign. Incidentally, the students will find their own ways of helping.

[Question] What are the roots of Stalinism? How do you envision the mechanism which will ensure that there is no return to the situation when a group of people at power enables one of them to become the dictator?

[Sakharov] I think that Stalinism is rooted in the fundamental errors in the program for the development of our society. These reasons are very deep and they have no bearing on the peculiarities of Stalin's personality. For that reason we need a prevention mechanism. But you cannot legislate it. It can appear only as a result of radical economic and political changes in the country.

[Question] Andrey Dmitriyevich, they say that a large and well-organized group of first secretaries of party obkoms [oblast committees] came out at the April plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with sharp criticism of Gorbachev's policies. Could that mean that in April of 1989 our country was on the verge of another coup d'etat?

[Sakharov] The April plenum was really quite critical. But to me, Gorbachev seemed to have controlled the situation then. I think the situation was far more critical in October when the Supreme Soviet came very close to declaring a state of emergency in the country. I do not quite understand what really happened. It is clear that the advocates of tough measures were stopped only by the speech that Mikhail Sergeyevich made at the end of the session. It sort of reversed the whole thing. Whether it was a performance acted out to scare everyone or we were really standing on a very dangerous threshold, I do not know.

[Question] Is it possible that the present strikes will result in the introduction of the state of emergency or martial law all over the country?

[Sakharov] The danger of having the state of emergency is there but the conservatives in the bureaucracy should understand that for them it is a suicidal idea. They cannot defend themselves by such methods. The state of emergency would surge above the heads of the conservatives and create structures that, becoming even more conservative, will then destroy them. It seems to me that our bureaucracy is not willing to commit suicide. Therefore, I think that pressure from the radicals, even in the form of strikes, may be dangerous but not to an extent where it cannot be justified in a number of cases.

[Question] Is a peaceful transition to new relations possible at all in our country?

[Sakharov] It seems to me that we have not yet lost the opportunity for a peaceful transition to a new structure of relations. That might be explained by the fear that the conservative part of the bureaucracy holds about the situation becoming even more critical. At the same time the central part of the bureaucracy is interested in turning in the radical direction; but it needs one thing—acceleration.

[Question] Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Novocherkassk and Tbilisi—are there any guaranties that such events cannot be repeated somewhere again?
[Sakharov] The actions you mentioned were not initiated by generals. They were a part of the country's general policy. Any army, of course, has crazy generals. But still, I think that our country has not yet lost that much of its political stability as to undertake such insane measures.

[Question] What do you think about the legislation that would aim to defend the country from a rash decision made by one individual to declare a state of emergency, or military law, or anything of that nature?

[Sakharov] Such legislation is a must. The main thing is for all the deputies to understand how much depends on such a law and thus to approve it in an up-to-date phrasing.

[Question] Could you characterize the position of the working class at present?

[Sakharov] "Working class" is not a very precise concept. Considering the poor state of our sociology I can only speak about my personal impressions. I think that workers are developing a serious mistrust in the authorities and to me it seems justified. But I would like to hope that it will always be constructive, i.e. drive the leadership to more radical actions in the social, political, and economic areas.

[Question] What is the distribution of forces in the present Supreme Soviet? What are the percentages of radicals and conservatives?

[Sakharov] I think that the person who asked that question can look at the electronic display that they show on TV and can draw his own conclusions not any worse than I. Radicals are in the minority but they speak a lot and do it in a very well-informed way; and that to me seems very important. Besides, they participate in the work of commissions who draw projects considerably more radical sometimes than the ones that the Supreme

Soviet is prepared to approve. Even though I am not a politician to the extent that would allow me to cope with similar questions, I think that the voters can pressure the present Supreme Soviet into becoming more radical.

[Question] What do you think about the "look for the enemy" syndrome that is still lingering in our society? They already found the next enemy—the cooperative owners.

[Sakharov] The hatred felt by all the people for the cooperative owners is a negative phenomenon of the same nature as the very fact of discussing anti-cooperative laws by the Supreme Soviet. All this undermines the trust in the irreversibility of the entire perestroyka. You can find crooks everywhere, there are enough of them in the state trade system too.

[Question] Andrey Dmitriyevich, what should we, students, do?

[Sakharov] As I learned your forum started with a moment of silence in the memory of those who perished defending democracy in China. It was a very important action. I met with two Chinese students who were among the leaders of the movement. He is 21 and she is 19—that is how young their leaders are. They told me that they had had only two demands for their government: to allow an independent students' organization to register and to give them free access to the press. That was all. They had expressed no other political demands. And these were the demands that were denied. The worst of repressions were employed only because the students and the workers who supported them did not give up. The students told me that people were crushed by tanks in the square and nearby streets. There was no body count at all. I consider it necessary for you to show your solidarity with the Chinese students. You also need to be in solidarity with the processes that occur in the countries of Eastern Europe: GDR, Hungary, and Poland. The editors of the progressive newspapers and magazines that happened to fall out of favor need your support just as badly. The reaction can by stopped only in this way: by well-organized political measures and not by illegal actions to which I am not calling you, by any means.

[Question] What is your opinion on Article 6 of the Constitution?

[Sakharov] To me, Article 6 is of primary importance. According to it, the CPSU, which is a public organization, is put in a privileged position in the country. At the same time, in my opinion, the CPSU is, in fact, the leading political force of the USSR. But it should not be the only force. To single out the CPSU through the Constitution to me seems an undemocratic concept which in essence is directed against the real prestige of the CPSU and cannot be tolerated.

On the Baltics

The processes that occur in the Baltic republics are of a very progressive character. As I see them they do not contradict the concepts of national and constitutional restructuring in the USSR which I defend. Even more so, my position was in a certain degree engendered by the events that have been taking place in the Baltic republics.

They may be overdoing some things, but that can be easily corrected.

On Karabakh

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has been unusually tragic for a long, long time. We even have problems receiving any information from there. But whatever we do learn is terrible. In my opinion, this situation is almost unsolvable. It became possible because the central leadership at first was hesitant to act and made a number of mistakes. For me the idea of self-determination of nations is the domineering one.

It is very important at present for both nations to restrain from violence. We are talking about the tragedy of two peoples and we cannot separate them now along those lines.

Nagorno-Karabakh is only part of a big problem. What we need, I think, is simply a constitutional restructuring based on the principle that all national and territorial formations are equal; they should be independent and have a possibility to join the Union later, according to a mutual agreement. To me this seems to be the only solution for the tangle of nationalistic contradictions in our country which are rather crucial not only in Transcaucasia but in other regions as well. And the number of those regions keeps growing.

On Russia

The Russian language should undoubtedly be the state language in the Russian republic. Russian should be the language of communication among the republics and it should be used in the offices that are subordinate to the state: post-offices, savings-banks, etc. But I cannot agree with some of the republics that select Russian as the language of communication between nationalities. This can be defined not by the Constitution but by life itself—every village will do it its own way.

[Question] According to the information published in the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY newspaper there are only a few dozen political prisoners in the USSR? Don't you find this number ridiculous?

[Sakharov] I think that strictly speaking we do not have many political prisoners. If we mean those who were sentenced according to Articles 70 and 190, then these figures can be close to real.

Besides, there are people in psychiatric hospitals that in reality are political prisoners. There are also people who were jailed for an illegal crossing of the state border and for draft evasion for religious reasons. These would make up two or three hundred.

But we do not have any exact figures and there is no way of obtaining them yet.

[Question] In the early 1980's, we displayed our support for the American program of deploying MX missiles which became the basis of the policy of nuclear deterrence from a position of strength. Why did this happen?

[Sakharov] In 1983 I published an article under the title "Danger of a Nuclear War." In it I wrote, in particular, that nuclear weapons can be considered as a means of a nuclear threat of the enemy. I wrote there about the right of the United States to build MX-type missiles as a response to the superior potential of strategic vertical launch missiles of the first strike created in the USSR. I also wrote about the futile character of the "Star Wars" (SDI) program.

I consider my position correct and it also reflected the situation of that period in time. As it became known, now the start of work on the MX missiles in the United States has served as a stimulus for the USSR to begin negotiations. We have come very close now to the agreement of a 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons. If the Americans had no MX missiles, this would have not happened either. It is a serious omission, in my opinion, that the Soviet Union did not support constitutionally its decision not to be the first country to use nuclear weapons. So far this was only present in some of the statements of our political leaders which is not sufficient. It is, of course, important for the United States and other nuclear powers to make the same decision.

Gorbachev for me is somewhat mysterious. To me it looks like the country, in general, is moving to the left even when he is moving to the right.

[Question] Why do you think they procrastinate with respect to the approval of Laws on Land and Property? Our country may fall apart without a solution for these economic problems.

[Sakharov] Here is an explanation most favorable for Gorbachev: He is a man of caution. He spoke against great and big leaps as we know in what they result. Possibly, his policy is caused by that very evaluation of the state of things. But certainly there can be explanations that are less favorable for him: For instance, he may be guided by tactical and secondary considerations in his struggle for power. And that is unforgivable. So far I have not been able to make my choice between these two alternative explanations.

[Question] How do you explain your support for Gorbachev at the first Congress? Is it due to tactical considerations or are you really convinced that there is no alternative for Gorbachev?

[Sakharov] I was not guided by tactical considerations, but by my convictions. I considered Gorbachev the initiator of the perestroyka. The problem of an alternative is more complex. I simply do not see any other choice at present and I doubt that it will appear in the near future.

Communist Party Seen Lacking 'Moral Authority'

90UN0474A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 9 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by Tulenbergen Kaipbergenov: "Right to Authority"]

[Text] The party is saying openly today and with full voice that it is renouncing administrative-command methods of leadership. Not only saying but doing it—transferring real power to the soviets, the workforce and the public organizations in full. However, the party is at the same time emphasizing just as openly that it was, is and will remain the governing party.

How can this be combined? What could substitute for the power of command?

In my view, only the height and strength of moral authority. I emphasize, only this. I see no alternative.

There will most likely be many opponents who will raise the objection: There is, after all, still ideological and theoretical authority... There has to be, of course, more precisely, it has to be acquired. For if we look truth in the eye, the party is today obviously lacking this authority. In just over 70 years our ideologists have enriched Marxism-Leninism with essentially nothing. Nor can we truly consider an essential contribution to the development of Marxism postulates like "single Soviet people" or "developed socialism." The works of the classics—Marx, Engels, Lenin—have not fundamentally lost their significance to this day. But let us remember that these are works which are 70 and 150 years old and which studied and evaluated and forecast the realities of an entirely different historical era. The contemporary historical moment insistently demands new studies of the concept of socialism with regard for the evolved objective conditions, and this work is complex, lengthy and in no way opportunist.

So in our time the governing Communist Party cannot get by without moral authority, proving daily, hourly and by each action of each member of the party that it is the CPSU which is the decisive force in the country which is constantly concerned for what is most important—society's blessing. Indispensable ingredients of such authority, at such a difficult time even more, are selflessness and self-limitation.

We are not the first institution in history laying claim to the ideological and spiritual leadership of society. There have been other parties, orders, alliances and churches also. Yes, churches also—there is no need to fear such comparisons. Mother Theresa has done no less, more even, in my opinion, for the moral authority of Christianity than bishops and popes. In our village the indigent sufis raised by their selfless and disinterested service of all those living in poverty the authority of Mohammedanism in the difficult starvation years incomparably higher than the village mullah—rich and sated.

I wish to be understood correctly. I am not about to change my beliefs and am by no means calling for anyone to be copied or anyone to be imitated. Yes, we communists have aims and tasks which are different from those of religion. Religion promises people paradise in heaven and after death. We, on the other hand, aspire to the organization of a just and prosperous society on earth and in life. Religion maintains that "everyone dies alone" and will alone answer to God. We, on the other hand, are collectivists and maintain that only in unison can people improve the world, in which they are called upon to live as in a common home. Our ideas and our moral rules do not require vows, fasting, reclusivity, pilgrimages to holy places and such but all moral codes are inconceivable without selflessness and purity of thought and deed. All world spiritual experience has at all times been based on this.

Any claims on others need to begin with oneself. I, for example, am convinced that the communist is obliged to bear greater responsibility than the nonparty person for official crimes—arbitrariness, exceeding authority, bribe-taking, embezzlement.

I may be asked: What about equality before the law, all are equal in the law-based society, after all?

I would answer: We still do not have this equality as yet, and the policy of leading state personnel is today determined by the party, it thereby appearing to society as a guarantor of the fact that its members in the commanding positions are people who are competent and honest, and these guarantees should be not only verbal but also legal. For this reason I am convinced that it is the party which should display the initiative before the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Court concerning legislative recognition of party membership as an aggravating circumstance in crimes of office. The governing party would thereby prove that it was ready to bear before society legal responsibility for the imperfection of its personnel policy.

I also believe that the salary of executives of all levels should truly depend on the average per capita income of the rayon, oblast and republic, production sector and so forth. Given that the kolkhoz [collective farm] peasant obtains on average R58 per month, I consider amoral the incommensurable wages of executives, who make on behalf of these peasants society's economic and social policy, which abounds, as is now clear, in a multitude of sicknesses and defects.

I am told: It is difficult computing the average oblast or sector wage.

And I stand amazed: How is it that we compute the average wage for the country and publish it annually in statistical references, but cannot compute it for a rayon or for a ministry for some reason or other? And this given the huge establishment of all rayon statistical offices, rayon finance offices and ministerial labor and wages departments! Very well, even if it is difficult, it is precisely this dependence on the well-being of their subordinates which would force communist executives to real accounting.

And, further, I am sure that such limitations would force many of those who today carry a party card, making not a thing incumbent upon themselves here, to set to thinking about whether it was worth it to them to remain in the party given such "unprofitable" conditions. But if such people leave the party (and they should be allowed to leave voluntarily and calmly—without being berated and ostracized), the CPSU's moral authority would only benefit from this. And moral authority, I repeat, is, in my opinion, the sole foundation on which the governing party's leading role may be based.

And, finally, a few words about the party's organizational structure. Rather, about what is said and what is in fact done. Have you often encountered a person answering a question concerning his party membership as follows: "I am a member of the Uzbek Communist Party." Or the Moldavian, Georgian, Latvian, Kazakh... But what do we write on the questionnaires? In all parts of the country, in all union republics, one and the same thing—member of the CPSU. And, period. What, then, you will excuse me, is the point of the existence of seemingly separate republic communist parties? What are they? We have 14 separate communist parties, but neither the Uzbek Communist Party, the Latvian Communist Party nor any other has its own statutes. Odd, is it not? Numismatic and matchbox label collector societies very likely have their own statutes, but not the republic communist parties. And it is right that they do not for the statutes of national communist parties would simply duplicate one another. But the communists of different republics cannot live by different party laws! There are single, common CPSU Statutes, by which we all live.

In addition and most important of all—we have one program also. The CPSU Program.

I understand that the names of the republic communist parties were in some sense necessary. The point being, after all, that the party has not so much repeated as substituted for both economic and state leadership. But it is one thing when the governing body is called the Central Committee, but quite another, when something different...

But I began by saying that the party was transferring power to the people in the shape of the soviets. And is it not time for us communists to bring our organizational structures into line with reality? Should we not be giving some solid thought to what the party should be like in the future? Why do we divide it along national lines if it is essentially and in terms of its tasks international? Let the republics be independent, but the party should be united, we have one party—the CPSU. And one Central Committee. This is by no means a formal point, here is a condition of the community of our party and, consequently, of the unity of the peoples also. Precisely now, in a period of a certain vacillation and disorder, I consider this point of the utmost importance. As far as the union republic communist parties are concerned, I propose a return to the structure of the 1920's, modifying it somewhat, of course. That is, one party, and locally, committees of the Central Committee. The Russian Committee of the Central Committee, the Uzbek Committee of the Central Committee, the Kazakh Committee of the Central Committee, the Moldavian Committee of the Central Committee....

I am prepared for arguments and disputes with those who find my thoughts "jarring." I understand the power of the myths which have possessed our minds for several decades. At the same time, however, account has to be taken of the power of reality, and we cannot close our eyes to the fact that it is coming into visible and, at times, absurd contradiction with the myths.

The hour has come when the party cannot, must not sit with arms folded, submissively waiting to see "what tomorrow brings". The movement and qualitative renewal of both the essence of party work and its organizational structures aimed at a cohesion of the ranks are essential. We communists are all responsible for the party and for how and with whom we act henceforward.

Public Responds to Leningrad Platform

WA2712200389 Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Dec 89 p 1

[Readers' letters comment on Leningrad mass party meeting: "Not Speaking, Acting"]

[Text] "Thanks to Leningrad's communists for the meeting. We are unanimous. High School No 3 of Rovno, Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]."

"I wholeheartedly support Leningraders' resolution. Perfilyeva, Moscow."

Such telegrams have been no rarity in the editorial mailbag in recent days. Thanks to television and the press, the joint obkom and gorkom [oblast and city party committee] plenum, the platform of the Leningrad party organization adopted at the plenum, and the thousands-strong meeting at the V.I. Lenin Sports-Concert Complex have attracted the close attention of the whole country. But, of course, the largest number of comments on these events is being received by the newspaper from people from our own region. Let us say right away: They are equivocal. However, one also catches something that is common in this kaleidoscope of opinions. In putting forward party-wide demands, the majority of readers emphasize, Leningrad's communists must themselves decisively increase their contribution to perestroyka and bring order to bear in their own region.

But let us let the writers of the letters and appeals speak for themselves.

"While fairly demanding precision of positions and the speediest restructuring of the top party leadership," P. Smirnov, a member of the CPSU since 1954, writes, "we are in no hurry to reorganize ourselves. There is a lack of initiative and inquisitiveness, and we are giving insufficient thought to the question of what we ourselves can do, at our places of work, to get perestroyka in Leningrad moving. Forgive the trite words, but we need to mobilize the gray matter of each of us and look for unutilized potential and possibilities...."

And here is the opinion of Aleksandra Andreyevna Smirnova, a participant in the Great Patriotic War:

"...I did not like the fact that many of those who spoke at the meeting were mainly accusing only the government, including M.S. Gorbachev (without naming him specifically). But thanks to whom, if not Gorbachev, was such a meeting at all possible? He should not be accused but helped since he cannot rid himself of ungifted people, who are clinging tightly to their cosy positions, by himself. And we need to take a more critical look at ourselves also...."

"I fully support the idea of the personal rendering of account of members of the Politburo at a special Central Committee plenum," CPSU member I.V. Veresnyanov writes. "I also believe that this plenum should evaluate personalities of the former party leadership who led the country into crisis such as Grishin, Romanov, Solomentsev, Kirilenko, and others. We need to act, and not talk about perestroyka."

A different matter disturbs Leningrad citizen N.P. Vasilenko:

"The appeal of the joint obkom and gorkom plenum published in your paper is an antiperestroyka document. The question of property is a question of whether we live as civilized people or continue destitute in a state of the absurd.... But the plenum, controlled by the apparatus, lacked the boldness to acknowledge that the forms of ownership which operate currently only continue to engender poverty...."

And in conclusion one further telegram, from Ulyanovsk this time:

"The communists and the whole workforce of the Ulyanovsk Beer and Nonalcoholic Beverages Works wholly and fully support the resolution of the meeting of Leningrad's communists. We express to you feelings of our solidarity and party support in the name of a renewal of socialism and wish all Leningraders success. Hold firmly the red Leninist banner. Through and for the workforce, Ya. Rybak, secretary of the party organization, M. Panova, chairman of the workforce council."